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This dissertation is comprised of four self-contained chapters that contribute to di⁄erent
research areas in the ￿eld of behavioral economics. Still, each chapter addresses the
topic of incentives and social preferences.
Both monetary and non-monetary incentives are frequently used in order to moti-
vate individuals to behave in a certain way. If individuals are not completely sel￿sh
but have some sort of social preferences, as it is often observed in empirical studies,
then the e⁄ects of these incentives may be considerably di⁄erent than predicted by
standard theory. In the ￿rst chapter we empirically study monetary incentives that
are intended to deter individuals from taking or stealing. We set up an experiment
in which individuals have the possibility to take from another individual￿ s endowment
and are punished for taking with a given detection probability and a given ￿ne. By
varying deterrent incentives, i.e. the detection probability and the ￿ne, in the experi-
ment we empirically test Becker￿ s (1968) deterrence hypothesis that crime is reduced
by deterrent incentives. In an extension we check whether the observed incentive ef-
fects depend on the incentives￿labeling. In the second chapter we address the question
how free-riding in teams can be reduced. In contrast to the ￿rst chapter, we do not
focus on the e⁄ect of monetary incentives, i.e. the team members￿remuneration, but
on the e⁄ect of information ￿ ows in teams. If a team member receives information
or signals about a colleague￿ s performance prior to his decision, the team member￿ s
and his colleague￿ s incentives to free-ride may change. In an experimental study we
analyze the e⁄ect of signals and how it depends on the signals￿types. In the third
chapter we experimentally study whether intentions can spoil the kindness of a gift. If
so, then the success of a campaign that intends to stimulate individuals to behave inPreface 2
a certain way by distributing gifts or behaving in a way that seems altruistic crucially
depends on whether the individuals recognize the intention behind the campaign. In
our experimental study a ￿rst mover can do a second mover a favor and the second
mover can reciprocate with a given probability. The higher the probability that the
second mover can reciprocate, the higher is the probability that the ￿rst mover can
expect a return. We vary the probability that the second mover can reciprocate and
analyze whether the second mover returns more the smaller this probability. In the
fourth chapter we focus on behavior in hierarchically structured organizations in which
the exchange of resources is determined by power relations. We set up an experiment
and empirically analyze whether more powerful individuals in these organizations use
their power in order to seize resources of less powerful individuals, and whether they
￿nally end up wealthier than their less powerful fellows. If the latter does not hold
and less power is a blessing, promotion to upper hierarchies is no suitable instrument
to incentivize less powerful individuals.
In all four chapters we use laboratory experiments in order to empirically address
our research questions. In the last decades laboratory experiments have been estab-
lished as a common tool in empirical economic analysis. A crucial role in this progress
has been played by Vernon L. Smith ￿one of the ￿rst experimenters in economics ￿
who was awarded the Nobel Prize in economics in 2002. Experimental studies com-
plement ￿eld studies. On the one hand, laboratory experiments allow more control,
on the other hand, the environment in the laboratory is less natural than in the ￿eld.
Given the research questions we address in all four chapters of this dissertation, there
are either no ￿eld data available or ￿eld data that typically lack of control. Hence,
laboratory experiments are an appropriate way to shed more light on these questions.
All four chapters contribute to the literature on social preferences. Field as well
as experimental data have provided ample evidence that human behavior often sys-
tematically deviates from the predictions of standard theory but is consistent with the
predictions of models of social preferences (for an overview see Camerer, 2003; Fehr
and Schmidt, 2006). This empirical evidence suggests that (i) not all individuals are
completely sel￿sh as typically assumed in standard theory but at least some individuals
have social preferences and care about fairness or reciprocity, and (ii) social preferencesPreface 3
may have real behavioral e⁄ects. Of course, this is not always the case and there are
a lot of situations in which the self-interest model explains behavior well, e.g. in large
competitive markets. In the settings that are analyzed in the four chapters of this
dissertation (some) individuals can in￿ uence the payo⁄s of those they interact with.
Typically, social preferences play a crucial role in such settings.
In the ￿rst chapter ￿a joint study with Hannah Schildberg-H￿risch ￿we focus
on the question how to combat crime. Di⁄erent professions have discussed this topic
and have come up with various answers. The standard economic contribution, which
was ￿rst formalized by Becker (1968), states that punishment, i.e. the probability of
detection and the amount of the ￿ne, reduces crime. In the last decades, however,
empirical evidence that shows that monetary incentives can be detrimental in certain
contexts (for an overview see Frey and Jegen, 2001) has accumulated. On the one
hand, monetary incentives a⁄ect material (extrinsic) motivation to undertake or not
undertake an action, on the other hand, they may crowd out intrinsic motivation.
Empirical studies on the deterrence hypothesis typically rely on aggregate ￿eld data and
￿nd mixed evidence that is largely in line with Becker￿ s (1968) deterrence hypothesis.
Yet, the detection probability and the severity of punishment explain only a small part
of criminal activity (for an overview see Eide, 2000; Glaeser, 1999). Serious drawbacks
of these studies are the methodological problems they have to tackle, e.g. simultaneity
bias, omitted variable problems and measurement errors. We go down a di⁄erent road
and gather individual data from an experiment in which we exogenously vary incentives
and are able to directly test Becker￿ s (1968) deterrence hypothesis. We ask a very basic
but important question: Do deterrent incentives work?
In order to answer this question, we set up one of the simplest experimental designs
in which person B has the possibility to take or steal from person A￿ s endowment.
B￿ s theft is detected with a given probability and ￿if detected ￿B has to return
the stolen amount to A and is punished with a given ￿ne. We exogenously vary the
detection probability and the ￿ne across treatments from no deterrent incentives up to
very strong deterrent incentives such that stealing does not pay o⁄ in expectation. As
punishment possibilities are usually restricted in real life, we devote special attention
to treatments with small and intermediate incentives. The experiment is neutrallyPreface 4
framed and does not include terms such as "steal", "theft", or "￿ne".
In contrast to Becker￿ s (1968) hypothesis, we ￿nd an inverted-U shape relationship
between the average taken amount and deterrent incentives: Intermediate incentives
strictly increase B￿ s average taken amount compared to the setting with no incentives,
and only very strong incentives deter taking. Hence, intermediate incentives back￿re.
This observation contradicts predictions of standard theory as well as of the most
frequently used models of social preferences. Our data can be explained by a model
in which about 50 % of individuals are sel￿sh and act according to the deterrence
hypothesis and the rest has fairness concerns which are crowded out by monetary
incentives. In an extension we check whether our observed incentive e⁄ects change
when incentives have a strong moral connotation. We run additional experiments in
which we use the terms "steal" and "￿ne", and still ￿nd evidence for back￿ring of
incentives.
Our results suggest that monetary incentives may be detrimental. Taking our ob-
servations literally would imply to punish criminal activities either very hard or not at
all to e¢ ciently deter crime and avoid back￿ring of incentives. We are, however, well
aware that the laboratory is a less natural environment than the ￿eld and abstracts
from social norms and stigmata that could be the driving forces behind punishment in
reducing criminal behavior in real life. Nevertheless, our data reject Becker￿ s (1968)
deterrence hypothesis that punishment deters crime independent of all other factors.
Thus, monetary incentives should be used with great care and without neglecting other
(social) factors that may be at work.
In the second chapter ￿a joint study with Sandra Ludwig ￿we focus on the question
how to reduce free-riding in teams. As agents in a team are rewarded according to the
team output but the costs of contributing to the team output accrue to the individual
member only, agents work ine¢ ciently little. One way to stimulate agents to work
more is the implementation of information ￿ ows. If an agent receives a signal on the
colleague￿ s performance prior to his decision, the agent￿ s as well as the colleague￿ s
incentives to free-ride are a⁄ected. According to standard theory the overall e⁄ect
depends on the team production function. If agents￿contributions are, for example,Preface 5
substitutes (i.e. the more one agent contributes, the lower are the incentives for the
other agent to work), the ￿rst moving agent is predicted to work very little in order to
induce the second moving agent to work hard. However, if agents are concerned about
fairness and reciprocity, the implementation of information ￿ ows may have a positive
e⁄ect for all agents, even if agents￿contributions are substitutes. In our study we raise
the question how the structure of information ￿ ows a⁄ects team behavior and which
types of signals are especially e⁄ective.
In order to empirically study the e⁄ect of signals in teams, we set up an experiment
in which two agents sequentially exert e⁄ort to contribute to the team output. The
second mover either observes no signal, the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort, the ￿rst mover￿ s con-
tribution, or both prior to his decision. At the end of the experiment both agents earn
the same wage, which positively depends on the team output, minus their individual
e⁄ort costs. The wage scheme is exogenously ￿xed, e.g. by a market or a principal that
we do not model in our experiment, such that agents￿contributions are substitutes.
We observe that signals in teams raise both the average e⁄ort of the ￿rst mover
and the second mover. In general, the second mover reacts positively to signals. For
example, if the second mover observes the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort, he works more the more
the ￿rst mover worked. Furthermore, the ￿rst mover does not lean back if signals on his
performance will be available for the second mover prior to the second mover￿ s decision.
Especially the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort seems to be a stimulating signal. In an extension
we check whether our results also hold for the case where agents￿contributions are
complements. Our ￿ndings in these treatments are similar. Overall, our results are in
contradiction to the predictions of standard theory but largely in line with those of a
simple model of social preferences. The latter assumes that individuals avoid payo⁄
inequalities generated by di⁄erent e⁄ort levels.
We conclude that on average information ￿ ows reduce free-riding, irrespective of
whether agents￿contributions are substitutes or complements. Especially the provision
of information on the team mate￿ s e⁄ort seems to be an e⁄ective way to achieve more
e¢ cient outcomes. Our results suggest that social comparison plays a crucial role
in team work and shapes behavior: The reaction to signals may be contrary to thePreface 6
predictions of the self-interest model and signals that are considered to have no e⁄ect
may, in fact, be in￿ uential.
In the third chapter we study whether intentions can spoil the kindness of a gift.
Campaigns or business strategies often rely on distributing small gifts or behaving in
a way that seems altruistic when they try to gain the future support or cooperation
of individuals. We ask, however, whether the kindness of these gifts and their actual
future returns are spoiled by the expectation of future rewards.
We address this question in an experiment in which individual A can transfer an
amount of money to individual B. B receives the tripled amount transferred and, with
a given probability, he can return a part of it to A. We vary the probability that B
can return money and, thereby, that A can expect a return. Models of intention-based
reciprocity predict that A￿ s expected rewards spoil the kindness of A￿ s transfer and
that, therefore, B returns less for a given transfer the higher the probability that he
can return money.
In contrast to standard theory, we observe that gifts generate future cooperation.
On average, B returns more (given he is asked to decide) the higher A￿ s transfer. In-
tentions, however, do not seem to spoil the kindness of the gifts and their returns. B￿ s
average return for a given transfer of A does not vary in the probability that B can re-
turn money. This empirical evidence contradicts models of intention-based reciprocity
but is in line with models of social preferences based on outcomes. Our results suggest
that gifts are rewarded (if possible), irrespective of the donor￿ s intentions.
In the fourth chapter ￿a joint study with Matthias Sutter ￿we address the question
whether more powerful agents in organizations where power governs the exchange of
assets (e.g. in vertical hierarchies) ￿nally end up less wealthy than their less powerful
fellows. Piccione and Rubinstein (2004) have shown that this may actually happen if
agents are sel￿sh and more powerful agents are initially wealthier. In this case some
agents seize the wealth of other ￿less powerful and initially less wealthy ￿agents and
relatively powerful agents become an attractive target due to their initial wealth and
their power which enables them to attack others and accumulate more wealth. In the
presence of the abundant literature on the importance of social preferences like fairnessPreface 7
and reciprocity (for an overview see Camerer, 2003; Fehr and Schmidt, 2006), we raise
the questions whether individuals seize others￿assets and, thereby, create extremely
unequal distributions of ￿nal wealth, and whether less power may, indeed, be a blessing.
In order to empirically address these questions, we set up a simple experiment in
which three agents are ordered by power. Each agent can ￿but needs not ￿attack at
most one less powerful agent at given transaction costs. If several agents attack the
same victim, then only the most powerful attacker prevails and receives the victim￿ s
initial as well as accumulated assets, while the other attackers do not receive anything
and still have to bear transaction costs.
We observe that individuals try to seize others￿assets more ￿instead of less ￿often
than sel￿sh individuals are expected to do. This behavior creates an extremely unequal
distribution of ￿nal wealth. Furthermore, the second most powerful agent ends up less
wealthy than the least powerful agent almost always when it is predicted by Piccione
and Rubinstein (2004) and even sometimes when it is not. Our results are in line with
the predictions of standard theory but, at ￿rst sight, they seem to be at odds with
those of models of social preferences. Yet, we show that some of our results that seem
to be unsocial can be reconciled with a frequently used model of social preferences.
Our results suggest that individuals do not shy away from using their power in
hierarchies and seize others￿assets. As a consequence, agents may even end up less
wealthy than their weaker fellows. This creates disincentive e⁄ects. First, weak agents
in hierarchies may be unwilling to invest ex ante, e.g. in ￿rm speci￿c knowledge.
Second, promotion to upper-hierarchies does not serve as an instrument to incentivize
weak agents since less power may be a blessing.
The following four chapters all have their own introduction and appendix and each
can be read independently of the other three chapters.Chapter 1
An experimental test of the
deterrence hypothesis￿
1.1 Introduction
That crime has to be punished seems to be universally accepted. The purpose and
the level of punishment, however, are controversial. Immanuel Kant advocated pun-
ishment to re-establish justice, Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel stressed that ill has to
be retaliated with ill. Both philosophers regard punishment as a mean to establish
justice. In contrast, there exist schools of thoughts which stress that punishment shall
prevent (future) crime. Becker￿ s (1968) deterrence hypothesis is the classic economic
contribution to the debate on punishment. According to Becker (1968) the purpose
of punishment is to (e¢ ciently) deter individuals from committing crimes. To achieve
deterrence, Becker (1968) relies on the power of deterrent incentives such as the sever-
ity and the probability of punishment. The deterrence hypothesis states that crime
(weakly) decreases in the severity and in the probability of punishment.
Our laboratory experiment tests the deterrence hypothesis in a controlled environ-
ment that permits to exogenously vary deterrent incentives, i.e. the detection prob-
ability and the level of punishment. For this purpose, we use a very straightforward
context, namely subjects have the possibility to steal from another subject. They can-
￿This chapter is joint work with Hannah Schildberg-H￿risch from the University of Bonn.An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis 9
not only decide whether they steal or not, but also how much they steal. We ask a
very basic but important question: Do deterrent incentives work?
In order to answer this question, we have chosen one of the simplest possible designs:
a modi￿ed dictator game. Two agents, A and B, are randomly matched. Agent A is
a passive agent and has a higher initial endowment than agent B. Agent B can decide
how much he takes away (steals) from A￿ s initial endowment. With probability 1 ￿ p,
this amount is transferred from A to B. With probability p (the detection probability),
however, this amount is not transferred and a ￿xed ￿ne f is deducted from B￿ s initial
endowment if B has chosen a strictly positive amount.
We conduct six di⁄erent treatments in which we vary the detection probability
p and the ￿ne f. Our benchmark treatment T1 sets p = f = 0. Treatments T2,
T3, and T4 implement small and intermediate incentives such that taking agent A￿ s
whole initial endowment still pays o⁄ in expectation. Treatment T5 is characterized
by a combination of p and f such that taking everything generates about the same
expected payo⁄ as taking nothing. In treatment T6, however, the expected payo⁄
from taking everything is substantially smaller than the one from taking nothing. Each
subject participates in two di⁄erent treatments sequentially. This design permits both
an across and a within subject analysis of taking behavior. In other words, we can
analyze di⁄erent regimes and regime changes with the data at hand.
Our experimental design has three main advantages. First, the game is very simple
and easy to understand for the subjects. Second, our design allows testing the isolated
e⁄ect of monetary incentives. This is because the implemented incentives themselves
do not contain a message from agent A, e.g. about A￿ s trust, expectations, intentions,
costs of a theft, or future actions, as incentives are determined exogenously (by the
experimenter) and not by agent A, the payo⁄ table is common knowledge, and A is
passive. Third, our design captures some crucial features of many crimes: The victim
is rather passive. It cannot a⁄ect the severity of punishment and ￿to a large extent
￿the detection probability. The distribution of costs and bene￿ts of the committed
crime is relatively clear. In case of a theft, for example, the stolen amount is a good
predictor of the thief￿ s bene￿t and the victim￿ s cost.An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis 10
The results obtained in our across subjects analysis clearly reject the deterrence
hypothesis: The average taken amount does not monotonically (weakly) decrease in
deterrent incentives. In contrast, we ￿nd that incentives may back￿re: Subjects take
signi￿cantly more in the treatment with intermediate incentives than in the absence
of incentives. Only very strong incentives deter subjects from taking. Back￿ring of
small incentives and deterrence of strong incentives can also be observed in our within
subjects analysis. These results can be explained by a model of two types of subjects:
sel￿sh subjects who react to deterrent incentives as predicted by the deterrence hypoth-
esis and fair-minded subjects who take more when incentives are introduced or raised
until incentives reach a very high level. Possible explanations for the behavior of the
second type of subjects are crowding out of fairness concerns by extrinsic incentives or
fairness concerns regarding expected outcomes. Only lasting crowding out of fairness
concerns can explain the sequence e⁄ects in our data: Many fair-minded subjects take
more in a given treatment if this treatment was preceded by a treatment with stronger
incentives than if it was not preceded by any treatment, i.e. played in the ￿rst part.
Furthermore, we ￿nd that p and f seem to be interchangeable instruments in achieving
deterrence.
Since we obtain our data from neutrally framed experiments, one may question
our results and their relevance for real life stealing. In real life crime and deterrent
incentives often have a strong moral connotation, and policy makers may make use of
that. Still, we consciously use a neutral frame because our primary aim is to test the
(standard) economic approach to crime. Its core, the deterrence hypothesis, relies on
incentive e⁄ects that are independent of all other factors which may in￿ uence crime.
In Becker￿ s (1968) model framing might ceteris paribus a⁄ect crime, but not the com-
parative statics with respect to deterrent incentives. Whatever the frame, the taken
amount should monotonically decrease in deterrent incentives. In order to measure the
e⁄ect of moral costs evoked by a non-neutral, moral framing, we run some additional
sessions in which we label B￿ s decision as "stealing" if x > 0 and the ￿xed ￿ne f as
"penalty" instead of "minus points". In these sessions we still observe back￿ring of
incentives.
Becker￿ s (1968) seminal paper has triggered numerous theoretical extensions asAn experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis 11
well as ￿eld studies testing its external validity.1 At large, the empirical evidence from
￿eld studies implies that punishment reduces crime, but variations in the detection
probability and the severity of punishment explain only a small part of the variation
in crime (see Glaeser, 1999). This may be caused by methodological problems that
arise when using ￿eld data. Usually, only aggregate data are available which results in
simultaneity bias and omitted variable problems.2 Field data often report the behavior
of o⁄enders only and not that of the general population. Furthermore, measurement
error is widespread as not all crime is reported. All these problems do not exist in the
laboratory.
There already exist experimental studies focusing on criminal behavior. The ex-
perimental literatures on tax evasion and on corruption explicitly address deterrence.3
Corruption and tax evasion setups clearly di⁄er from ours, though. In experimental
corruption games the cooperation of both the briber and the bribee is typically neces-
sary to successfully bribe. In tax evasion experiments subjects￿behavior often does not
in￿ uence other subjects￿payo⁄s at all, or only indirectly when the collected taxes are
used for public good provision or redistribution of resources among a group of subjects.
In other tax evasion experiments the tax authority itself is a player and can strategi-
cally interact with the taxpayer. In our setup, in contrast, a stealing subject directly
hurts another subject, which seems to be a crucial feature of many crimes, the victim
is passive, and incentives are set exogenously. Laboratory experiments on criminal be-
havior other than tax evasion and corruption are scarce. Falk and Fischbacher (2002)
explore the in￿ uence of social interaction phenomena on committing a crime. Bohnet
and Cooter (2001), Galbiati and Vertova (2005), and Tyran and Feld (2006) investi-
gate whether law can act as expressive law, i.e. prevent crime by activating norms
that prohibit committing a crime. Tyran and Feld (2006) also compare the e⁄ects of
exogenously imposed and endogenously chosen incentives. While Falk and Fischbacher
1Garoupa (1997) and Polinsky and Shavell (2000a) provide comprehensive overviews on the eco-
nomic theory of optimal law enforcement. Eide (2000) and Glaeser (1999) survey empirical studies on
the deterrence hypothesis.
2See Levitt (1997) for a convincing example of how to address the simultaneity problem.
3Torgler (2002) reviews the experimental literature on tax evasion and concludes that evidence
on the e⁄ectiveness of deterrent incentives is rather mixed (p. 662). While Abbink et al. (2002) ￿nd
in an experiment that deterrent incentives reduce corruption, Schulze and Frank (2003) observe that
deterrent incentives in an experimental corruption game can back￿re.An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis 12
(2002) and Bohnet and Cooter (2001) do not vary incentives and, therefore, cannot
test for incentive e⁄ects, Galbiati and Vertova (2005) and Tyran and Feld (2006) do,
however in a context that di⁄ers from our setup. In Galbiati and Vertova (2005) the
average contribution in a public good game increases the higher the obligatory mini-
mum contribution. In Tyran and Feld (2006) the average contribution in a public good
game increases the higher the punishment for not contributing.
In addition, there is a growing economic literature that investigates the e⁄ectiveness
of incentives in di⁄erent contexts, e.g. in labor market relations. These setups are usu-
ally richer than ours: Incentives are often determined endogenously by a principal and,
therefore, may signal the principal￿ s trust or intentions (Ellingsen and Johannesson,
2008), or norms (Sliwka, 2007), or an action￿ s costs and bene￿ts (BØnabou and Tirole,
2003). Some laboratory and ￿eld experiments on such contexts document that (small)
incentives back￿re and thus challenge the belief in the e⁄ectiveness of incentives.4 Frey
and Jegen (2001) stress that introducing incentives has two countervailing e⁄ects: Be-
sides the standard relative price e⁄ect, incentives may crowd out intrinsic motivation.
With small incentives the relative price e⁄ect is small and the latter, counterproductive
e⁄ect may dominate.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 presents the experimental design and
procedure, Section 1.3 the behavioral predictions and hypotheses. The across and
within subjects analyses are summarized and discussed in Section 1.4. In Section 1.5
we check the robustness of our results by presenting results from sessions with a moral
frame. Section 1.6 concludes.
4Bowles (2007), Fehr and Falk (2002), and Frey and Jegen (2001) survey the economic literature on
crowding out of intrinsic motivation. The origins of this literature are in psychology, see for example
Deci (1971) and Lepper et al. (1973). Deci et al. (1999) provide a meta-analysis of more than 100
psychological studies on the e⁄ect of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation.An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis 13
Figure 1.1: Structure of the stealing game
1.2 Experimental design and procedure
Consider the simplest possible stealing game with two agents, A and B. Agent A is
initially endowed with wA, and agent B is initially endowed with wB, with wA > wB.5
While agent A is passive, agent B can take any amount x 2 [0;wA] from agent A￿ s
initial endowment. If B does not take anything, i.e. x = 0, agents A and B both
receive their initial endowments wA and wB, respectively. If B takes a strictly positive
amount, i.e. x > 0, with probability (1 ￿ p) 2 [0;1] the taken amount x is transferred
from A to B, with probability p the taken amount x is not transferred and, on top of
that, agent B has to pay a ￿xed ￿ne f. We use a ￿xed ￿ne f that is independent of x
for x > 0 in order to keep the design as simple as possible. The structure of the game
is summarized in Figure 1.1.
Since we focus on incentive e⁄ects on B￿ s behavior, we vary the detection probability
p and the ￿ne f across di⁄erent treatments and ￿x wA and wB at levels 90 and 50,
respectively. Table 1.1 presents the treatments.
Treatment T1, our benchmark treatment, implements no deterrent incentives. It
is simply the mirror image of a dictator game.6 In all other treatments a strictly
5wA > wB allows to distinguish between subjects who have a preference for fair (equal) outcomes
and subjects who simply do not want to take anything in treatment T1.
6Here subjects can decide how much they take away from (instead of to give to) another agent inAn experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis 14
Table 1.1: Treatments of the stealing game
Treatment p f B￿ s expected payo⁄ B￿ s expected payo⁄ Level of incentives
given x = 0 given x = 90
T1 0.0 0 50 140 zero
T2 0.6 6 50 82.4 small
T3 0.5 25 50 82.5 small
T4 0.6 20 50 74 intermediate
T5 0.7 40 50 49 high
T6 0.8 40 50 36 very high
positive p and a strictly positive f is implemented. We categorize the intensity of
these incentives according to agent B￿ s expected payo⁄ when taking agent A￿ s whole
initial endowment. As Table 1.1 shows, the level of incentives (weakly) increases in
the order of the treatment. In treatments T2, T3, and T4 taking everything pays o⁄
in expectation. Treatment T5 is characterized by a combination of p and f such that
taking the maximally possible amount generates about the same expected payo⁄ as
taking nothing. In treatment T6, however, the expected payo⁄from taking everything
is substantially smaller than the one from taking nothing. Since in treatments T2 and
T3 the same intensity of incentives is implemented by di⁄erent p and f, we can analyze
whether p and f are interchangeable instruments in deterring taking behavior, at least
for this level of incentives.
Each experimental session consisted of three parts: two di⁄erent treatments of the
stealing game and a dictator game.7 After these three parts participants ￿lled out a
questionnaire eliciting data on their age, sex and subject of studies. We used a paid
Holt and Laury (2002) procedure to get an indication of subjects￿risk preferences.8
The conducted sessions are presented in Table 1.2.
At the beginning of each session participants were told that one randomly picked
part out of the three would be paid for all of them. After each part only the instructions
a purely distributional context without any strategic considerations.
7In the dictator game the dictator could give any amount of his initial endowment of 90 to a passive
agent with an initial endowment of 50. The chosen amount may indicate the dictator￿ s aversion to
advantageous inequity. Note, however, that the donated amount might be a⁄ected by the treatments
played in part 1 and part 2.
8The translated table and a brief report on the observed levels of risk aversion can be found in
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Table 1.2: Session plan of the stealing game
Session Part 1 Part 2 Part 3 Questionnaire* Number of
participants
T1T3 T1 T3 DG Yes 38
T3T1 T3 T1 DG Yes 38
T2T3 T2 T3 DG Yes 20
T3T2 T3 T2 DG Yes 18
T2T4 T2 T4 DG Yes 38
T4T2 T4 T2 DG Yes 36
T5T6 T5 T6 DG Yes 32
T6T5 T6 T5 DG Yes 38
* includes a Holt and Laury (2002) table
DG dictator game
for the following part were handed out. Subjects did not receive any feedback before the
end of the experiment. They were matched according to a perfect stranger design, i.e.
a couple matched once is never matched again in the following parts. Those subjects
who were randomly chosen to be agents B in part 1 remained agents B in part 2
and were assigned the role of the dictator in part 3. Consequently, passive subjects
remained passive throughout all three parts of the session.9
This design o⁄ers the possibility to analyze the observed behavior in two di⁄erent
ways. First, we can compare behavior in part 1 across di⁄erent treatments. This is
the cleanest comparison because individual behavior in part 1 is not in￿ uenced by any
preplay. Second, we can analyze how agents B adapt their behavior to the change in
incentives from part 1 to part 2. Since the structure of the game is very simple, we
assume that a change in behavior from part 1 to part 2 is stimulated by the change of
incentives rather than learning.
Our experimental sessions were run in November 2006 and March 2007 at the
experimental laboratory of the SFB 504 in Mannheim, Germany. 258 students of the
Universities of Mannheim and Heidelberg participated in the experiment. Subjects
were randomly assigned to sessions and could take part only once. The experiment
was programmed and conducted with the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007). The sessions were framed neutrally10 and lasted about 40 minutes. Subjects
9To keep the passive subjects busy, we asked them how they would decide if they were agent B.
10Translated instructions for agents B and a more detailed description of the procedure of a sessionAn experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis 16
did not receive a show-up fee11 and earned 12.34 e on average.
1.3 Behavioral predictions and hypotheses
We focus on the question how the intensity of incentives a⁄ects B￿ s decision. This
depends on the speci￿c form of B￿ s utility function. Di⁄erent theoretical approaches
make di⁄erent assumptions and, therefore, have varying behavioral predictions.
1.3.1 Behavioral predictions
Model 1: The self-interest model
The standard neoclassical approach assumes that all people are sel￿sh, i.e. their utility
function U depends on their own material payo⁄ m only and increases in m.
With these assumptions, the deterrence hypothesis holds, namely the optimal taken
amount x￿(p;f) monotonically (weakly) decreases in p and f.
Due to the ￿xed ￿ne f, agent B who maximizes his expected utility either takes as
much as possible (wA) or nothing. This depends on the relative sizes of p, f, wA, wB,
and on the level of risk aversion. B￿ s optimal taken amount is
x￿(p;f) 2
8
> > > <
> > > :
f0g if p >
U(wA+wB)￿U(wB)
U(wA+wB)￿U(wB￿f)
f0;wAg if p =
U(wA+wB)￿U(wB)
U(wA+wB)￿U(wB￿f)




The higher p or the higher f, the less attractive it is to take everything. For su¢ ciently
high values of p and f, agent B does not take anything. This holds for any risk
preferences, i.e. it is independent whether U is concave or convex in m. For risk averse
agents, i.e. agents whose U is concave in m, the set of p, f, wA, wB combinations for
are provided in the appendix.
11Six subjects did not earn anything in the randomly selected part and in the Holt and Laury
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which taking everything is optimal is smaller than the one for risk neutral agents, i.e.
agents whose U is linear in m.12
Numerous empirical studies have shown that individual behavior may systemati-
cally deviate from predictions of the standard neoclassical approach. In these studies
observed behavior is often consistent with predictions of models of social preferences.13
Our two-agent setup with unequal initial endowments seems to be a context in which
it is very plausible to consider models of fairness concerns.
Model 2: A model of fairness concerns regarding ￿nal outcomes
Models of fairness concerns regarding ￿nal outcomes (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt, 1999;
Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) assume that an agent￿ s utility function e U is not only
dependent on m but also on the material payo⁄ inequality jm ￿ yj with y as the
material payo⁄ of the other agent. e U increases in m for any given jm ￿ yj and e U
decreases in jm ￿ yj for any given m.
Given these assumptions, the deterrence hypothesis still holds if there exists a
unique optimal decision x￿(p = 0;f = 0) that maximizes agent B￿ s expected utility for
p = 0 and f = 0.
Due to the ￿xed ￿ne f, agent B who maximizes his expected utility either takes an
amount which is optimal for no incentives (x￿(p = 0;f = 0)) or nothing. For relatively
low values of p and f, agent B takes x￿(p = 0;f = 0), which may be smaller than wA.
For relatively high values of p and f, agent B is deterred and takes nothing.
The reason is that agents cannot trade o⁄ payo⁄s from di⁄erent states, in our
context payo⁄s if B￿ s taking is detected and payo⁄s if B￿ s taking is not detected.
Hence, x￿(p ￿ 0;f ￿ 0) cannot be strictly larger than x￿(p = 0;f = 0): If B￿ s taking
is not detected, e U is maximized at x￿(p = 0;f = 0); if B￿ s taking is detected, e U is
the same for any x > 0 and largest for x = 0. Analogously, taking a strictly positive
but smaller amount than x￿(p = 0;f = 0) yields less expected utility than taking




13Fehr and Schmidt (2006) survey empirical foundations of social preferences.An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis 18
x￿(p = 0;f = 0) and, therefore, cannot be optimal.
Model 3: A model of fairness concerns regarding expected outcomes
Models of fairness concerns regarding expected outcomes (e.g. Trautmann, 2009) as-
sume that an agent￿ s utility function b U is not only dependent on m but also on the
absolute di⁄erence between the own expected payo⁄ me and the other agent￿ s ex-
pected payo⁄ ye (jme ￿yej).14 b U increases in m for any given jme ￿yej) and decreases
in jme ￿ yej) for any given m.
If jme ￿ yej directly enters the utility function, the deterrence hypothesis may not
hold any more, i.e. there may exist values of p and f for which x￿(p;f) strictly increases
in p or in f.
The reason is that agents can trade o⁄ payo⁄s from di⁄erent states, e.g. an ad-
vantageous inequity in material payo⁄s if B￿ s taking is not detected can compensate
a disadvantageous inequity in material payo⁄s if B￿ s taking is detected. As an illus-
tration, consider the following utility function b U = m ￿ ￿ ￿ maxfme ￿ ye;0g with
me = (1￿p)￿(wB +x)+p￿(wB ￿f) and ye = (1￿p)￿(wA￿x)+p￿wA for x > 0. If
￿ > 1
2, agent B who maximizes his expected utility tries to perfectly equate me and ye
by choosing x. Hence, agent B takes more the higher p or the higher f. Nevertheless,
deterrence by strong incentives may still occur in this illustration as x is bounded from
above by wA.15
Model 4: A model of fairness concerns (regarding ￿nal outcomes) that are
crowded out by extrinsic incentives
The literature on crowding out of intrinsic motivation by extrinsic incentives uses the
term "intrinsic motivation" very broadly. It may apply to fairness concerns as well.
In our context crowding out implies that agents￿fairness concerns decrease in the
intensity of deterrent incentives. Formally, this assumption can be captured by the
14Consequently, the evaluation of a state is not independent of another state.
15If p and f are so high such that taking everything would generate me < ye with me < wB, taking
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following utility function:
V = ￿(p;f) ￿ U(m) + [1 ￿ ￿(p;f)] ￿ e U(m;jm ￿ yj),
where, as above, U(m) represents the utility of a sel￿sh agent and e U(m;jm ￿ yj) the
utility of an agent with fairness concerns regarding ￿nal outcomes. The core of the
crowding out assumption is that ￿(p;f) 2 [0;1], the weight of U(m), increases in p
and in f.
With these assumptions, there may be ranges of p, f combinations such that the
optimal amount x￿(p;f) strictly increases in p and f. Therefore, the deterrence hy-
pothesis does not necessarily hold.
The intuition is that for small values of p and f, agent B is relatively fair-minded
and takes a small amount, while for higher values of p and f, he is rather sel￿sh and
takes a high amount. If the level of incentives is very high such that both sel￿sh and
fair-minded subjects are deterred, agent B does not take anything.
If we observe crowding out by deterrent incentives, our data may contribute to the
following two aspects of crowding out on which the verdict is still out.
(i) Continuity of crowding out: ￿(p;f) 2 [0;1] may increase continuously or
discontinuously in p and f. Even if it increases continuously, x￿(p;f) may increase
discontinuously in p and f for some e U(m;jm ￿ yj).
The empirical results of Gneezy and Rustichini (2000b) and Gneezy (2003) suggest
discontinuous crowding out. Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997), however, explain their
data by assuming continuous crowding out.
In our context subjects who increase their taken amount to a level strictly less than
the maximal amount of wA as a reaction to an introduction or an increase in incentives
are evidence for continuous rather than discontinuous crowding out.
(ii) Hysteresis: Extrinsic incentives may crowd out fairness concerns lastingly.
As a consequence, the crowding out e⁄ect of an increase in incentives is larger than the
crowding in e⁄ect of the subsequent decrease in incentives that reverses the increase in
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Some studies (e.g. Irlenbusch and Sliwka, 2005; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000a;
G￿chter et al., 2006) ￿nd evidence for hysteresis, i.e. evidence that incentives crowd
out fairness concerns lastingly.
To give an example, if subjects in our setting take more in a given treatment
with small incentives when it is played in part 2 after a part 1 with relatively strong
incentives than when it is played in part 1, this is evidence for hysteresis. If we ￿nd
both back￿ring of incentives and hysteresis, our data can only be explained by a model
of lasting crowding out of fairness concerns and not by a model of fairness concerns
regarding expected outcomes. Thus, hysteresis might be a mean to distinguish between
these two models (models 3 and 4) that can explain back￿ring of incentives.
1.3.2 Hypotheses
The behavioral predictions of the various models di⁄er. However, all four models
predict Hypothesis 1.1.
Hypothesis 1.1: Deterrence by strong incentives
Relatively high values of the detection probability p and the ￿xed ￿ne f deter agents
from taking. The range of these values is larger, if an agent is risk averse.
The threshold of strong incentives may vary by subject. A risk neutral or risk
averse sel￿sh agent abstains from taking in treatments T5 and T6. A risk neutral or
risk averse agent with Fehr and Schmidt (1999) fairness preferences may even abstain
from taking in treatment T4.
In contrast to Hypothesis 1.1, only the self-interest model and the model of fairness
concerns regarding ￿nal outcomes necessarily predict Hypothesis 1.2.
Hypothesis 1.2: Deterrence hypothesis
The taken amount x monotonically (weakly) decreases in the detection probability
p and the ￿xed ￿ne f.An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis 21
Hypothesis 1.2 implies that the average taken amount x (weakly) decreases from
treatments T1 to T6.
1.4 Results
In a ￿rst step, we compare behavior in part 1 across subjects. This step has the
advantage that the analyzed behavior is not in￿ uenced by any preplay. However, we
cannot draw any conclusion how (the same) subjects react to a change of incentives,
and whether hysteresis occurs. In a second step, we address these issues by comparing
behavior in part 1 with behavior in part 2.
1.4.1 Comparison of treatments in part 1
Summary statistics ￿Benchmark treatment
The experimental data of treatment T1 show how much people take in the absence of
deterrent incentives. The upper left panel of Figure 1.2 summarizes the distribution of
the taken amount x in the benchmark treatment.
As treatment T1 is the mirror image of a dictator game, we can compare behavior in
T1 with standard results of dictator games as those from Forsythe et al. (1994). In line
with their paper, we can identify two types of agents: sel￿sh agents and fair-minded
agents. In their benchmark treatment (the paid dictator game conducted in April with
a pie of 5 $) about 45 % of subjects are pure gamesmen who do not give anything, and
the rest gives a strictly positive amount. These types of agents correspond remarkably
well to the 47 % (52.5 %) of sel￿sh subjects in treatment T1 who take everything
(between 80 and 90), and the rest who takes a strictly positive amount below 90 (80).
To summarize, we have two types of agents: slightly less than 50 % of our subjects
have sel￿sh preferences while a bit more than 50 % have fairness concerns. As the
model of fairness concerns regarding ￿nal outcomes shows, fairness concerns do not
necessarily imply that the deterrence hypothesis fails. It may fail if fairness concerns
are based on expected outcomes or if they are crowded out by deterrent incentives.An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis 22
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To ￿gure out whether the deterrence hypothesis holds, we have a closer look at the
treatments with deterrent incentives.
Summary statistics ￿Treatments with deterrent incentives
Figure 1.3 summarizes the average taken amount per treatment. Our treatments are
ordered by the intensity of deterrent incentives, i.e. the combined e⁄ect of the detection
probability p and the ￿ne f (compare Table 1.1).
The average taken amount increases in the range of no, small, and intermediate
incentives (from T1 to T4), while it decreases in the range of strong and very strong
incentives (T5 and T6). Hence, the relationship between the average taken amount and
the intensity of deterrent incentives is rather inverted-U shaped than monotonically
decreasing.
Figure 1.2 shows that the fraction of subjects taking everything increases by treat-
ment from T1 to T4. In treatment T4 it peaks at a value of more than 80 % which is
considerably higher than the corresponding 47 % in the absence of any incentives as in
treatment T1. From treatment T5 onwards, this fraction decreases.
Still, the share of subjects not taking anything monotonically increases in the level
of incentives. It is moderate with no, small and intermediate incentives (￿ 10 %),
quite substantial with strong incentives (about 25 %), and largest with very strong
incentives (nearly 70 %).
Interestingly, there are always subjects taking interior values of their choice set,
most so in the benchmark treatment. The share of these subjects decreases in the
intensity of incentives. Moreover, the average of the chosen interior values increases in
the order of the treatment from T1 to T4.
Compared to the benchmark treatment, deterrent incentives shift mass to the bor-
ders of the choice set. We observe both back￿ring of small incentives and deterrence at
the same time.16 Small and intermediate incentives move mass predominately towards
the upper border which stands in sharp contrast to the deterrence hypothesis but is
16In an experiment on corruption that uses probabilistic incentives as we do Schulze and Frank
(2003) observe a similar pattern in their data.An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis 24




























consistent with models 3 and 4. Strong and very strong incentives move mass exactly
to the lower border which is consistent with Hypothesis 1.1.
Since the results of treatments T2 and T3 are very similar, the detection probability
and the ￿ne seem to be interchangeable instruments.
Analysis of hypotheses
A Kruskal-Wallis test on behavior in part 1 documents signi￿cant (p < 0.01) treatment
e⁄ects. In order to identify and characterize the signi￿cant di⁄erences, we run pairwise
Mann-Whitney-U tests. The one-sided p-values are recorded in Table 1.3.
Table 1.3: One-sided p-values of pairwise Mann-Whitney-U tests on taking
T2 T3 T4 T5 T6
T1 0.287 0.234 0.015 0.400 < 0.001
T2 0.408 0.040 0.447 < 0.001
T3 0.058 0.390 < 0.001
T4 0.071 < 0.001
T5 0.005
In treatment T6 agents take signi￿cantly (p < 0.01) less than in any other treatment.
This is consistent with Hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2. However, contradictory to HypothesisAn experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis 25
1.2 ￿the deterrence hypothesis ￿agents take signi￿cantly more in treatment T4 than in
treatments T1 (p < 0.05), T2 (p < 0.05) and T3 (p = 0.058).17 There is no signi￿cant
di⁄erence in behavior between treatments T2 and T3.
In order to account for individual characteristics when comparing treatments, we
estimate two speci￿cations whose results are presented in Table 1.4.
Table 1.4: Regression results on taking
Dependent variable: x OLS-r Tobit
Intercept +057.15*** +094.56***
Sex (1 if male, 0 else) +011.51* +025.70
Risk aversion (1 if risk averse, 0 else) - 013.73** - 054.78**
Inconsistent risk pref. (1 if inconsistent, 0 else) - 027.29 - 105.99*
Economist (1 if economist, 0 else) +010.12 +031.33




T5 - 007.22 - 020.41
T6 - 042.84*** - 132.32***
Number of observations 129 129
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.3098 0.0771
Ti: 1 if treatment = Ti, 0 else
Inconsistent risk pref.: several switching points in the Holt and Laury (2002) table
*, **, *** signi￿cant at 10, 5, 1 percent signi￿cance level
-r with robust standard errors
First, we regress the taken amount x on individual characteristics and treatment
dummies using an OLS estimation with robust standard errors. Second, we address
the fact that the taken amount x is truncated and estimate a Tobit speci￿cation with
the same regressors. In both estimations the treatment dummy for T4 is signi￿cantly
positive (p < 0.05), the treatment dummy for T6 is signi￿cantly negative (p < 0.05),
and the treatment dummies for T2 and T3 are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from each
other. Hence, these results are robust. Risk aversion has a signi￿cantly negative e⁄ect
(p < 0.05) on the taken amount in both speci￿cations (as risk averse subjects are more
likely to be deterred).18
17One-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests and ￿2-tests based on a grouping of subjects according to
whether they are deterred, try to roughly equate payo⁄s (take between 15 and 29 points), have some
fairness concerns (take between 30 and 79 points), or are sel￿sh (take between 80 and 90 points) largely
con￿rm the results of the Mann-Whitney-U tests presented here. In particular, subjects always take
signi￿cantly more in treatment T4 than in T1.
185 subjects in the role of agent B indicated several switching points in the Holt and Laury (2002)An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis 26
Given the results of the Mann-Whitney-U tests and the regressions, we do not reject
Hypotheses 1.1 but we reject Hypothesis 1.2, the deterrence hypothesis.
Result 1.1: Deterrence by strong incentives
Very strong incentives as in treatment T6 signi￿cantly reduce the taken amount.
On average, risk averse agents take signi￿cantly less.
Result 1.2: Back￿ring of small incentives
The average taken amount does not monotonically (weakly) decrease in the level of
deterrent incentives. Intermediate incentives as in treatment T4 signi￿cantly increase
the average taken amount.
Result 1.3: Interchangeability of detection probability and ￿ne
We do not ￿nd any signi￿cant di⁄erences between treatments T2 and T3. In that
sense, the detection probability p and the ￿ne f seem to be interchangeable policy
instruments.
In sum, these results are consistent with the predictions of models 3 and 4.
1.4.2 Comparison of behavior in part 1 with behavior in part
2
Up to now, we have compared our treatments across di⁄erent subjects in part 1. In
contrast to the deterrence hypothesis, our results so far show that intermediate incen-
tives back￿re. A model of fairness concerns regarding expected outcomes or a model
of fairness concerns that are crowded out by incentives can explain this phenomenon.
Since each subject sequentially participated in two di⁄erent treatments, we can further
analyze how the same subjects react to a change of deterrent incentives.19 Sessions in
which we increase the intensity of incentives from part 1 to part 2 allow analyzing (i)
table. Since we could not classify them as risk averse, risk neutral, or risk loving, we report them as
individuals with inconsistent risk preferences.
19Since subjects do not get any feedback after part 1, behavioral e⁄ects cannot be triggered by the
realization of punishment.An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis 27
whether back￿ring of small and intermediate incentives is observed on an individual
level and (ii) whether back￿ring is a continuous or discontinuous process. Sessions in
which we decrease the intensity of incentives from part 1 to part 2 enable us to check
whether we observe hysteresis. Hysteresis can be explained by lasting crowding out
of fairness concerns, but it is inconsistent with the model of fairness concerns regard-
ing expected outcomes. Sessions with incentives of the same intensity in both parts
indicate whether p and f are interchangeable instruments on an individual level.
Back￿ring of incentives on an individual level
In three di⁄erent sessions we increase the intensity of incentives from part 1 to part
2: in session T1T3 from no to small incentives, in session T2T4 from small to inter-
mediate incentives, in session T5T6 from strong to very strong incentives. Figure 1.4
summarizes how subjects behave in part 2 conditional on whether they acted sel￿shly
(x = 90), acted fair-mindedly (0 < x < 90) or were deterred (x = 0) in part 1.
Since the benchmark treatment was played in the ￿rst part of session T1T3, we can
identify about 47 % of subjects with sel￿sh preferences. All except one take everything
in part 2 again. About 53 % of all subjects take a positive amount strictly less than
everything in part 1. About a third of them increase the taken amount x to a level
smaller than 90, a ￿fth switch to taking everything in part 2, and another ￿fth keep
x constant. Hence, for 50 % of fair-minded subjects small incentives seem to strictly
back￿re. Only one sel￿sh and one fair-minded subject are deterred by small incentives.
In session T2T4 about 63 % of subjects take everything already in part 1. We
cannot distinguish whether they have sel￿sh preferences or fairness concerns which are
completely crowded out by the small incentives present in part 1. Again, the majority
of these subjects is not deterred and keeps taking everything in part 2. The share of
subjects taking intermediate amounts in part 1 is considerably smaller than in session
T1T3. For 20 % of these subjects the increase of incentives completely back￿res. The
majority, however, is deterred. Note that a moderate fraction of deterrence can already
be found in part 1.20
20None of the proposed models can explain the behavior of subjects in sessions T1T3 and T2T4An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis 28
Figure 1.4: Reactions to an increase in the intensity of incentives








x = 90   increase in x
| x < 90
   constant
x | 0 < x < 90
decrease in x
| x > 0
x = 0



















selfish in part 1 (47.37%)
fair-minded in part 1 (52.63%)
deterred in part 1 (0%)








x = 90   increase in
x | x < 90
   constant
x | 0 < x < 90
decrease in
x | x > 0
x = 0



















"selfish" in part 1 (63.16%)
fair-minded in part 1 (26.31%)
deterred in part 1 (10.53%)








x = 90   increase in
x | x < 90
   constant
x | 0 < x < 90
decrease in
x | x > 0
x = 0



















"selfish" in part 1 (62.5%)
fair-minded in part 1 (12.5%)
deterred in part 1 (25%)








x = 90   increase in x
| x < 90
   constant
x | 0 < x < 90
decrease in x
| x > 0
x = 0



















selfish in part 1 (47.37%)
fair-minded in part 1 (52.63%)
deterred in part 1 (0%)








x = 90   increase in
x | x < 90
   constant
x | 0 < x < 90
decrease in
x | x > 0
x = 0



















"selfish" in part 1 (63.16%)
fair-minded in part 1 (26.31%)
deterred in part 1 (10.53%)








x = 90   increase in
x | x < 90
   constant
x | 0 < x < 90
decrease in
x | x > 0
x = 0



















"selfish" in part 1 (62.5%)
fair-minded in part 1 (12.5%)
deterred in part 1 (25%)An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis 29
In session T5T6 62.5 % of subjects still take everything in part 1. More than two
thirds of them are deterred by the increase of incentives, though. 25 % of all subjects
are deterred in part 1 and stay deterred in part 2. Only 12.5 % of subjects take a
strictly positive amount below 90 in part 1. Half of them are deterred in the second
part.
These observations can be summarized by the following two results:
Result 1.4: Back￿ring of small incentives on an individual level
Subjects seem to be heterogeneous. There are sel￿sh agents for which the deterrence
hypothesis holds. However, there are also fair-minded agents for which small and
intermediate incentives back￿re. Independent of the type of agent, strong incentives
deter.
Result 1.5: Continuous and discontinuous back￿ring of incentives
We ￿nd evidence for both continuous and discontinuous back￿ring of incentives.
Hysteresis
Whether hysteresis (lasting crowding out of fairness concerns) is present in our data can
be seen by comparing behavior of a given treatment played in part 1 with behavior of
the same treatment played in part 2 after a part 1 with stronger incentives. Hysteresis
implies that we observe sequence e⁄ects for these treatments. Table 1.5 records two-
sided p-values of pairwise Mann-Whitney-U tests that compare the same treatment
played in di⁄erent parts of a session.21
As Table 1.5 indicates, we observe sequence e⁄ects in treatments T1, T2, and T5.
Subjects in T1 take signi￿cantly (p < 0.05) more when it is played after T3 (81.3
instead of 65.0 points on average). Preplay in T3 with small incentives increases the
average taken amount in treatment T1. Similarly, the average taken amount in T2 is
who react to increased incentives by decreasing the taken amount to a level strictly larger than 0 or
increasing it from 0 to a strictly positive amount.
21Treatments T2 and T3 are played second in two di⁄erent sessions. Since the observations from the
second parts are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent (p=0.71 and p=0.34, respectively according to two-sided
Mann-Whitney-U tests) for di⁄erent sessions, we do not report each session comparison separately.An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis 30
Table 1.5: Non-parametric comparisons of di⁄erent sequences (Mann-Whitney-U tests)
Treatment played played p-value
￿rst in second in (two sided)
T1 T1T3 T3T1 0.082
T2 T2T3 T3T2 0.099
T2T4 T4T2
T3 T3T1 T1T3 0.676
T3T2 T2T3
T4 T4T2 T2T4 0.061
T5 T5T6 T6T5 0.014
T6 T6T5 T5T6 0.617
signi￿cantly (p < 0.05) higher when it is played second (after a harsher or a constant
intensity of incentives) than ￿rst. Both results are consistent with a model of lasting
crowding out of fairness concerns but cannot be reconciled with the predictions of a
model of fairness concerns regarding expected outcomes. In contrast, subjects in T5
take signi￿cantly (p < 0.05) less when it is played after T6. Preplay in T6 with very
strong incentives seems to increase deterrence in treatment T5. This is inconsistent with
a model of fairness concerns regarding expected outcomes and with lasting crowding out
of fairness concerns (if fairness concerns imply less taking in T5 than sel￿sh concerns
imply).
Result 1.6: Hysteresis
Small and intermediate incentives have a lasting e⁄ect. They still back￿re when
incentives are decreased or even removed in the following period.
Since we observe hysteresis, a model of fairness concerns that are crowded out by
incentives explains our data better than a model of fairness concerns regarding expected
outcomes. Hysteresis also underlines how costly extrinsic incentives are. In addition
to the e⁄ect incentives have in the current period, they may also in￿ uence behavior
in future periods. From this perspective, also strong and very strong incentives could
back￿re by crowding out fairness concerns in future periods in which incentives are
smaller.
In treatments with an increase in incentives there are no signi￿cant sequence e⁄ectsAn experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis 31
for treatments T3 and T6. Subjects in treatment T4, however, take signi￿cantly (p <
0.05) less when it is played in part 2 after treatment T2 than when it is played in part
1.
Substitutability of detection probability and ￿ne
Since treatments T2 and T3 have the same intensity of deterrent incentives imple-
mented by di⁄erent values of the detection probability p and the ￿ne f, we can test
￿at least for this speci￿c level of incentives ￿whether these two instruments are in-
terchangeable. We have already observed that treatments T2 and T3 do not di⁄er
signi￿cantly across subjects in part 1 (Result 1.3). Our within subject analysis in
Figure 1.5 also ￿nds this result on an individual level.
In session T2T3 7 out of 10 subjects do not change their behavior. In session T3T2
only a single subject is apart from the 45￿ line. 6 subjects keep taking everything, 2
keep taking the same intermediate amount.
Result 1.7: Interchangeability of detection probability and ￿ne on an
individual level
Our within subjects comparison con￿rms Result 1.3 that p and f seem to be inter-
changeable instruments.
1.5 Robustness check - Framing
So far, we have presented results from neutrally framed experiments. This is a valid
approach to test the deterrence hypothesis which relies on incentive e⁄ects that are
independent of all other factors that may in￿ uence crime as e.g. the frame. While a
non-neutral frame may ceteris paribus a⁄ect the taken amount (e.g. due to additional
moral costs), comparative statics should remain unchanged. For any given (neutral or
non-neutral) frame, the deterrence hypothesis predicts the taken amount to monotoni-
cally decrease in the detection probability and the ￿ne. However, it is not clear whetherAn experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis 32
Figure 1.5: Reactions to a change of incentives keeping their intensity constantAn experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis 33
a non-neutral frame interacts with incentives in a model of fairness concerns regarding
￿nal outcomes that are crowded out by incentives which ￿ts our data best. While
neutrally framed incentives crowd out fairness concerns, this may not necessarily be
the case for incentives that are combined with a strong moral connotation.
In real life deterrent incentives often have a moral connotation and policy makers
may try to make use of that. This is why we run two additional, morally framed
sessions and check whether a non-neutral, moral frame changes our results. In the
morally framed sessions B￿ s decision was labeled as "stealing" if x > 0 and the ￿xed
￿ne f was called "penalty" instead of "minus points". Apart from these two di⁄erent
labels, the neutrally and morally framed sessions were conducted completely identically.
In order to check whether framing a⁄ects behavior in the absence of incentives, we run
a morally framed version of treatment T1 (T1f). To analyze whether framing and
incentives interact, we run a morally framed version of treatment T4 (T4f).22 38
subjects participated in session T1fT4f, 32 subjects in session T4fT1f.
The results in the morally and neutrally framed treatments are similar. There is
no signi￿cant framing e⁄ect in part 1 in the absence of incentives, i.e. between T1 and
T1f (two-sided Mann-Whitney-U test: p > 0.5). In contrast, subjects take more in
part 1 in treatment T4 than in treatment T4f (two-sided Mann-Whitney-U test: p =
0.075). There is no signi￿cant di⁄erence in parts 1 between treatments T1f and T4f.
However, the within subjects analysis documents crowding out: when incentives are
introduced in part 2 of session T1fT4f more than 30 % of subjects ￿ ip from taking
intermediate amounts to taking everything. This parallels the results obtained in the
neutrally framed sessions T1T3 and T2T4. We conclude that also with moral framing
back￿ring of intermediate incentives is a non-negligible phenomenon.
22We choose treatment T4 since the intensity of deterrent incentives in this treatment is (i) low
enough to not deter the majority of subjects and (ii) high enough to potentially crowd out fairness
concerns signi￿cantly.An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis 34
1.6 Conclusion
We have presented an experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis applied to the
context of stealing. Our across subjects analysis of part 1 rejects the hypothesis that
the average taken amount monotonically (weakly) decreases in deterrent incentives.
On average, subjects take most when intermediate incentives are present. Only very
strong incentives deter.
Both our across subjects comparison of behavior in part 1 and our within subjects
comparison of behavior in part 1 with behavior in part 2 re￿ ect two di⁄erent types of
subjects. We identify about 50 % sel￿sh subjects whose behavior is consistent with
the deterrence hypothesis and about 50 % fair-minded subjects for which intermediate
incentives back￿re. Since we observe hysteresis, a model of lasting crowding out of
fairness concerns explains our data best.
We have contributed to the empirical literature on crowding out in various ways.
First, we observe crowding out of fairness concerns in a very simple setting. Second, we
have established the existence of crowding out as a reaction to probabilistic incentives23
and in a new domain, namely when incentives are set to deter criminal activities.
Third, our comparison of behavior in part 1 with behavior in part 2 provides further
evidence for lasting crowding out as it is observed by Irlenbusch and Sliwka (2005),
Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a), and G￿chter et al. (2006). While it exists for many
subjects, we have also observed some subjects whose fairness concerns are ￿at least
partially ￿reestablished when incentives are reduced or removed completely. Fourth,
our study has explicitly focused on the domain of small and intermediate incentives
that are especially important in real life24: We have run four out of six treatments with
small and intermediate incentives which according to standard neoclassical theory do
not deter risk neutral subjects. Thus, we have several treatments to analyze whether
23To our knowledge the only other paper that documents the existence of crowding out of intrinsic
motivation due to probabilistic incentives is Schulze and Frank (2003).
24In Germany the clearance rate for thefts with (without) aggravating circumstances was 14 % (44
%) in 2005 (Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik, 2005, Table 23). Andreoni et al. (1998) present ￿gures for
tax evasion in the US: In 1995 the audit rate for individual tax return was only 1.7 %, the penalty
for underpayment of taxes usually 20 % of the underpayment. Polinsky and Shavell (2000b) point
out that, in general, the severity of punishment is quite low in relation what potential o⁄enders are
capable to pay.An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis 35
crowding out is a continuous or discontinuous process. Our within subject analysis
￿nds evidence for both.
Interestingly, incentives ￿even in this very simple and plain context ￿back￿re.
Tversky and Kahneman￿ s (1986) argument that extrinsic incentives shift the context
from an ethical and other-regarding to an instrumental and self-regarding one seems
to be adequate for our results. Similarly, the ￿ndings con￿rm those of Houser et al.
(2008) who show that crowding out of intrinsic motivation is not only caused by the
intentions that incentives signal but also by incentives per se.
What are the policy implications from our experimental study? Taking our data
literally would imply to punish criminal behavior either hard or not at all in order
to avoid back￿ring of incentives. Of course, the laboratory may abstract from social
norms and stigmata that could be the driving forces behind punishment in reducing
criminal behavior. Thus, we do not conclude that punishment does not work outside
the laboratory. However, our data directly reject the deterrence hypothesis that relies
on punishment whose e⁄ectiveness is independent of all other factors that may in￿ uence
crime. Our results show that if crime was a gamble ￿as economists generally argue and
as we have modeled it in the laboratory ￿incentives may not work: Especially small
and intermediate incentives back￿re and may crowd out fairness concerns lastingly.
Thus, to convincingly contribute to the discussion on how to e¢ ciently deter crime,
economists should go beyond the standard deterrence hypothesis.
1.7 Appendix
1.7.1 Experimental sessions
The order of events during each experimental session was the following: Subjects were
welcomed and randomly assigned a cubicle in the laboratory where they took their
decisions in complete anonymity from the other participants. The random allocation
to a cubicle also determined a subject￿ s role in all three parts. Subjects were handed
out the general instructions for the experiment as well as the instructions for partAn experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis 36
1. After all subjects had read both instructions carefully and all remaining questions
had been answered, we proceeded to the decision stage of the ￿rst part. Part 2 and
3 were conducted in an analogous way. We ￿nished each experimental session by
letting subjects answer a questionnaire that asked for demographic characteristics and
included a paid Holt and Laury (2002) table. This table was explained in detail in the
questionnaire and it was highlighted that one randomly drawn decision from the table
was paid out in addition to the earnings in the previous parts.
Instructions, the program, and the questionnaire were originally written in German.
The translated general instructions, the translated instructions of the neutrally framed
treatment T4 in part 1 for agent B, and the translated Holt and Laury (2002) table
can be found in the following. Instructions for part 2 and part 3 are as similar to part
1 as possible. For the framed treatments, we used the expressions "steal any integer
amount between 0 and 90 from participant A" instead of "choose any integer amount
between 0 and 90 that shall be transferred from participant A to you", and the term
"minus a penalty of x points" instead of "minus an amount of x points".
1.7.2 Translated general instructions
General explanations concerning the experiment
Welcome to this experiment. You and the other participants are asked to make deci-
sions. Your decisions as well as the decisions of the other participants will determine
the result of the experiment. At the end of the experiment you will be paid in cash
according to the actual result. So please read the instructions thoroughly and think
about your decision carefully.
During the experiment you are not allowed to talk to the other participants, to use cell
phones or to start any other programs on the computer. The neglect of these rules will
lead to the immediate exclusion from the experiment and all payments. If you have
any questions, please raise your hand. An experimenter will then come to your seat to
answer your questions.
During the experiment we will talk about points instead of Euros. Your total incomeAn experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis 37
will therefore be calculated in points ￿rst. At the end of the experiment the total
amount of points will be converted into Euros according to the following exchange
rate:
1 point = 15 Cents.
The experiment consists of three independent parts in which you can accumulate
points. Before each part only the instructions of this part will be handed out.
During the experiment neither you nor the other participants will receive
any information on the course of the experiment (e.g. decisions of other
participants or results of a particular part).
The results of each single part will be calculated only after all three parts will be
￿nished. Then, one of these three parts will be chosen randomly. At the end
of the whole experiment only this part will be paid out in cash according
to your decisions.
1.7.3 Translated instructions of the neutrally framed treat-
ment T4 in part 1
Part 1
In this part there are participants in role A and participants in role B. You
have been randomly assigned role B for this part. You will be randomly and
anonymously matched to another participant in role A. This random matching
lasts only for this part. The matched participant will not be matched to you in the
following two parts again. Neither before nor after the experiment will you receive any
information about the identity of your matched participant. Likewise, your matched
participant will not receive any information about your identity.
As participant B you have an initial endowment of 50 points. Participant A has an
initial endowment of 90 points.An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis 38
As a participant in role B you can choose any integer amount between 0 and 90
points (including 0 and 90) which shall be transferred from participant A to
you. Participant A does not make any decision. In order to make your decision, please
enter your chosen amount on the corresponding computer screen and push the OK
button.
￿ If you choose a transfer amount of 0 points, you will receive your initial endow-
ment of 50 points, and participant A will receive his initial endowment of 90
points.
￿ If you choose a transfer amount larger than 0 points,
￿with 40 % probability you will receive your initial endowment
of 50 points plus your chosen transfer amount and participant A
will receive his initial endowment of 90 points minus your chosen
transfer amount.
￿with 60 % probability you will receive your initial endowment
of 50 points minus an amount of 20 points, i.e. 30 points, and
participant A will receive his initial endowment of 90 points.
Example 1: You choose a transfer amount of 22 points. With 40 % probability you
will receive 50 + 22 points = 72 points, and with 60 % probability you will receive 50
￿20 points = 30 points. Participant A will receive 90 ￿22 points = 68 points with 40
% probability and his initial endowment of 90 points with 60 % probability.
Example 2: You choose a transfer amount of 0 points. You will receive 50 points.
Participant A will receive 90 points.
The course of action of part 1 is illustrated by the following ￿gure:An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis 39
If you have any questions, please raise your hand. An experimenter will come to your
seat to answer your questions.An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis 40
1.7.4 Translated Holt and Laury (2002) table
Decision Option A Option B
Decision 1 10 points 25 points with a probability of 10 %
0 points with a probability of 90 %
Decision 2 10 points 25 points with a probability of 20 %
0 points with a probability of 80 %
Decision 3 10 points 25 points with a probability of 30 %
0 points with a probability of 70 %
Decision 4 10 points 25 points with a probability of 40 %
0 points with a probability of 60 %
Decision 5 10 points 25 points with a probability of 50 %
0 points with a probability of 50 %
Decision 6 10 points 25 points with a probability of 60 %
0 points with a probability of 40 %
Decision 7 10 points 25 points with a probability of 70 %
0 points with a probability of 30 %
Decision 8 10 points 25 points with a probability of 80 %
0 points with a probability of 20 %
Decision 9 10 points 25 points with a probability of 90 %
0 points with a probability of 10 %
Decision 10 10 points 25 points with a probability of 100 %
0 points with a probability of 0 %
Participants made 10 separate decisions whether they preferred option A to option
B. While option A was the same in all 10 decisions, option B varied in the associated
probabilities as displayed above. At the end of the experiment one decision was chosen
randomly (all with equal probability) and paid.
In the following we have a look at the decisions of agents B in the neutrally and
morally framed treatments. We classify the observed 51 subjects who prefer option A
to option B in decisions 1 to 4 and option B to option A otherwise as risk-neutral. The
observed 16 subjects preferring option A in decisions 1 to k, with k < 4, and optionAn experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis 41
B else are categorized as risk-seeking. We observe 88 risk-averse subjects indicating
option A in decisions 1 to k, with k > 4, and option B else. Three subjects behave
irrationally in the sense that they always prefer option A to option B, even in decision
10.Chapter 2
An experimental study on
information ￿ ows in teams￿
2.1 Introduction
Team members often work ine¢ ciently little as their rewards are related to the team
output but the costs of contributing to the team output accrue to the individual member
only. In this study we address the question whether team members are stimulated to
work more when one member receives a signal on his colleague￿ s performance prior to
his own decision. Furthermore, we analyze how the signal￿ s type a⁄ects behavior.
In many situations agents of a team act sequentially and the second mover observes
some signal on the ￿rst mover￿ s performance. The signal may a⁄ect the second mover￿ s
incentives and, thereby, provide the ￿rst mover with commitment power. Consider, for
example, the case where individual contributions to the team output are substitutes
(i.e. the more one agent contributes, the lower are the incentives for the other agent to
work hard) and the second mover can perfectly observe the ￿rst mover￿ s contribution.
If all agents are self-interested, it is optimal for the ￿rst mover to work very little
in order to induce the second mover to work hard. However, if agents are concerned
about fairness or reciprocity, it may be optimal for the ￿rst mover to work very hard
for the project in order to induce his fellow worker to work very hard as well. An
￿This chapter is joint work with Sandra Ludwig from the University of Munich.An experimental study on information flows in teams 43
important role may be also played by the signal￿ s type: The second mover may observe
how hard the ￿rst mover worked for the team project or how much value he added to
the team output. Take, for example, the development of a new product consisting of a
design and a construction phase. The constructor may observe the e⁄ort the designer
devoted to designing the product (e.g. if their o¢ ces are situated closely together),
or the quality of the design (e.g. results of a customer test series), or both. If the
constructor￿ s and the designer￿ s wages depend only on the quality of the product, a
sel￿sh constructor focuses on the information on the quality of the design, whereas a
fair-minded constructor takes also the designer￿ s e⁄ort into account. This raises the
question how the structure of information ￿ ows in teams a⁄ects behavior.
In order to put this question to a test, we conduct a series of laboratory experiments
in which two team members work sequentially. We observe that on average both agents
work more when the second mover receives an informative signal on the ￿rst mover￿ s
performance. Especially the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort turns out to be a stimulating signal.
In our experiment a team consists of two agents who sequentially decide on their
e⁄ort to contribute to the team output. Prior to the second mover￿ s e⁄ort choice he
observes a signal on the ￿rst mover￿ s performance. The higher an agent￿ s e⁄ort, the
higher is the probability that his contribution to the team output is high rather than
low. An agent￿ s payo⁄ equals his wage minus his e⁄ort costs. Both agents receive the
same wage that positively depends on the team output. The wage scheme is given
exogenously, e.g. by a principal or a market that is not modeled in the game.
As we focus on the pure incentive e⁄ect of di⁄erent information ￿ ows, we vary
the signal across treatments, while we keep everything else constant. Our treatments
are de￿ned according to the degree of information the signal provides about the ￿rst
mover￿ s contribution ￿the only performance variable of the ￿rst mover that is directly
payo⁄ relevant for the second mover. Given the ￿rst mover￿ s contribution, the second
mover￿ s payo⁄does not depend on the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort. In our benchmark treatment
there is no signal at all, while in all other treatments the signal is either the ￿rst mover￿ s
e⁄ort (i.e. an imperfect signal), or the ￿rst mover￿ s contribution (i.e. a perfect signal),
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mover￿ s contribution than observing his contribution only. Still, the e⁄ort provides
additional information about the ￿rst mover￿ s payo⁄.
We implement a wage scheme such that agents￿contributions are substitutes. In
this case standard theory predicts for all treatments with an informative signal that
the second mover￿ s e⁄ort is negatively related to the signal25 and the ￿rst mover works
less than in the benchmark treatment. We observe, however, that on average the
￿rst mover works more when informative signals are available and the second mover
positively reacts to the signals. Even if the second mover observes the ￿rst mover￿ s
contribution and e⁄ort, the second mover￿ s e⁄ort increases in the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort.
This contradicts standard theory since in this case the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort is payo⁄
irrelevant for the second mover. Overall, both agents work more on average when
informative signals are available.
In an extension we test whether these results are robust to the strategic context.
By varying the wage scheme we implement a setting where agents￿contributions are
complements, i.e. the more one agent contributes to the team output, the higher
are the incentives for the other agent to work hard. In this case standard theory
predicts for all treatments with an informative signal that the second mover￿ s e⁄ort is
positively related to the signal and the ￿rst mover works more than in the benchmark
treatment. Similar to before ￿but more consistent with standard theory ￿we ￿nd
that the ￿rst mover works more in the presence of informative signals and the second
mover￿ s e⁄ort increases in the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort. The positive relation with the ￿rst
mover￿ s e⁄ort is again inconsistent with standard theory when both the ￿rst mover￿ s
e⁄ort and contribution are observable. As for substitutes, both agents work more when
informative signals are available.
Overall, our results indicate that standard theory fails to explain how team members
behave when informative signals are available. A simple model of inequity aversion,
however, can largely explain our results. Taking into account that agents care about
payo⁄inequalities, the information on the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort becomes directly relevant
for the second mover￿ s utility: The ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort determines the ￿rst mover￿ s
25If the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort and contribution are observable, the second mover only reacts to the
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e⁄ort costs and, thereby, payo⁄ inequalities.
The issue of team production when agents can observe signals on team mates￿
performance has been addressed in theoretical papers relying on standard preferences
by Goldfayn (2006), Winter (2006a,b), and Ludwig (2008). They ￿nd mixed results
on whether sequentially working teams outperform simultaneously working teams in
which no signals are observable. Their results crucially depend on the team￿ s produc-
tion function and the strategic nature of the game. Moreover, the theoretical paper by
Huck and Rey-Biel (2006) shows that sequentially working teams outperform simul-
taneously working teams when agents dislike e⁄ort inequalities between team mates.
This indicates that also social comparison is crucial in team settings where signals are
available. In our empirical analysis we can address the role of the strategic nature of
the game, di⁄erent signals, and social preferences.
Some empirical studies investigate the e⁄ect of signals in settings where the agents￿
payments are completely independent of those agents￿actions on whom they receive
the signal: Falk and Ichino (2006) study the performance in a real-e⁄ort task when
individuals work either separately or in a shared room. Sausgruber (2009) investigates
behavior in a public good experiment when individuals receive information on the
overall contribution of another group of individuals. Both studies ￿nd that individuals
work or contribute more when signals are available.
Mohnen et al. (2008), in contrast, consider signals in dynamic teams where the
agents￿payments directly depend on those agents￿actions on whom they receive the
signal. Nevertheless, agents￿actions in their setting are strategically independent ac-
cording to standard theory since agents have a dominant strategy. Hence, standard
theory predicts that signals on the other agent￿ s action have no e⁄ect. They conduct
a real-e⁄ort experiment in which two agents work simultaneously in two stages succes-
sively. After the ￿rst stage agents either mutually observe their performance or observe
nothing. They ￿nd that agents work harder in the ￿rst stage and also achieve a better
aggregate team performance when agents receive interim information. While in their
study both agents send and receive a signal, in our study one agent is the sender and
the other one the receiver. Therefore, full commitment of the sender and a reactionAn experimental study on information flows in teams 46
without strategic uncertainty of the receiver are only possible in our study.
Similar to Mohnen et al. (2008), the literature on sequential contributions to public
goods considers signals within groups. The signal in these settings is equal to one or
more predecessors￿contributions. In the standard (linear) public good game agents￿
actions are again strategically independent. Consequently, standard theory predicts no
di⁄erence between sequential and simultaneous contributions. Standard public good
experiments ￿nd that a sequential structure alone does not or only slightly increase
the contributions to the public good, e.g. G￿th et al. (2007), Levati et al. (2007),
Potters et al. (2007), G￿chter et al. (2008), and Rivas and Sutter (2008). These studies
observe, however, that many individuals are conditional cooperators (Fischbacher et
al., 2001), i.e. they contribute if others do so but they do not if others do not con-
tribute. In contrast to the aforementioned studies, G￿chter et al. (2009) implement
a non-standard public good experiment in which actions are strategic substitutes. In
line with their theoretical predictions, sequential contributions result in lower overall
provision than simultaneous contributions. Nevertheless, there is evidence for condi-
tional cooperation. In contrast to our setup, an agent￿ s investment is deterministically
related to his contribution and, in addition, the signal￿ s type does not vary in all these
public good experiments.
Huck and M￿ller (2000) vary the noisiness of the signal a second mover receives on
the ￿rst mover￿ s action. Their experimental setup considerably di⁄ers from a voluntary
contribution game: Its payo⁄s resemble those of a market with quantity competition
and are designed such that fairness considerations do not play a major role. They ￿nd
that behavior converges to the subgame perfect outcome, irrespective of the signal￿ s
noise. While their signals di⁄er in the degree of information, our signals di⁄er in the
type of information: The ￿rst mover￿ s contribution directly a⁄ects both agents￿wages,
the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort directly a⁄ects his e⁄ort costs.
This chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 2.2 we present the experimental design
and procedure, and in Section 2.3 the behavioral predictions and hypotheses. We
summarize our results in Section 2.4. In Section 2.5 we extend our analysis to the case
of complements. We discuss our results in Section 2.6 and conclude in Section 2.7.An experimental study on information flows in teams 47
Figure 2.1: Timeline of the team production setting
2.2 Experimental design and procedure
We consider a team of two agents, agent 1 and agent 2, that generates a team output
T. Agents sequentially exert e⁄ort: First, agent 1 exerts e⁄ort e1 ￿ 0. Second,
agent 2 observes a signal s and, then, exerts e⁄ort e2 ￿ 0. Agent i￿ s e⁄ort ei, with
i 2 f1;2g, does not directly in￿ uence the team output T but the probability that
agent i￿ s contribution to T is high (bi = 1) rather than low (bi = 0), Pr(bi = 1jei) =
p(ei) with p0 (ei) > 0. The probability that agent i￿ s contribution to T is low equals
Pr(bi = 0jei) = 1 ￿ p(ei). p(ei) is independent of ej. The sum of both agents￿
contributions generates the team output T := b1 +b2. Each agent receives a high wage
wH if T = 2, i.e. if the contributions of both agents are high, an intermediate wage
wM if T = 1, i.e. if the contribution of only one agent is high, and a low wage wL
if T = 0, i.e. if the contributions of both agents are low, with wH > wM > wL = 0.
If agent i exerts e⁄ort ei, he incurs private costs c(ei) with c(0) = 0, c0(ei) ￿ 0, and
c00(ei) > 0. Agent i￿ s expected payo⁄is his expected wage minus his e⁄ort costs. Figure
2.1 illustrates the timing of the game.
For our experimental design we choose the following parameters. Agent i 2 f1;2g




e⁄ort of ei yields a high contribution (bi = 1) with probability p(ei) = 0:1 + 0:01 ￿ ei.
The agents￿wages conditional on the team output are wH = 280, wM = 172, and
wL = 0.
In this experimental study we focus on the question how the availability of di⁄erent
signals a⁄ects team mates￿behavior. Hence, we vary s across treatments and keep
everything else constant. Table 2.1 presents our four treatments.An experimental study on information flows in teams 48
Table 2.1: Treatments of the team production setting
Treatment Signal Number of
participants
T-NO no signal 18
T-IMP e1 34
T-P b1 36
T-PPlus e1 and b1 30
As agent 1￿ s contribution ￿in contrast to his e⁄ort ￿directly a⁄ects agent 2￿ s payo⁄,
we de￿ne our treatments according to the degree of information the signal provides
about agent 1￿ s contribution. In treatment T-NO, our benchmark treatment, there is
no signal at all, i.e. s = fg. Hence, agent 1￿ s and agent 2￿ s decision problems are
theoretically identical and so agents behave as if they had to decide simultaneously.26
In treatment T-IMP s = e1 which is an imperfect signal on b1. In treatment T-P s = b1,
i.e. agent 2 receives a perfect signal on b1. In T-PPlus agent 2 receives s = (e1;b1) and
is again perfectly informed on b1. Observing e1 in addition to b1 does, however, not
provide more information on agent 1￿ s contribution.
In each of our experimental sessions the team production setting was played for 14
rounds. Individuals￿roles as well as the treatment conditions were ￿xed for all rounds.
The matching of agents, in contrast, was random such that individuals were not able to
distinguish whether their current team mate had already been matched with them in
a previous round or not. After each round individuals received feedback concerning e1,
e2, b1, b2, and both agents￿payo⁄s of the past round. Therefore, treatment di⁄erences
cannot be explained by shame. Only one randomly determined round was paid for all
participants of a session. At the end of the 14th round individuals were informed which
round is paid. All this was told the participants in the instructions that were handed
out at the beginning of the experiment and were framed as a team work setting.27 In
a post-experimental questionnaire we elicited data on the participants￿sex, subject of
26Empirically, the mere knowledge about the physical timing of moves may a⁄ect behavior even if
the informational condition is equivalent to a simultaneous setting: Du⁄y et al. (2007), for instance,
￿nd that the timing itself matters in a dynamic public good experiment, whereas Masclet et al. (2007)
￿nd that it has no e⁄ect in a standard public good experiment.
27See the appendix for a more detailed description of the procedure of a session and translated
instructions. Original instructions are written in German and are available upon request.An experimental study on information flows in teams 49
studies and risk attitude28.
Our experimental sessions were run at the Munich Experimental Laboratory for
Economic and Social Sciences (MELESSA) in Germany in 2008. 118 individuals par-
ticipated in the experiment. They were randomly assigned to sessions and could take
part in one session only. For the recruitment we used the software ORSEE by Greiner
(2004). The experiment was programmed and conducted with the experimental soft-
ware z-Tree by Fischbacher (2007). The sessions lasted about 1 hour. Individuals
earned on average 12.6 e (at the time of the experiment 1 e ￿ 1.57 USD), including
a show-up fee of 7 e29.
2.3 Behavioral predictions and hypotheses
In this section we derive behavioral predictions on how agents in a team react when one
member receives a signal on his colleague￿ s performance. As a benchmark, we consider
the standard neoclassical approach.
2.3.1 Behavioral predictions of a self-interest model
The standard neoclassical approach assumes that all individuals are sel￿sh, i.e. their
utility depends only on their own material payo⁄ and increases in this payo⁄. Fur-
thermore, we assume that all individuals maximize their expected utility and are risk-
neutral.
T-NO
If there is no signal at all, we solve for the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous move
game. Agent i￿ s expected payo⁄ given agent j chooses ej, with i;j 2 f1;2g and j 6= i,
28Individuals indicated on a scale ranging from 0 to 10 whether they are willing to take risks (or
try to avoid risks). 0 represented a very weak willingness to take risks, while 10 represented a strong
willingness to take risks. Dohmen et al. (2005) show that this general risk question is a good predictor
of actual risk-taking behavior.
29We chose a relatively high show-up fee as losses were deducted from the show-up fee. This was
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and wL = 0 is




Maximizing Ui (ei;ej) with respect to ei, agent i￿ s reaction function is
e￿
i(ej) = 0:4 ￿ [wM + (0:1 + 0:01 ￿ ej) ￿ (wH ￿ 2 ￿ wM)].
e￿
i(ej) strictly increases in ej if wH > 2￿wM, while it strictly decreases if wH < 2￿wM.
Hence, e⁄orts are strategic complements if wH > 2 ￿ wM, while they are strategic
substitutes in our setting as wH < 2 ￿ wM. Solving for the intersection of both agents￿
reaction functions and substituting wH = 280 and wM = 172, we derive the unique





In T-IMP agent 2 receives the signal s = e1 and we solve for the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium given s = e1. Agent 2￿ s reaction to s = e1 is equivalent to his reaction
function in T-NO, i.e.
e￿
2(s) = 0:4 ￿ [wM + (0:1 + 0:01 ￿ s) ￿ (wH ￿ 2 ￿ wM)].
Equivalently to above, e￿
2(s) strictly increases (decreases) in s = e1 if wH >(<)2 ￿ wM.
e￿
2(s) = e￿
2(e1) maximizes agent 2￿ s expected payo⁄ U2 (e2;s) given s = e1. Agent 1
anticipates agent 2￿ s reaction to s and maximizes his own expected payo⁄
U1 (e1;e￿
2(e1)) =
wH ￿ p(e1) ￿ p(e￿
2(e1)) + wM ￿ [p(e1) ￿ (1 ￿ p(e￿





with respect to e1. Agent 1￿ s expected payo⁄ is maximized at e1 = 1:616256
0:0434464 ￿ 37:20.
Consequently, in the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium e1 = s ￿ 37:20 and
e2 = 2:464128
0:0434464 ￿ 56:72 according to agent 2￿ s reaction (e￿
2(e1) = 66:24 ￿ 0:256 ￿ e1).An experimental study on information flows in teams 51
T-P
In T-P we solve for the unique Nash equilibrium given s = b1. Agent 2￿ s expected
payo⁄ given agent 1￿ s contribution is high, i.e. s = b1 = 1, is





U2 (e2;b1 = 1) is maximized at e￿
2(b1 = 1) = 0:4 ￿ (wH ￿ wM) = 43:20. Agent 2￿ s
expected payo⁄ given agent 1￿ s contribution is low, i.e. s = b1 = 0, is





U2 (e2;b1 = 0) is maximized at e￿
2(b1 = 0) = 0:4 ￿ wM = 68:80. Note that e￿
2(b1 =
1) >(<)e￿
2(b1 = 0) if wH >(<)2 ￿ wM. Agent 1 anticipates agent 2￿ s reaction to s and
maximizes his own expected payo⁄
U1 (e1;e￿
2(b1)) = wH ￿ p(e1) ￿ p(e￿
2(b1 = 1)) + wM ￿
[p(e1) ￿ (1 ￿ p(e￿
2(b1 = 1))) + (1 ￿ p(e1)) ￿ p(e￿




with respect to e1. e1 = 37:568 maximizes U1 (e1;e￿
2(b1)). Hence, in the unique Nash
equilibrium e1 = 37:568, e￿
2(b1 = 1) = 43:20, and e￿
2(b1 = 0) = 68:80.
T-PPlus
In T-PPlus agent 2 also observes agent 1￿ s e⁄ort (in addition to his contribution). This
additional piece of information does, however, neither in￿ uence agent 2￿ s expected
payo⁄ nor his reaction to s in comparison to T-P since agent 2￿ s expected payo⁄ is
independent of e1 given b1 (cf. Equations 2.1 and 2.2). Consequently, agent 1￿ s decision
problem is the same as in T-P. Thus, in the unique Nash equilibrium e1 = 37:568,
e￿
2(b1 = 1) = 43:20, and e￿
2(b1 = 0) = 68:80.
Table 2.2 summarizes the predictions of the standard self-interest model. In all
treatments agents work ine¢ ciently little since an e⁄ort of 80 always maximizes theAn experimental study on information flows in teams 52
sum of payo⁄s.
Table 2.2: Behavioral predictions of e1 and e2
Treatment e1 e2
T-NO 52.74 52.74
T-IMP 37.20 66.24 - 0.256 * e1 = 56.72
T-P 37.57 43.20 if b1 = 1
68.80 if b1 = 0
T-PPlus 37.57 43.20 if b1 = 1
68.80 if b1 = 0
The predictions are rounded to two digits after the
decimal point.
2.3.2 Hypotheses
Based on the predictions of the self-interest model, we formulate the following hypothe-
ses.
Hypothesis 2.1: Decreasing reaction of the second mover to informative signals:
(i) In T-IMP the second mover exerts less e⁄ort the higher the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort.
(ii) In T-P and T-PPlus the second mover exerts less e⁄ort when the ￿rst mover￿ s
contribution is high than when it is low.
If wH < 2 ￿ wM, the second mover faces higher incentives to work when either the
￿rst mover works less in T-IMP, or when the ￿rst mover￿ s contribution is low rather
than high in T-P and T-PPlus.
Hypothesis 2.2: Less e⁄ort of the ￿rst mover when signals are informative: The
￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort is smaller in T-IMP, T-P, and T-PPlus than in T-NO.
If wH < 2 ￿ wM, the ￿rst mover leans back when signals are informative. This is
due to the ￿rst mover￿ s anticipation that the second mover works more the smaller the
informative signal. Hence, by working less he can shift work load to the second mover
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Hypothesis 2.3: No additional information by the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort when the
￿rst mover￿ s contribution is known: E⁄orts in T-P and T-PPlus are the same.
As individuals only care about their own expected payo⁄, the information on the
￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort in addition to the information on the ￿rst mover￿ s contribution does
not alter the second mover￿ s maximization problem. Therefore, both agents￿decisions
are identical in T-P and T-PPlus.
2.4 Results
First, we focus on the second mover￿ s behavior and analyze how it is a⁄ected by di⁄erent
signals. Then, we consider the ￿rst mover￿ s behavior.
2.4.1 The second mover￿ s behavior
Table 2.3 reports for each treatment the mean and the standard deviation of the second
mover￿ s e⁄ort across individuals and all rounds.
Table 2.3: Mean and standard deviation of e2
Treatment Mean Standard Number of
deviation observations
T-NO 50.29 13.23 126
T-NO* 49.07 14.21 252
T-IMP 53.49 23.98 238
T-P 54.25 23.72 252
T-PPlus 55.26 18.34 210
*: e1 and e2 are considered.
In T-NO the second mover￿ s average e⁄ort is around 50 (with or without the de-
cisions of the ￿rst movers)30 which is close to our prediction of about 52.74. If, in
contrast, an informative signal is available for the second mover, the second mover
works more on average. This may be caused by the signal￿ s realized value the second
30As in T-NO the second mover does not receive a signal prior to his decision, the ￿rst mover￿ s
decision problem is theoretically identical to the second mover￿ s decision problem. Therefore, both
agents￿decisions of T-NO may be considered in the analysis of the second mover￿ s behavior.An experimental study on information flows in teams 54
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mover observes in these treatments. In the following we, therefore, illustrate how the
second mover reacts to the signals. The second mover￿ s average reaction to the ￿rst
mover￿ s contribution is considerably di⁄erent than predicted: In T-P the second mover
works more when the ￿rst mover￿ s contribution is high rather than low, and in T-
PPlus the second mover￿ s average e⁄ort does not vary in the ￿rst mover￿ s contribution.
Figure 2.2 reports the second mover￿ s average e⁄ort conditional on the ￿rst mover￿ s
contribution in T-P and T-PPlus.
If we consider the second mover￿ s reaction to the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort in T-IMP and
T-PPlus, we ￿nd that the second mover￿ s e⁄ort is positively correlated with the ￿rst
mover￿ s e⁄ort: In T-IMP and in T-PPlus the correlation coe¢ cient is equal to 0.24 and
0.12, respectively. The self-interest model, in contrast, predicts a negative correlation
in T-IMP and no correlation in T-PPlus.
In order to analyze the second mover￿ s behavior more closely and to test our hy-
potheses regarding the second mover, we regress the second mover￿ s e⁄ort31 on treat-
ment dummies, the interactions of treatments dummies with available signals, and
control variables such as sex and risk aversion32. In the ￿rst two columns of Table
31In our regressions we also consider the ￿rst mover￿ s decisions in T-NO. Our results do not change
considerably when we only consider the second mover￿ s decisions.
32We create the variable for risk aversion from our measure of risk attitude that we elicited in the
post-experimental questionnaire.An experimental study on information flows in teams 55
2.4 we report the results of two random e⁄ects panel regressions where one (Tobit)
captures that our dependent variable is (weakly) between 0 and 80.
Table 2.4: Regression results on e2 and e1
Dependent variable: e2 e2 e1 e1
Panel (re) Panel (re) Panel (re) Panel (re)
(Tobit) (Tobit)
Intercept +47.30 +46.73 +45.58 +44.65
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
T-IMP - 09.72 - 13.17 +07.49 +07.72)
(0.066) (0.045) (0.092) (0.124)
T-P - 01.44 - 01.73 +02.54 +01.88
(0.737) (0.752) (0.568) (0.707)
T-PPlus - 05.46 - 05.65 +10.66 +12.17
(0.432) (0.496) (0.020) (0.019)
T-IMP * e1 +00.24 +00.34
(0.000) (0.000)
T-PPlus * e1 +00.25 +00.27
(0.008) (0.014)
T-P * b1 +12.56 +16.01
(0.000) (0.000)
T-PPlus * b1 - 02.88 - 03.03
(0.275) (0.313)
Sex +05.65 +08.05 +06.85 +08.54
(1 if male, 0 else) (0.059) (0.035) (0.040) (0.023)
Risk aversion - 01.65 - 02.88 - 02.53 - 01.92
(1 if risk averse, 0 else) (0.582) (0.453) (0.454) (0.617)
Number of observations 952 952 952 952
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.069 0.089
(re): random e⁄ects
In all four regressions e1 and e2 in T-NO are considered.
Numbers in brackets represent the p-values of the coe¢ cients.
When only the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort is observable (T-IMP), the second mover￿ s e⁄ort
signi￿cantly increases in the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort. When only the ￿rst mover￿ s contri-
bution is observable (T-P), the second mover￿ s e⁄ort signi￿cantly increases in the ￿rst
mover￿ s contribution. When both the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort and contribution are observ-
able (T-PPlus), the second mover￿ s e⁄ort signi￿cantly increases in the ￿rst mover￿ s
e⁄ort. We do, however, not ￿nd a signi￿cant e⁄ect of the ￿rst mover￿ s contribution
on the second mover￿ s e⁄ort in T-PPlus. These results con￿rm our previous observa-
tions from Figure 2.2 and from the correlation coe¢ cients in T-IMP and T-PPlus: In
contrast to our predictions, the second mover positively reacts to informative signalsAn experimental study on information flows in teams 56
￿in T-PPlus at least to the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort. The ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort seems to be
an especially stimulating signal as it even a⁄ects the second mover￿ s e⁄ort in T-PPlus.
Consequently, we reject Hypotheses 2.1(i) and 2.1(ii). We also reject Hypothesis 2.3
since the second mover￿ s behavior in T-PPlus varies with the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort and,
therefore, does not equal the second mover￿ s behavior in T-P.
We summarize our ￿ndings on the second mover￿ s behavior in the following three
results:
Result 2.1: Higher average e⁄ort of the second mover in T-IMP, T-P, and T-
PPlus than in T-NO: On average the second mover exerts more e⁄ort when informative
signals are available for the second mover.
Result 2.2: Increasing reaction of the second mover in T-IMP, T-P, and T-PPlus:
In contrast to Hypotheses 2.1(i) and 2.1(ii), the second mover exerts more e⁄ort, the
higher the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort in T-IMP and T-PPlus, or the higher the ￿rst mover￿ s
contribution in T-P.
Result 2.3: E⁄ect of the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort on the second mover￿ s behavior when
the ￿rst mover￿ s contribution is observable: In contrast to Hypothesis 2.3, the second
mover￿ s e⁄ort increases in the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort in T-PPlus.
2.4.2 The ￿rst mover￿ s behavior
We now turn to the ￿rst mover. Our theoretical predictions of the ￿rst mover￿ s be-
havior are based on the fact that the ￿rst mover expects the second mover to react
as predicted by the self-interest model. Yet, the second mover￿ s behavior systemati-
cally deviates from the predictions. The ￿rst mover may anticipate the second mover￿ s
actual behavior and, therefore, behave di⁄erently than hypothesized even if he maxi-
mizes his own material payo⁄. Table 2.5 reports for each treatment the mean and the
standard deviation of the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort across individuals and rounds. Similar to
the second mover￿ s behavior in T-NO, the ￿rst mover￿ s average e⁄ort in T-NO is about
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Table 2.5: Mean and standard deviation of e1
Treatment Mean Standard Number of
deviation observations
T-NO 47.84 15.08 126
T-NO* 49.07 14.21 252
T-IMP 55.26 17.74 238
T-P 49.28 24.15 252
T-PPlus 58.43 13.34 210
*: e1 and e2 are considered.
an informative signal the ￿rst mover works more than in T-NO and considerably more
than predicted. Thus, the ￿rst mover does on average not lean back when the second
mover receives an informative signal. One can show that ￿given the actual behavior of
the second movers ￿it paid o⁄ for ￿rst movers to work more when informative signals
are available.
In order to test our hypotheses regarding the ￿rst mover, we regress the ￿rst mover￿ s
e⁄ort on treatment dummies and control variables such as sex and risk aversion.33 In
the third and fourth column of Table 2.4 we report the results of two random e⁄ects
panel regression where one (Tobit) captures that our dependent variable is (weakly)
between 0 and 80.
When the second mover only observes the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort (T-IMP), the ￿rst
mover works (marginally) signi￿cantly more compared to T-NO. When the second
mover observes only the ￿rst mover￿ s contribution (T-P), the ￿rst mover neither works
signi￿cantly more nor less compared to T-NO. When the second mover observes both
the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort and contribution (T-PPlus), the ￿rst mover works signi￿cantly
more than in T-NO. Thus, the availability of signals (weakly) increases the ￿rst mover￿ s
e⁄ort. Especially the observability of his e⁄ort stimulates the ￿rst mover to work more.
The reason may be that the second mover positively reacts to the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort
and the ￿rst mover anticipates this. Although the second mover positively reacts to
the ￿rst mover￿ s contribution in T-P, the ￿rst mover does not work signi￿cantly more
in T-P than in T-NO. The reason may be that the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort does not directly
33In our regressions we also consider the second mover￿ s decisions in T-NO. Our results do not
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map into his contribution. On the basis of these results, we reject Hypothesis 2.2. We
also reject Hypothesis 2.3 since the coe¢ cient of T-PPlus is signi￿cantly larger than
the one of T-P in both regressions. These ￿ndings are summarized in the following two
results:
Result 2.4: No decreasing e⁄ect of informative signals on the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort:
On average, the ￿rst mover works more in T-IMP, T-P, and T-PPlus than in T-NO.
In T-IMP and T-PPlus, in which the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort is observable, the ￿rst mover
works (marginally) signi￿cantly more than in T-NO.
Result 2.5: E⁄ect of the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort on his behavior when the ￿rst mover￿ s
contribution is observable: In contrast to Hypothesis 2.3, the ￿rst mover exerts more
e⁄ort when the second mover can observe the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort in addition to his
contribution.
Our results show that both the ￿rst and the second mover￿ s behavior systematically
di⁄er from the predictions of the self-interest model when informative signals on the ￿rst
mover￿ s performance are available. The second mover positively reacts to informative
signals, especially to the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort, and on average both agents work more.
Finally, we test whether the sum of the ￿rst and the second mover￿ s e⁄ort is higher
when informative signals are available. Table 2.6 presents the results of two random
e⁄ects panel regressions where we regress the sum of the ￿rst and the second mover￿ s
e⁄ort on treatment dummies. In one of these regressions (Tobit) we capture that the
sum of the ￿rst mover￿ s and the second mover￿ s e⁄ort is (weakly) between 0 and 160.
When informative signals are available, the sum of e⁄orts is at least as high as
in T-NO. When the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort is available for the second mover (T-IMP or
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Table 2.6: Regression results on the sum of e1 and e2
Dependent variable: e1 + e2 e1 + e2










Number of observations 826 826
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.031
(re): random e⁄ects
Numbers in brackets represent the p-values of the coe¢ cients.
2.5 Extension
So far, we have focused on the case of substitutes in which wH < 2￿wM. In this section
we vary the strategic setting and consider the opposite case, i.e. wH > 2￿wM, to check
whether our results still hold when agents￿contributions are complements. We invited
130 additional individuals in order to run our four treatments with wM = 110 instead
of wM = 172. All other parameters of the game remained the same. Table 2.7 presents
our additional treatments that are indicated by X.
Table 2.7: Additional treatments of the team production setting
Treatment Signal Number of
participants
T-NOX no signal 18
T-IMPX e1 36
T-PX b1 38
T-PPlusX e1 and b1 38
As described in Section 2.3, e⁄orts are strategic complements in T-NOX and the
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T-PPlusX.34 Furthermore, the self-interest model predicts the ￿rst mover to not work
less but more when informative signals are available. Similar to the case of substi-
tutes, no treatment di⁄erences are predicted between T-PX and T-PPlusX. Table 2.8
summarizes the predictions of the self-interest model for our additional treatments.35
Table 2.8: Behavioral predictions for the additional treatments
Treatment e1 e2
T-NOX 61.05 61.05
T-IMPX 77.61 46.40 + 0.240 * e1 = 65.02
T-PX 73.28 68.00 if b1 = 1
44.00 if b1 = 0
T-PPlusX 73.28 68.00 if b1 = 1
44.00 if b1 = 0
The predictions are rounded to two digits after the
decimal point.
Based on these predictions we formulate the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 2.4: Increasing reaction of the second mover when signals are infor-
mative and wM = 110:
(i) In T-IMPX the second mover exerts more e⁄ort the higher the ￿rst mover￿ s
e⁄ort.
(ii) In T-PX and T-PPlusX the second mover exerts more e⁄ort when the ￿rst
mover￿ s contribution is high than when it is low.
If wH > 2 ￿ wM, the second mover faces higher incentives to work when the ￿rst
mover works more in T-IMPX, or when the ￿rst mover￿ s contribution is high rather
than low in T-PX and T-PPlusX.
Hypothesis 2.5: Higher e⁄ort of the ￿rst mover when signals are informative and
wM = 110: The ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort is higher in T-IMPX, T-PX, and T-PPlusX than
in T-NOX.
34In T-PPlusX the increasing reaction only refers to the ￿rst mover￿ s contribution and not to his
e⁄ort. This is analogous to T-PPlus.
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The ￿rst mover anticipates that the second mover positively reacts to the informa-
tive signals and that he can, therefore, induce the second mover to exert a high e⁄ort
by working a lot in T-IMPX, T-PX, and T-PPlusX.
Hypothesis 2.6: No e⁄ect of the additional information on the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort
when the ￿rst mover￿ s contribution is known and wM = 110: E⁄orts in T-PX and T-
PPlusX are the same.
Table 2.9 reports the average behavior of both agents in our additional treatments.
Table 2.9: Mean of e1 and e2 in the additional treatments
Treatment Mean of e1 Mean of e2 Number of
observations
T-NOX 45.37 46.53 126
T-NOX* 45.95 45.95 252
T-IMPX 62.27 59.67 252
T-PX 61.05 61.88 266
if b1 = 1 61.60 199
if b1 = 0 62.70 67
T-PPlusX 55.54 55.82 266
if b1 = 1 62.94 155
if b1 = 0 45.88 111
*: e1 and e2 are considered.
In T-NOX agents work on average about 46 which is lower than the prediction of
about 61.05. As wM is smaller than in the case of substitutes (and wH and wL remained
the same), agents may be less motivated to exert e⁄ort. Similar to the previous section,
both agents work more on average when the second mover receives an informative
signal. The second mover￿ s reaction to the ￿rst mover￿ s contribution di⁄ers, however,
compared to what we observed for substitutes: In T-PX the second mover￿ s average
e⁄ort does not vary with the ￿rst mover￿ s contribution, while in T-PPlusX the second
mover on average works more when the ￿rst mover￿ s contribution is high than when it
is low.
In order to analyze behavior more closely and to test our hypotheses for the ad-
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teractions of treatments dummies with available signals, and control variables and we
regress the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort on treatment dummies, and control variables.36 Table
2.10 reports our regression results.
Table 2.10: Regression results on e2 and e1 in the additional treatments
Dependent variable: e2 e2 e1 e1
Panel (re) Panel (re) Panel (re) Panel (re)
(Tobit) (Tobit)
Intercept +46.08 +44.79 +43.52 +42.56
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
T-IMPX - 09.85 - 13.09 +17.23 +20.58
(0.083) (0.076) (0.001) (0.001)
T-PX +14.96 +20.67 +14.08 +19.09
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.003)
T-PPlusX - 12.64 - 14.38 +09.15 +11.75
(0.003) (0.010) (0.066) (0.064)
T-IMPX * e1 +00.37 +00.48
(0.000) (0.000)
T-PPlusX * e1 +00.30 +00.34
(0.000) (0.000)
T-PX * b1 +00.41 +00.72
(0.863) (0.814)
T-PPlusX * b1 +09.22 +11.08
(0.000) (0.000)
Sex +01.02 +02.73 +05.46 +06.48
(1 if male, 0 else) (0.680) (0.421) (0.133) (0.162)
Number of observations 1036 1036 1036 1036
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.173 0.106
(re): random e⁄ects
In all four regressions e1 and e2 in T-NOX are considered.
Numbers in brackets represent the p-values of the coe¢ cients.
Similar to the results for substitutes, the second mover￿ s e⁄ort signi￿cantly increases
in the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort in T-IMPX. The coe¢ cient of the interaction of T-IMPX with
the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort is even signi￿cantly larger than the predicted 0.24. In contrast
to Hypothesis 2.4(ii) and the results for substitutes, the second mover￿ s e⁄ort does
not increase in the ￿rst mover￿ s contribution in T-PX. In T-PPlusX, however, the
second mover￿ s e⁄ort signi￿cantly increases in both the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort and his
contribution. Hence, the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort, again, is a very stimulating signal for
the second mover, while the ￿rst mover￿ s contribution signi￿cantly a⁄ects the second
36In our regressions we again consider the ￿rst and the second mover￿ s decisions in T-NOX. Our
results do not change considerably if we separately consider the ￿rst mover￿ s and the second mover￿ s
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mover￿ s e⁄ort only if also the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort is observable. With respect to the
￿rst mover￿ s behavior we ￿nd that in all treatments with informative signals the ￿rst
mover works signi￿cantly more than in our benchmark treatment. On the basis of these
results, we reject Hypothesis 2.4(ii) with respect to T-PX. We also reject Hypothesis
2.6 regarding the second mover￿ s behavior as his e⁄ort in T-PPlusX varies with the
￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort and contribution, while it is independent of both in T-PX. We
summarize our ￿ndings in the following results.
Result 2.6: Higher average e⁄ort in T-IMPX, T-PX, and T-PPlusX than in T-
NOX: On average, the ￿rst and the second mover exert more e⁄ort when informative
signals are available.
Result 2.7: Increasing reaction of the second mover in T-IMPX and T-PPlusX:
In line with Hypotheses 2.4(i) and 2.4(ii), the second mover works more the higher the
￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort in T-IMPX, and the higher the ￿rst mover￿ s contribution in T-
PPlusX. In T-PX the ￿rst mover￿ s contribution does not signi￿cantly a⁄ect the second
mover￿ s e⁄ort.
Result 2.8: Increasing e⁄ect of informative signals on the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort
when wM = 110: The ￿rst mover works signi￿cantly more in T-IMPX, T-PX, and
T-PPlusX than in T-NOX.
Result 2.9: E⁄ect of the additional information on the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort on the
second mover￿ s behavior when wM = 110: In contrast to Hypothesis 2.6, the second
mover￿ s e⁄ort increases in the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort in T-PPlusX. The ￿rst mover￿ s
behavior does, however, not di⁄er between T-PX and T-PPlusX.
2.6 Discussion
Our results of both the case of substitutes and complements show that (i) the sec-
ond mover positively reacts to the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort when the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort is
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mover￿ s contribution when the ￿rst mover￿ s contribution is the only available signal,
(iii) the second mover positively reacts to the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort when the ￿rst mover￿ s
e⁄ort and contribution are observable, and (iv) the ￿rst mover does not lean back
but (weakly) forward when informative signals are available. These observations are
inconsistent with the predictions of the self-interest model.
We try to explain our data with an alternative model that considers elements of
social comparison. If individuals compare their payo⁄ with their team mate￿ s payo⁄,
the information on the team mate￿ s e⁄ort becomes crucial ￿even if the information on
the team mate￿ s contribution is given. This is because the team mate receives the same
wage and his payo⁄ may only di⁄er due to a di⁄erent e⁄ort level. In order to make a
converse assumption to the self-interest model, we make the extreme assumption that
all individuals are inequity averse. We choose the inequity aversion model by Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) as it has proved to explain human behavior in series of di⁄erent games
and is comparably simple.37 Inequity averse agents dislike payo⁄ inequalities which
implies for our team setting that they dislike e⁄ort inequalities (as they receive the
same wage).
We summarize the main predictions of our alternative model as follows:38 If only
the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort is observable (in T-IMP and T-IMPX), the second mover￿ s e⁄ort
increases in the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort39, and the ￿rst mover works at least as much than
if no informative signal is available (in T-NO and T-NOX). If only the ￿rst mover￿ s
contribution is observable (in T-P and T-PX), the second mover does not react to
the ￿rst mover￿ s contribution, and the range of the ￿rst mover￿ s equilibrium e⁄ort
is about the same as if no informative signal is available. If the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort
and contribution are observable (in T-PPlus and T-PPlusX), the second mover￿ s e⁄ort
increases in the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort and is constant in the ￿rst mover￿ s contribution40,
37Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) also model inequity aversion. For the sake of simplicity, however,
we focus on the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). In particular, we assume that the parameter of
aversion to disadvantageous inequity is ￿ = 2 and the parameter of aversion to advantageous inequity
is ￿ = 0:6. These values were also assumed in Fehr et al. (2007, 2008) for inequity averse individuals
in order to explain observed behavior.
38The detailed predictions and their derivations are in the appendix.
39In T-IMP the second mover￿ s reaction decreases for e1 < 66:24
3:256 ￿ 20:34. Yet, more than 95 % of
our observations of e1 are strictly larger than 20.34.
40In T-PPlus (T-PPlusX) this holds for e1 > 68:8
3 ￿ 22:93 (68
3 ￿22.67). Yet, more than 99 % (84
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and the ￿rst mover works at least as much than if no informative signal is available.
In T-IMP and T-IMPX our observations are in line with the predictions of the model
of inequity aversion for both agents: The corresponding coe¢ cients are signi￿cantly
positive (cf. Tables 2.4 and 2.10).
For T-P and T-PX the model of inequity aversion predicts that the second mover
chooses the same e⁄ort independent of the ￿rst mover￿ s contribution. In equilibrium
the second mover knows the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort. Therefore, the signal b1 does not
give any additional information on the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort. If the second mover is
inequity averse, he tries to match the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort independent of b1. In T-P
we observe that the second mover exerts more e⁄ort if the ￿rst mover￿ s contribution is
high (cf. Table 2.4), which is inconsistent with the predictions of the model of inequity
aversion and also the self-interest model. In line with the model of inequity aversion, we
observe in T-PX that the second mover does not react to the ￿rst mover￿ s contribution
(cf. Table 2.10). As the model of inequity aversion predicts multiple equilibria for T-P
and T-PX, it is not clear for the second mover which e⁄ort the ￿rst mover has chosen.
Thus, one may argue that the signal b1 provides some information to the second mover
whether the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort was rather high or low. As a low contribution rather
indicates a low e⁄ort, the second mover￿ s behavior in T-P could be interpreted as a
punishment of the ￿rst mover for choosing a low e⁄ort. Why does this argument not
hold for T-PX? Figure 2.2 and Table 2.9 show that the second mover￿ s e⁄ort after
a high contribution is similar in T-P as in T-PX, but after a low contribution the
second mover￿ s e⁄ort is lower in T-P than in T-PX. Hence, there seems to be no such
punishment in T-PX. This observation could be related to the fact that in T-PX the
second mover ex ante has a second mover advantage in terms of material payo⁄s, while
in T-P there is a ￿rst mover advantage. If an agent faces an ex ante advantage, he
may hesitate to punish his team mate in an environment where e⁄ort is unobservable
and he cannot be sure whether his team mate, indeed, exerted a low e⁄ort. Regarding
the ￿rst mover￿ s behavior in T-P and T-PX, we observe that he works at least as much
as if no informative signal is available. This does not contradict the prediction of the
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In T-PPlus and T-PPlusX the second mover positively reacts to the ￿rst mover￿ s
e⁄ort, and the ￿rst mover works at least as much as if no informative signal is available
(cf. Tables 2.4 and 2.10). Furthermore, the second mover does not react to the ￿rst
mover￿ s contribution in T-PPlus. These results are in line with the model of inequity
aversion. We observe that the second mover positively reacts to the ￿rst mover￿ s
contribution in T-PPlusX, which is in line with the self-interest model but only in line
with the inequity aversion model for a small range of e1 (cf. Footnote 40).
Overall, our model of inequity aversion with the extreme assumption that all in-
dividuals are inequity averse largely explains our results. Nevertheless, our simple
parameterization, in particular that all individuals are inequity averse with the cor-
responding parameters, does not comply with all of our observations. This concerns
especially the exact point predictions. Anyhow, our results suggest that social com-
parison plays a crucial role in teams and shapes behavior: The reaction to signals may
be contrary to the predictions of the self-interest model and signals that are predicted
to have no e⁄ect may, in fact, be in￿ uential.
2.7 Conclusion
We have presented an experimental study on teams in which one team member receives
a signal on his colleague￿ s performance prior to his own decision. We observe that both
the ￿rst and the second mover tend to work more on average when informative signals
are available. This holds when agents￿contributions are substitutes as well as when
they are complements. Especially the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort seems to be a stimulating
signal: If the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort is observable, the second mover works more the higher
the ￿rst mover￿ s e⁄ort, and the ￿rst mover chooses a higher e⁄ort. This observation is
independent of whether the ￿rst mover￿ s contribution is observable or not. If the ￿rst
mover￿ s contribution is the only observable signal, the second mover reacts (weakly)
positively and the ￿rst mover works (weakly) more. If the ￿rst mover￿ s contribution is
observable in addition to his e⁄ort, the second mover does not react to the contribution
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Overall, the self-interest model fails to capture our results, while a simple model of
inequity aversion largely explains behavior. Therefore, we conclude that social com-
parison plays a crucial role in teams in which informative signals are available. Agents￿
behavior may not only be contrary to the predictions of the self-interest model but also
signals that are predicted to have no e⁄ect may, in fact, be in￿ uential and signals that
are predicted to have an e⁄ect may be redundant.
Our results suggest that signals in teams may reduce free-riding irrespective of
the strategic context. Providing information on e⁄ort seems to be an e⁄ective way
to achieve more e¢ cient outcomes. With regard to the organization of teams it seems
particularly promising if agents work closely together: In this case they are not only able
to observe their colleagues￿e⁄orts but also social comparison may be very pronounced.
2.8 Appendix
2.8.1 Experimental sessions
The order of events during each experimental session was the following: Individuals
were welcomed and randomly assigned a cubicle in the laboratory where they took
their decisions in complete anonymity from the other participants. The random alloca-
tion to a cubicle also determined an individual￿ s role. Individuals were handed out the
instructions for the experiment and the experimenter read them aloud. Then, individ-
uals had time to go through the instructions on their own and ask questions. After all
individuals had ￿nished going through the instructions and all remaining questions had
been answered, we proceeded to the decision stages. After the 14th round individuals
were informed about which of the 14 rounds is paid for all participants of the session,
and their payment. We ￿nished each experimental session by letting individuals an-
swer a questionnaire that asked for demographic characteristics such as sex, subject
of studies, and risk attitude. We also asked individuals to describe how they came to
their decisions.
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In the following we give a translation of the instructions for T-NO. Instructions for the
other treatments are as similar to T-NO as possible, with the di⁄erence being the
description of what worker 2 knows when choosing his e⁄ort.
2.8.2 Translated instructions for T-NO
Instructions for the experiment
Welcome to this experiment. You and the other participants are asked to make deci-
sions. At the end of the experiment you will be paid in cash according to
your decisions and the decisions of the other participants. In addition, you
receive a payment of 7 Euro.
During the whole experiment you are not allowed to speak to other participants, to
use cell phones, or to start any other program on the computer. If you have questions,
please raise your hand. An instructor of the experiment will then come to your seat to
answer your questions.
During the experiment we do not speak of Euros but of points. Your payment will
initially be calculated in points. At the end of the experiment your actual amount of
total points will be converted into Euro according to the following exchange rate:
1 point = 4 Eurocents.
In this experiment there are participants in the role of worker 1 and participants in
the role of worker 2. One worker 1 and one worker 2 form a work team. When the
experiment starts, you will be informed whether you are in the role of worker 1 or
worker 2. The roles are assigned randomly. During the whole experiment that consists
of 14 rounds you keep your assigned role. At the beginning of each round it will be
determined anew which workers 1 and workers 2 form work groups. This assignment
is random and anonymous. No participant receives any information about the identity
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The procedure of a round
One worker 1 and one worker 2 form a work group that has to complete two tasks. Each
task can be completed with either high or low quality. Whether a task is completed
with high or low quality, depends on a worker￿ s e⁄ort and on chance.
At the beginning of each round worker 1 chooses his e⁄ort X1. X1 is an integer
between 0 and 80 (including 0 and 80). The e⁄ort chosen by worker 1 in￿ uences the
probability that the ￿rst task is completed with high quality and, therefore, also the
probability that the ￿rst task is completed with low quality. The probability that
the ￿rst task is completed with high quality is (10 + e⁄ort of worker 1) percent.
Accordingly, the probability that the ￿rst task is completed with low quality is (90 ￿
e⁄ort of worker 1) percent.
Probability that the ￿rst task is completed with high quality
=(10 + X1) %
Probability that the ￿rst task is completed with low quality
=(90 ￿ X1) %
Examples: If worker 1 chooses an e⁄ort of 17, the ￿rst task will be completed with
high quality with a probability of 27 % and with low quality with a probability of 73
%. If worker 1 chooses an e⁄ort of 72, the ￿rst task is completed with high quality
with a probability of 82 % and with low quality with a probability of 18 %.
After worker 1 has chosen his e⁄ort X1, worker 2 chooses his e⁄ort X2. At
this point in time worker 2 is neither informed about the e⁄ort of worker 1 nor about
the quality with which ￿rst task is completed. Worker 2 chooses an e⁄ort that is an
integer between 0 and 80 (including 0 and 80). The chosen e⁄ort of worker 2 in￿ uences
the probability that the second task is completed with high quality and, therefore, also
the probability that the second task is completed with low quality. The probability
that the second task is completed with high quality is (10 + e⁄ort of worker 2) percent.
Accordingly, the probability that the second task is completed with low quality is (90
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Probability that the second task is completed with high quality
=(10 + X2) %
Probability that the second task is completed with low quality
=(90 ￿ X2) %
Examples: If worker 2 chooses an e⁄ort of 17, the second task will be completed with
high quality with a probability of 27 % and with low quality with a probability of 73
%. If worker 2 chooses an e⁄ort of 72, the second task is completed with high quality
with a probability of 82 % and with low quality with a probability of 18 %.
The wage of the workers in a work group depends on the quality with which both
tasks are completed:
￿ If both tasks are completed with high quality, both workers receive a wage of
280 points each.
￿ If one task is completed with high and the other task with low quality, both
workers receive a wage of 172 points each.
￿ If both tasks are completed with low quality, both workers receive a wage of 0
points each.
Each worker bears the e⁄ort costs for his e⁄ort. The e⁄ort costs depend on the
chosen e⁄ort of a worker and are the following:
e⁄ort costs =
(chosen e⁄ort of a worker)2
80
The table at the end of the instructions indicates the e⁄ort costs for all possible e⁄ort
levels of a worker.
A worker￿ s payo⁄ for a round is his wage minus his e⁄ort costs:
pro￿t of a round = wage - e⁄ort costsAn experimental study on information flows in teams 71
After worker 1 and worker 2 have chosen their e⁄ort, both workers are informed about
the e⁄ort of both workers in their work group, the quality with which the ￿rst and the
second task are completed, and each worker￿ s pro￿ts in this round.
Number of rounds
The experiment consists of 14 repetitions of the procedure described above. This
results in 14 constituent rounds. Each participant keeps his role as worker 1 or worker
2 throughout all 14 rounds. At the beginning of each round the work groups are
randomly formed anew. No worker is able to distinguish whether his matched worker
has already been assigned to him in one of the preceding rounds or not.
Payment of the experiment
In this experiment not all 14 rounds are paid. One randomly determined round is paid
for all participants. Which of the 14 rounds is paid out, will be told all participants
after the 14th round. All participants are paid according to their pro￿t in the randomly
chosen round. If your pro￿t in this round is negative, this amount is deducted from





















































































Numbers are rounded to two digits after the decimal point.
2.8.3 Behavioral predictions of a model of inequity aversion
In this subsection we derive behavioral predictions for our treatments from a model of
inequity aversion. In contrast to the self-interest model, an individual￿ s utility does no
longer only depend on his own material payo⁄but also on other individuals￿payo⁄s. We
use the assumptions from the model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) in order to capture the
notion of inequity aversion. For the case of two players, individual i￿ s utility functionAn experimental study on information flows in teams 73
is
ui (ei;ej) =
￿i (ei;ej) ￿ ￿ ￿ maxf￿j (ei;ej) ￿ ￿i (ei;ej);0g ￿ ￿ ￿ maxf￿i (ei;ej) ￿ ￿j (ei;ej);0g,
where ￿j (ei;ej) denotes individual j￿ s payo⁄ given he chooses ej and individual i 6= j
chooses ei. ￿ measures the aversion to disadvantageous inequity, and ￿ the aversion to
advantageous inequity.
In stark contrast to the self-interest model, in which ￿ = ￿ = 0 for all individuals,
we now assume ￿ = 2 and ￿ = 0:6 for all individuals. Furthermore, we assume that
individuals maximize their expected utility.
The case of substitutes
T-NO: If there is no signal at all, we solve for the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous
move game. In a ￿rst step, we derive agent i￿ s reaction to any possible strategy of agent
j 6= i, with i;j 2 f1;2g.
Given agent j chooses ej = 165:6
3:14 ￿ 52:74, the unique prediction of the self-interest
model, agent i chooses ei = 66:24￿0:256￿ej = 165:6
3:14 as a best response. This maximizes
agent i￿ s expected payo⁄, which is shown in the derivation of the predictions of the self-
interest model, and minimizes the inequity of payo⁄s as ei = ej. Thus, it maximizes
agent i￿ s expected utility.
Given agent j chooses ej > 165:6
3:14 , ei = 66:24￿0:256￿ej maximizes agent i￿ s expected
payo⁄but not his utility as it generates advantageous inequity since 66:24￿0:256￿ej <
165:6
3:14 for ej > 165:6
3:14 . Therefore, agent i￿ s optimal response is larger than 66:24￿0:256￿ej





, which is derived by maximizing
agent i￿ s expected utility for the case of advantageous inequity with respect to ei. For
￿ = 0:6 and ej ￿ 80 the minimum is equal to ej.
Given agent j chooses ej < 165:6
3:14 , again ei = 66:24￿0:256￿ej maximizes agent i￿ s ex-
pected payo⁄but not his expected utility as it generates disadvantageous inequity since
66:24￿0:256￿ej > 165:6
3:14 for ej < 165:6
3:14 . Therefore, agent i￿ s optimal response is smallerAn experimental study on information flows in teams 74





, which is derived analogously to
above. For ￿ = 2 the maximum is equal to ej if and only if ej ￿ 66:24
3:256.







ej if ej ￿ 66:24
3:256
66:24￿0:256￿ej
3 if ej < 66:24
3:256
.


















, there is no intersection. To see this, suppose, to the contrary,
there was at least one intersection. Then ei =
66:24￿0:256￿ej
3 and ei < 66:24
3:256, as otherwise
ej = ei ￿ 66:24
3:256 which was a contradiction. As ei < 66:24
3:256, ej =
66:24￿0:256￿ei
3 . Yet, the two







, there cannot be an
intersection.
Thus, the set of Nash equilibria is equal to the set of all strategy combinations with






T-IMP: In T-IMP agent 2 receives the signal s = e1. We solve for the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium given s = e1. Agent 2￿ s reaction to s = e1 is equivalent to his
reaction function in T-NO as derived before. Agent 1 anticipates agent 2￿ s reaction to
s and maximizes his own expected utility41
U1 (e1;e￿
2(e1)) = wH ￿ p(e1) ￿ p(e￿
2(e1)) + wM ￿ [p(e1) ￿ (1 ￿ p(e￿





















2(e1) = e1 and agent 1￿ s expected utility is








3 ￿ e1 and agent 1￿ s
41Here we use the fact that agent 1 either faces no payo⁄ inequality because agent 2 perfectly
matches his e⁄ort
￿
for e1 ￿ 66:24
3:256
￿
or advantageous inequality because agent 2 chooses more e⁄ort ￿




42This function￿ s maximum is attained at e1 > 80. As the function is concave, it increases in e1
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expected utility is maximized at e1 = 66:24
3:256.43 As e1 = 66:24
3:256 is agent 1￿ s best choice











, which includes e1 = 66:24
3:256, agent 1￿ s best choice for the whole range of
e1 2 [0;80] is e1 = 80. Consequently, in the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
e1 = s = 80 and e2 = 80 according to agent 2￿ s reaction e￿
2(e1) = e1 for e1 ￿ 66:24
3:256.
T-P: In T-P we solve for Nash equilibria given s = b1. In a ￿rst step, we derive
agent 2￿ s reaction to any combination of e1 and b1. Consider b1 = 1. What is agent 2￿ s
best response in this case?
Given agent 1 chooses e1 = 43:20, which is agent 2￿ s equilibrium e⁄ort in the self-
interest model as derived in Section 2.3, agent 2 chooses e2 = 43:20 as a best response.
This maximizes agent 2￿ s expected payo⁄, which is shown in the derivation of the
predictions of the self-interest model, and minimizes the inequity of payo⁄s as e2 = e1.
Given agent 1 chooses e1 > 43:20, e2 = 43:20 maximizes agent 2￿ s expected payo⁄
(as the payo⁄ maximizing e⁄ort is independent of e1). This choice, however, generates
advantageous inequity. Therefore, agent 2￿ s utility maximizing response is larger than





, which is derived by maximizing
agent 2￿ s utility for the case of advantageous inequity with respect to e2. For ￿ = 0:6
and e1 ￿ 80 the minimum equals e1.
Given agent 1 chooses e1 < 43:20, e2 = 43:20 again maximizes agent 2￿ s expected
payo⁄. This time, however, it generates disadvantageous inequity. Therefore, agent






is derived analogously to above. For ￿ = 2, the maximum equals e1 if and only if
e1 ￿ 14:4.
We summarize agent 2￿ s reaction for b1 = 1, ￿ = 2, ￿ = 0:6 and e1 2 [0;80] as
follows
e￿




e1 if e1 ￿ 14:4
14:4 if e1 < 14:4
.
Equivalently, we can derive agent 2￿ s reaction for b1 = 0, ￿ = 2, ￿ = 0:6 and e1 2 [0;80]





, e1 = 66:24
3:256 yields the highest material payo⁄ for agent 1 and
avoids payo⁄ inequalities since e￿
2(e1) = 66:24￿0:256￿e1
3 = e1 for e1 = 66:24
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that is the following
e￿




e1 if e1 ￿ 68:80
3
68:80
3 if e1 < 68:80
3
.
Note that for e1 ￿ 68:80
3 agent 2￿ s reaction is e2 = e1 independent of b1.
In a next step, we solve for the intersections of both agents￿reaction functions, i.e.
we search for strategy combinations (e1;(e2(b1 = 1);e2(b1 = 0))) in which e1 is a best
response to (e2(b1 = 1);e2(b1 = 0)) and (e2(b1 = 1);e2(b1 = 0)) is a best response to e1.
Given e1 = 165:6







since e1 ￿ 68:80
3 . Given agent 2 chooses 165:6
3:14 independent
of b1, agent 1￿ s best response is to choose e1 = 165:6
3:14 . This maximizes agent 1￿ s expected
payo⁄, which is shown in the derivation of the predictions of the self-interest model,
and minimizes the inequity of payo⁄s as e1 = e2(b1 = 1) = e2(b1 = 0). Hence, this
strategy combination is a Nash equilibrium.





, agent 2￿ s best response is (x;x) as e1 ￿ 68:80
3 . Given agent





independent of b1, agent 1￿ s best response is to choose x as it
is shown by the reaction function derived in T-NO for the model of inequity aversion.




















independent of b1, agent 1￿ s best response is to choose x,
as it is shown by the reaction function derived in T-NO for the model of inequity

















. Given agent 2
chooses x if b1 = 1 and 68:80
3 if b1 = 0, agent 1￿ s best response is not x. It can be
shown that e1 = 68:80

















. Given agent 2
chooses 14.4 if b1 = 1 and 68:80
3 if b1 = 0, agent 1￿ s best response is not x. ChoosingAn experimental study on information flows in teams 77
e1 = 14:4, for instance, yields a strictly higher expected payo⁄ and causes less payo⁄
inequalities than e1 = x 2 [0;14:4). Hence, there is no Nash equilibrium with e1 2
[0;14:4).
Thus, the set of Nash equilibria is equal to the set of all strategy combinations with






T-PPlus: In T-PPlus agent 2 observes agent 1￿ s e⁄ort in addition to his contri-
bution. We solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium given s = (e1;b1). Agent
2￿ s reaction to s = (e1;b1) is equivalent to his best response in T-P as derived before.
Agent 1 anticipates agent 2￿ s reaction to s and maximizes his own expected utility44
U1 (e1;e￿
2(e1jb1 = 1);e￿
2(e1jb1 = 0)) = wH ￿ p(e1) ￿ p(e￿
2(e1jb1 = 1)) + wM ￿
(p(e1) ￿ (1 ￿ p(e￿
2(e1jb1 = 1))) + (1 ￿ p(e1)) ￿ p(e￿
2(e1jb1 = 0))) ￿
e2
1



















with respect to e1. It can be shown that e1 = 14:4 is agent 1￿ s best choice out of the
range e1 2 [0;14:4], e1 = 68:8





, and e1 = 80 out of





. Hence, agent 1￿ s expected utility is maximized at e1 = 80.
Therefore, in the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium e1 = 80 and e2 = 80,
according to agent 2￿ s reaction e￿
2(e1jb1 = 1) = e￿
2(e1jb1 = 0) = e1 for e1 ￿ 68:80
3 .
The case of complements
T-NOX: If there is no signal at all, we solve for the Nash equilibrium of the simulta-
neous move game. In a ￿rst step, we derive agent i￿ s reaction function to any possible
strategy of agent j 6= i, with i;j 2 f1;2g. We proceed analogously to T-NO but
start with the unique Nash equilibrium prediction of the self-interest model that is
ej = 116
1:9 ￿ 61:05.






ej if ej ￿ 46:40
2:760
46:40+0:240￿ej
3 if ej < 46:40
2:760
.
44Note that agent 2￿ s reaction implies that agent 2￿ s e⁄ort is at least as high as e1. Thus, agent 1
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In a next step, we solve for the intersections of both agents￿reaction functions. It can
be shown that the set of Nash equilibria is equal to the set of all strategy combinations






T-IMPX: In T-IMPX we solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium given
s = e1 using agent 2￿ s reaction function of T-NOX. Agent 1 anticipates agent 2￿ s
reaction to s and maximizes his own expected utility with respect to e1. Analogously
to T-IMP, it can be shown that agent 1￿ s expected utility is maximized at e1 = 80.
Consequently, in the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium e1 = s = 80 and e2 = 80,
according to agent 2￿ s reaction e￿
2(e1) = e1 for e1 ￿ 46:40
2:760.
T-PX: In T-PX we solve for the Nash equilibrium given s = b1. To derive agent
2￿ s best response to e1 if b1 = 1, we proceed analogously to T-P and start with agent
2￿ s equilibrium e⁄ort of the self-interest model e1 = 68. Agent 2￿ s reaction for b1 =
1, ￿ = 2, ￿ = 0:6 and e1 2 [0;80] is as follows
e￿




e1 if e1 ￿ 68
3
68
3 if e1 < 68
3
.
Equivalently, we can derive agent 2￿ s best response for b1 = 0 that is the following
e￿




e1 if e1 ￿ 44
3
44
3 if e1 < 44
3
.
By solving for the intersections of both agents￿reaction functions we derive all Nash
equilibria of T-PX. Proceeding in an equivalent way to T-P and starting with e1 = 116
1:9,
the equilibrium e⁄ort in T-NOX in the self-interest model, we can show that the set of
Nash equilibria is equal to the set of all strategy combinations with e1 = e2(b1 = 1) =






T-PPlusX: In T-PPlusX we solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium given
s = (e1;b1). Agent 2￿ s reaction to s = (e1;b1) is equivalent to his best response in
T-PX. Agent 1 anticipates agent 2￿ s reaction to s and maximizes his own expected
utility with respect to e1. It can be shown that agent 1￿ s expected utility is maximized
at e1 = 80. Consequently, in the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium e1 = 80 and
e2 = 80, according to agent 2￿ s reaction e￿
2(e1jb1 = 1) = e￿
2(e1jb1 = 0) = e1 for e1 ￿ 68
3 .Chapter 3
Can intentions spoil the kindness of
a gift? An experimental study
3.1 Introduction
Consider a situation where person A undertakes a costly action that bene￿ts person
B. This behavior seems altruistic. However, if person A expects a reward in return,
e.g. from person B, then person A￿ s action may be motivated by the expected rewards
rather than by pure altruism. If the expected rewards are su¢ ciently high, even sel￿sh
individuals have an incentive to behave in this way. The question we address in this
study is how person B reacts to the intentions of person A. Does person B perceive
person A￿ s action as less kind if he expects person A to expect rewards, and ￿if person
B can reciprocate ￿does he return less?
There are many situations where behavior seems altruistic but is obviously strategic.
Companies, for example, give Christmas gifts to their business partners in order to
improve the business relationship, hoping that this pays o⁄ in future transactions.
Their business partners may well understand that the given Christmas gifts are part
of the company￿ s pro￿t maximizing investment strategy. The question, however, is
whether this knowledge spoils the perceived kindness of the gifts and makes them less
e⁄ective.
We address this question experimentally in a series of modi￿ed trust games. In theseCan intentions spoil the kindness of a gift? 80
games we vary the probability that the second mover can reciprocate and analyze e⁄ects
on second mover behavior. Our results suggest that neither the perceived kindness of
the ￿rst mover￿ s action nor the rewards given by the second mover are spoiled by
expected future rewards.
In our modi￿ed trust game agent A, the ￿rst mover, decides how much of his initial
endowment he transfers to agent B, the second mover. Agent B receives the tripled
amount of agent A￿ s transfer. Then, a lottery determines whether agent B can decide
on his return transfer to agent A or not. In the latter case nothing is returned to
agent A. We conduct two treatments of this modi￿ed trust game that di⁄er in the
probability that agent B can decide on his return transfer: In treatment T-HIGH this
probability is 80 % and in treatment T-LOW it is 50 %. Agent A behaves in a way
that seems altruistic when he transfers a strictly positive amount to agent B. This
is true in both treatments. Our treatment variation, however, changes the possibility
for agent B to make a return transfer to agent A and, thereby, varies the chance for
agent A to receive a return. Agent A￿ s expected returns for his transfer are smaller in
T-LOW if agent A has the same belief about agent B￿ s reaction in both treatments.
Consequently, agent B may perceive agent A as more kind in T-LOW than in T-HIGH
and, therefore, may return more in T-LOW than in T-HIGH when he is asked to decide.
Agent A￿ s beliefs about agent B￿ s reaction, however, may di⁄er in both treatments.
Models of intention-based reciprocity predict that agent B returns more in T-LOW
than in T-HIGH. Nevertheless, agent A expects smaller future rewards for a given
transfer in T-LOW than in T-HIGH. This is because the di⁄erence in the probability
that agent B can decide on his return transfer dominates the di⁄erence in agent B￿ s
return transfer.
Our results suggest that expected future returns do not a⁄ect the perceived kindness
of an action and the action￿ s rewards. Agent B￿ s return transfer for a given transfer
of agent A does not di⁄er across treatments. This is not because agent B does not
care about agent A￿ s action at all. Actually, we observe a lot of agents B who return
strictly positive amounts and, in addition, agent B￿ s average return transfer increases in
agent A￿ s transfer. This suggests that individuals reward actions that seem altruistic,
irrespective of the actor￿ s expectation of future rewards or of the actor￿ s speci￿c kindCan intentions spoil the kindness of a gift? 81
of intention. Consequently, we conclude that individuals in our setting condition their
behavior on outcomes rather than on intentions or higher order beliefs.
We try to explain our ￿ndings by analyzing data from our questionnaire that par-
ticipants ￿lled out after they had made their decisions. First, our regressions of agent
B￿ s return transfer on agent B￿ s elicited second order belief give no indication that the
given expected future returns spoil the kindness of an action and the action￿ s rewards.
Second, we analyze whether agent B￿ s perception of agent A￿ s action is a⁄ected by the
treatment. We do not ￿nd a signi￿cant e⁄ect. Third, we test treatment e⁄ects on agent
B￿ s stated emotions. For some interior values of agent A￿ s transfer, negative emotions
like anger and contempt are experienced signi￿cantly more intense in T-HIGH than
in T-LOW, while appreciation is signi￿cantly more pronounced in T-LOW than in T-
HIGH. Even though intentions may a⁄ect individuals￿emotions, these e⁄ects do not
seem to carry over to the perception of an action and the reaction to it.
Intentions have been modeled in a number of theoretical papers. Rabin (1993),
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), and Falk and Fischbacher (2006) introduce theo-
retical models of intention-based reciprocity. In contrast to models of social preferences
that are based on outcomes only (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels,
2000), they (also) take into account that intentions a⁄ect the perception of others￿
actions and, thereby, behavior.
Various experimental papers have focused on the empirical relevance of intentions.
A couple of them (e.g. Blount, 1995; O⁄erman, 2002; McCabe et al., 2003; Charness,
2004; Cox, 2004; Falk et al., 2008) study the e⁄ect of intentionality, i.e. whether the
second mover￿ s reaction to the ￿rst mover￿ s action is di⁄erent when the ￿rst mover￿ s
action is chosen by the ￿rst mover himself (out of a non-singleton action set) than when
it is exogenously determined by the experimenter or a lottery. These studies typically
￿nd that the second mover returns the favor or the disfavor of the ￿rst mover￿ s action
in a more pronounced way when it was intentionally chosen by the ￿rst mover himself.
Hence, intentionality seems to matter. These studies, however, do not provide evidence
for the e⁄ect of di⁄erent intentions behind the same intentional action.
Charness and Levine (2007) go further in this direction. They present experimentalCan intentions spoil the kindness of a gift? 82
results of a gift exchange game in which the principal determines an initial wage that
is, then, hit by a random shock. Agents work less for the same ￿nal wage when it was
brought about by a lousy o⁄er of the principal and a positive shock than by a generous
o⁄er and a negative shock. While this study compares two di⁄erent intentional actions
that lead to the same outcome, Bolton et al. (1998) and Falk et al. (2003) compare
the reaction to the same intentional action when di⁄erent (non-singleton) action sets
are available for the ￿rst mover. Typically, the same action is either the most or the
least generous action of the ￿rst mover￿ s action set. While Bolton et al. (1998) do
not observe any signi￿cant e⁄ects in their experimental setting, Falk et al. (2003) ￿nd
in an experimental ultimatum game that responders reject the same o⁄er less often
when it is the most generous o⁄er of the ￿rst mover￿ s action set than when it is the
least generous. Hence, there is evidence that the relative position of an action in the
￿rst mover￿ s choice set seems to matter. In our study, in contrast, we focus on gifts,
i.e. on intentional actions that always seem to be altruistic or generous. In all of our
treatments the ￿rst mover￿ s action set is the same and so is the ranking of the actions￿
generosity. We only vary the second mover￿ s possibility to reciprocate and, thereby, can
study di⁄erent intentions behind the same gift. In particular, we ask whether expected
rewards spoil the kindness of a gift.
Stanca et al. (forthcoming) analyze in their experimental study whether the second
mover￿ s reaction is di⁄erent when the ￿rst mover￿ s action is extrinsically motivated
rather than intrinsically. They compare the second mover￿ s reaction in a standard
trust game with the corresponding reaction in a trust game in which ￿rst movers are
not informed that second movers can react to their transfer until they have made their
decision.45 They hypothesize and also ￿nd that the slope of the second mover￿ s reaction
function is larger when the ￿rst mover is intrinsically motivated. In our experimental
study, in contrast, we do not distinguish between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation
since the ￿rst mover may expect a strictly positive return in both treatments and,
therefore, may be extrinsically motivated in both treatments. Furthermore, we test
the hypothesis that the second mover returns more for a given transfer in T-LOW
45Hence, they implement an asymmetry of information conditions, which is not present in our
experiment. In our experiment all participants (in all treatments) receive all relevant information at
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than in T-HIGH,46 which is supported by models of intention-based reciprocity.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 presents the experimental design
and procedure, Section 3.3 the behavioral predictions and hypotheses. Our results are
summarized and discussed in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Experimental design and procedure
We consider a modi￿ed trust game with two agents, A and B. Agent A, the trustor,
is initially endowed with wA = 20 and can transfer an amount x 2 f0;5;10;15;20g
to agent B, the trustee, who is initially endowed with wB = 0. Agent B receives the
tripled amount of agent A￿ s transfer, 3￿x. After agent A￿ s decision a lottery determines
whether the game stops at this point in time or continues. With probability 1 ￿ q the
game stops and agent A earns his initial endowment minus his transfer, 20 ￿ x, while
agent B earns agent A￿ s tripled transfer, 3 ￿ x. With probability q, though, the game
continues and agent B can transfer an amount y(x) 2 [0;3 ￿ x] to agent A. In the
latter case agent A earns his initial endowment minus his transfer plus agent B￿ s
return transfer, 20 ￿ x + y(x), and agent B earns agent A￿ s tripled transfer minus his
return transfer, 3￿x￿y(x).47 The structure of this game is summarized in Figure 3.1.
The modi￿cation of the trust game consists in the random move of nature after agent
A￿ s decision on x. If q = 1, the game resembles the standard trust game introduced
by Berg et al. (1995).48 In contrast, if q = 0, the game boils down to a dictator game
in which agent B can never return anything to agent A.49 The higher q 2 (0;1), the
higher the chance that agent B can make a return transfer (given x > 0) and the more
similar the game is to the standard trust game. The smaller q 2 (0;1), the smaller the
chance that agent B can make a return transfer (given x > 0) and the more similar
the game is to a dictator game.
46This hypothesis does not necessarily imply that the slope of the second mover￿ s reaction function
is larger in T-LOW than in T-HIGH.
47Note that agent A does not receive the tripled amount of agent B￿ s return transfer.
48One major di⁄erence to the game introduced by Berg et al. (1995) is that in their version agent
B also has a strictly positive initial endowment (which equals wA).
49One major di⁄erence to standard dictator games is that in the typical versions the dictator￿ s
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Figure 3.1: Structure of the modi￿ed trust game
As we address the question whether the perceived kindness of an action that seems
altruistic and the action￿ s rewards are reduced by the actor￿ s expectation of future
rewards, we vary q, the probability that agent B can return a positive amount (given
x > 0), across treatments and keep everything else constant. Table 3.1 presents our
treatments.
Table 3.1: Treatments of the modi￿ed trust game




In treatment T-HIGH q is higher than in treatment T-LOW. We do not implement
probabilities close or equal to 0 and 1 since we would like to avoid the e⁄ect that a
certain event is going to happen almost for sure. Furthermore, we are restrained to
take higher values of q since agents B are only asked to decide on y(x) when the game,
indeed, continues.50 If q was small, we expected very few observations of y(x) for a
given number of participants.51
50We could have asked all agents B to decide on y(x) given the game continues. Then, however,
treatment e⁄ects may also have been caused by social preferences based on expected outcomes and it
would have been di¢ cult to disentangle the source of observed treatment e⁄ects.
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In each experimental session one treatment of the modi￿ed trust game is conducted.
The implemented treatment of a session is played once. At the beginning of each session
the roles of the game are assigned randomly. Participants are informed about their
assigned roles after they have correctly answered a set of control questions. Agents A
are always asked to decide on x, while agents B are only asked to decide on y(x) when
the game continues after agent A￿ s decision. Given agents B are asked to decide, we
elicit y(x) by the strategy method, i.e. agents B are informed that the game continues
but are not informed about x and decide on their return transfer for each possible x.52
After participants have made their decisions, they ￿ll out a questionnaire concerning
their emotions, beliefs, perception of the other player￿ s action, and individual data such
as sex, age, and subject of studies.
Our experimental sessions were run at the Center for Experimental Economics of
the University of Innsbruck, Austria, in April 2008. 100 individuals participated in
the experiment, which was conducted with the software z-Tree by Fischbacher (2007).
Individuals were randomly assigned to sessions and could take part only once. The
sessions were framed neutrally and lasted about an hour.53 Individuals earned on
average 10.34 e including a show-up fee of 5 e.54
3.3 Behavioral predictions and hypotheses
We address the question whether the perceived kindness of an action that seems altru-
istic, i.e. a costly action that bene￿ts others, and the action￿ s rewards are reduced by
the actor￿ s expectation to receive future rewards. This may be the case since future
rewards can partially cover the actor￿ s initial costs and reduce the others￿net bene￿t.
In the presented modi￿ed trust game agent A behaves in a way that seems altruistic
when he transfers a strictly positive amount to agent B. First, this action is costly
agents B out of which we expect 10 to be asked to decide on y(x).
52We apply the strategy method here in order to get agent B￿ s reaction function. We are aware
that this elicitation method may a⁄ect y(x). However, we expect this e⁄ect to be orthogonal to our
treatment variation. Furthermore, Stanca et al. (forthcoming) argue that the strategy method applied
in their trust games does not signi￿cantly a⁄ect decisions.
53Translated instructions and a more detailed description of the procedure of a session are provided
in the appendix.
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because the amount is deducted from his initial endowment. Second, it bene￿ts agent
B since the tripled transfer is assigned to agent B. This is true for both treatments.
Agent A￿ s expectation to receive a transfer from agent B in return may reduce the
perceived kindness of agent A￿ s action. In particular, the more agent A expects in
return for his (given) transfer, the more of agent A￿ s initial costs are covered in ex-
pectation, the less expected payo⁄is assigned to agent B, and, therefore, the less kind
agent B may perceive agent A and the less agent B may, in fact, return when he is
asked to decide. Our treatment variation changes the possibility for agent B to make a
return transfer to agent A and varies the chance for agent A to receive a return. Hence,
agent A￿ s expected returns for a given transfer are smaller in T-LOW when agent A
has the same belief about agent B￿ s reaction in both treatments. Consequently, agent
B may perceive agent A as more kind in T-LOW and, therefore, may return more in
T-LOW when he is asked to decide. If this, indeed, is the case and agent A￿ s belief
about agent B￿ s reaction is correct and agent B￿ s belief about agent A￿ s belief is cor-
rect, then agent A expects agent B to transfer more in T-LOW when agent B is asked
to decide. Nevertheless, agent A faces less expected future returns in T-LOW since
the di⁄erence in q compensates the di⁄erence in agent B￿ s reaction. If it did not and
agent A expected higher future returns in T-LOW, agent B perceived agent A as less
kind in T-LOW and, therefore, he transferred less in T-LOW. Consequently, agent A￿ s
expectation were incorrect.
In the following we present standard models of social preferences that di⁄er in their
assumptions on the individuals￿utility function and, consequently, in their behavioral
predictions. Some of them explicitly model how the perceived kindness is reduced by
the actor￿ s expectation to receive future rewards and predict that agent B returns more
in T-LOW for a given transfer.Can intentions spoil the kindness of a gift? 87
3.3.1 Behavioral predictions
Model 1: The self-interest model
The standard neoclassical model assumes that all individuals are sel￿sh, i.e. their
utility function U depends on their own material payo⁄ m only and increases in m.
Given these assumptions, agent B￿ s decision does not vary in q 2 (0;1).
As agent B maximizes his own material payo⁄ only, he transfers y(x) = 0 8 x in
the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. This is true for all q 2 (0;1).
Model 2: A model of social preferences based on ￿nal outcomes
Models of social preferences based on ￿nal outcomes (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt, 1999;
Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) assume that an individual￿ s utility function e U does not
only depend on m but also on another individual￿ s material payo⁄ r. This does not
necessarily imply that an individual is altruistic. Individuals with e U may also be
spiteful, envious, inequity averse or inequity loving.
Given these assumptions, agent B￿ s decision does not vary in q 2 (0;1).
As agent B￿ s decision is a⁄ected by ￿nal outcomes only (and not by how these
outcomes came about),55 agent B faces the same decision problem at his decision node
independent of q 2 (0;1). Hence, his optimal decision does not vary across treatments.
Model 3: Models of intention-based reciprocity
Models of intention-based reciprocity (e.g. Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger,
2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006) assume that an individual￿ s utility function V is
not only dependent on outcomes but also on how these outcomes came about, e.g.
whether the underlying decision problem was determined randomly or whether the
underlying decision problem was intentionally brought about by another individual.
55Models of social preferences based on expected outcomes (e.g. Trautmann, 2009) predict the
same, as long as agent B￿ s decision is based on his expectations formed at the moment of his decision
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Crucial roles are played by the perceived kindness of an individual￿ s own action and
the perceived kindness of other individuals￿actions. Typically, the kinder an individual
perceives the action of another individual, the kinder the individual treats this other
individual. The perceived kindness of an action is shaped by the actor￿ s intentions.
How kindness is de￿ned exactly and how intentions concretely enter the utility varies
across models. In the following we present the predictions of a modi￿ed version of the
model by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and a similar model that implements
central elements from the model by Falk and Fischbacher (2006).56
A modi￿ed version of the model by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004):
As the model of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) is intended for ￿nite multi-stage
games without nature, we modify it in a simple and straight-forward way that accounts
for random moves of nature. Our modi￿cation consists in the way how agent B per-
ceives the kindness of agent A￿ s strategy in the course of the game, in particular, after
the lottery determined that the game continues.
Given the assumptions of this model, y(x) is (weakly)57 higher in T-LOW than in
T-HIGH for x = 20 in any sequential reciprocity equilibrium (SRE) in which agent B
chooses a pure strategy.
A modi￿ed version of the model by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004)
with central elements of the model by Falk and Fischbacher (2006): We
take our modi￿ed version of the model by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and
implement central elements of the model by Falk and Fischbacher (2006) that concern
how kindness is de￿ned.
Given the assumptions of this model, y(x) is (weakly)58 higher in T-LOW than in
T-HIGH 8 x > 0 in any sequential reciprocity equilibrium (SRE) in which agent B
chooses a pure strategy.
56In the appendix we present these models and derive their predictions.
57No treatment di⁄erences are predicted if either agent B is hardly sensitive to reciprocity concerns
such that he chooses y(x) = 0 in both treatments, or agent B is extremely sensitive to reciprocity
concerns such that he chooses y(x) = 3 ￿ x in both treatments.
58No treatment di⁄erences are predicted if either agent B is hardly sensitive to reciprocity concerns
such that he chooses y(x) = 0 in both treatments, or agent B is extremely sensitive to reciprocity
concerns such that he chooses y(x) = 3 ￿ x in both treatments.Can intentions spoil the kindness of a gift? 89
3.3.2 Hypotheses
The various theoretical models predict di⁄erent behavioral patterns of agent B. We fo-
cus on the predicted equilibria in which agent B chooses a pure strategy and summarize
these predictions in the following three hypotheses.
Hypothesis 3.1: No returns in all treatments
Agent B returns nothing to agent A in T-HIGH and in T-LOW.
This hypothesis is supported by the self-interest model and implies that y(x) = 0
for all x and all treatments. Actions that seem altruistic are never rewarded.
Hypothesis 3.2: The same returns in all treatments
Agent B returns a weakly positive amount to agent A. Agent B￿ s return transfer
for a given x is the same in all treatments.
Models of social preferences based on ￿nal outcomes support this hypothesis. Sim-
ilar to the self-interest model, there are no treatment e⁄ects with respect to agent B￿ s
behavior. In contrast to the self-interest model, agent B returns a weakly positive
amount to agent A. Actions that seem altruistic are rewarded, irrespective of the
actor￿ s intentions.
Hypothesis 3.3: Higher returns in T-LOW
Agent B returns a weakly positive amount to agent A. y(x) is higher in T-LOW
than in T-HIGH for x > 0.59
Models of intention-based reciprocity take into consideration how a decision problem
came about and, therefore, capture the e⁄ect of intentions. They predict that the
perceived kindness of an action that seems altruistic and the action￿ s rewards are
reduced by the expectation of future returns.
59This is supported by the modi￿ed version of the model by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004)
with central elements of the model by Falk and Fischbacher (2006). The modi￿ed version of the model
by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) predicts y(x) to be higher in T-LOW than in T-HIGH for
x = 20, but not necessarily for all x > 0. The reason for the possibly di⁄erent predictions is that the
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3.4 Results
First, we summarize the descriptive results of our experiment and compare them with
standard results from trust games and dictator games. In a next step, we test our hy-
potheses and analyze whether the perceived kindness of an action that seems altruistic
and the action￿ s rewards are reduced by the expectation of future rewards. Finally, we
try to explain our ￿ndings with questionnaire data.
3.4.1 Summary statistics
Behavior of agent A
Table 3.2 presents the mean and the standard deviation of agent A￿ s transfer in T-
HIGH, T-LOW and both treatments together.
Table 3.2: Mean and standard deviation of A￿ s transfer
Treatment Mean Standard Number of
deviation observations
T-HIGH 9.00 5.28 20
T-LOW 7.00 5.81 30
T-HIGH + T-LOW 7.80 5.64 50
On average, agent A transfers 7.8 points (out of 20 available points) to agent B.
This is considerably larger than 0. Camerer (2003, p. 86), however, reports that in
standard trust games, in which q = 1 and agent B often has the same initial endowment
as agent A, agent A transfers on average half of his initial endowment. This is more
than in our experiment, in particular in T-LOW, what suggests that agent A transfers
less when the probability that agent B can reciprocate is low. Figure 3.2 illustrates
the aggregate distribution of x in T-HIGH, T-LOW and both treatments together.
In both treatments together 84 % of agents A transfer strictly positive amounts,
more than 40 % half of their initial endowment or more, and more than 10 % even
more than 60 % of their initial endowment (some even their whole initial endowment).
This is considerably di⁄erent to results from standard dictator games, in which q = 0Can intentions spoil the kindness of a gift? 91
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and transfers are not tripled. For instance, in the benchmark treatment by Forsythe
et al. (1994) (the paid dictator game conducted in April with a pie of 5 $) about
55 % of dictators transfer a strictly positive amount, less than 20 % half of their
endowment or more, and no dictator transfers more than 60 % of his endowment. This
suggests that the distribution of x shifts towards higher values when q > 0 compared
to q = 0.60 When we consider the distributions of x in T-HIGH and in T-LOW, we
observe that that the distribution is more to the right in T-HIGH than in T-LOW.
Hence, it seems that agents A react to di⁄erences in q. They tend to send more the
higher the probability that agent B can reciprocate.
Behavior of agent B
Table 3.3 presents the mean and the standard deviation of agent B￿ s return transfer
per x in T-HIGH, T-LOW and both treatments together.
In line with the results from the standard trust game by Berg et al. (1995), the
more agent A transfers, the more agent B returns on average. The observed average
60This shift could also be caused by the fact that in standard dictator games agent A￿ s transfer is
not tripled. Cox (2004), though, observes that the distribution of transfers in a standard trust game
is centered on higher values than the distribution of transfers in the corresponding trust game with
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Table 3.3: Mean and standard deviation of B￿ s return transfer
Treatment x Mean Standard y(x)/x Number of
deviation observations
T-HIGH 5 01.75 02.59 0.35 16
10 06.75 06.14 0.68 16
15 11.06 08.83 0.74 16
20 17.31 13.68 0.87 16
T-LOW 5 01.93 02.76 0.39 15
10 04.93 04.35 0.49 15
15 10.13 08.19 0.68 15
20 16.47 12.00 0.82 15
T-HIGH + T-LOW 5 01.84 02.63 0.37 31
10 05.87 05.34 0.59 31
15 10.61 08.40 0.71 31
20 16.90 12.69 0.85 31
return transfers, however, seem to be lower than the ones by Berg et al. (1995).61 Table
3.3 also reports the rate of the average return transfer, i.e. the average return transfer
divided by the transfer. Independent of x > 0 the rate of average return transfer is
below 1. Hence, a strictly positive transfer does not pay for agent A on average, even
if agent A knew beforehand that the game is not stopped. Nevertheless, the rate of the
average return transfer increases in x and peaks at a value more than 0.8 at x = 20.
If we separately examine agent B￿ s return transfers in the two treatments, we
observe that on average agent B returns more in T-HIGH than in T-LOW for all
x 2 f10;15;20g.
3.4.2 Analysis of hypotheses
Hypothesis 3.1: No returns in all treatments
Table 3.3 shows that agent B￿ s average return transfers are considerably higher than
0 for x > 0. P-values of one sample median tests on y(x) = 0 per treatment and per x
are reported in Table 3.4.
On the basis of these tests, we reject Hypothesis 3.1 for all x > 0 and all treatments.
61One explanation for this di⁄erence could be that in the experiment by Berg et al. (1995) agents
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Table 3.4: P-values of one sample median tests on Hypothesis 3.1
Percentage of Number of
Treatment x agents B observations p-value
with y(x) = 0
T-HIGH 5 62.50 16 0.015
10 31.25 16 0.001
15 25.00 16 0.001
20 25.00 16 0.001
T-LOW 5 60.00 15 0.015
10 33.33 15 0.002
15 20.00 15 0.001
20 20.00 15 0.001
Nevertheless, Table 3.4 shows that there are some agents B that return nothing given
x > 0. The percentage of these observations decreases in x. Still, 25 % of agents B in
T-HIGH and 20 % of agents B in T-LOW return nothing given x = 20.
Hypothesis 3.2: The same returns in all treatments
Table 3.3 indicates that agent B￿ s average return transfer for a given x > 0 does not
considerably vary across treatments. Table 3.5 reports per x the two-sided p-values of
Mann-Whitney-U tests on whether y(x) di⁄ers across treatments.
Table 3.5: Two-sided p-values of pairwise Mann-Whitney-U tests on Hypothesis 3.2
Number of Number of
x observations observations p-value
in T-HIGH in T-LOW
5 16 15 0.856
10 16 15 0.405
15 16 15 0.873
20 16 15 0.873
On the basis of these tests, we are far from rejecting Hypothesis 3.2. Agent B￿ s
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Hypothesis 3.3: Higher returns in T-LOW
From the results presented in Table 3.5 we conclude that y(x) is not signi￿cantly smaller
in T-HIGH than in T-LOW, neither for x = 20 nor for any other x > 0. If anything
di⁄ered between T-HIGH and T-LOW regarding y(x), then y(x) was larger in T-HIGH
than in T-LOW, at least for x 2 f10;15;20g. Hence, our data seem to be inconsistent
with Hypothesis 3.3. One may, however, argue that the introduced models of intention-
based reciprocity predict no treatment di⁄erence either when agent B is hardly sensitive
to reciprocity concerns such that he chooses y(x) = 0 in both treatments, or when agent
B is extremely sensitive to reciprocity concerns such that he chooses y(x) = 3￿x in both
treatments. Table 3.4 reports that in both treatments a fraction of agents B return
nothing, even if x = 20. This suggests that a fraction of agents B are, indeed, hardly
sensitive to reciprocity concerns. We, however, do not observe a single individual with
y(x) = 3 ￿ x in any of our treatments. This rules out the possibility that a fraction
of agents B are extremely sensitive to reciprocity concerns such that no treatment
e⁄ects are predicted. Thus, either agents B are, in general, not sensitive to reciprocity
concerns, or too few of agents B are su¢ ciently sensitive to reciprocity concerns.
We summarize our ￿ndings in the following two results:
Result 3.1: Rewards for actions that seem altruistic
As in previous studies on trust games (see Camerer, 2003, p. 86), we observe that
agent B returns signi￿cantly positive amounts. On average, these amounts increase in
agent A￿ s transfer.
Result 3.2: No e⁄ect of the intention of a gift
Agent B￿ s return transfer (given x > 0) does not vary across treatments.
These results are consistent with the predictions of models of social preferences
based on ￿nal outcomes but inconsistent with the predictions of the self-interest model.
The introduced models of intention-based reciprocity may predict no treatment di⁄er-
ences, but only for individuals that are su¢ ciently insensitive to reciprocity concerns or
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ever, there is no evidence for individuals that are extremely sensitive to reciprocity
concerns. There may be individuals that are su¢ ciently insensitive to reciprocity
concerns and return nothing. On average, though, agents B return strictly positive
amounts. Consequently, the predictions of the introduced models of intention-based
reciprocity are inconsistent with our aggregate results. We conclude that the kind-
ness of an action and the action￿ s rewards are not spoiled by the actor￿ s expectation
to receive future rewards. On average, actions that seem altruistic are rewarded by
others. The rewards vary in the action: The more altruistic they seem, the higher are
the average rewards. The average rewards for a given action, though, are independent
of the actor￿ s expectation to receive future rewards.
3.4.3 Possible explanations for our ￿ndings
In this section we try to ￿nd explanations for our ￿ndings by analyzing data from our
questionnaire.
Incorrect higher order beliefs of agent B
The perceived kindness of an action that seems altruistic can only be spoiled by the
actor￿ s expectation of future rewards if individuals expect the actor to expect future
rewards. From other experimental studies we know that individuals have di¢ culties
to draw inferences from other individual￿ s actions and correctly form beliefs.62 In the
following we analyze whether the given elicited second order beliefs of agent B directly
a⁄ect his behavior.63 We regress agent B￿ s return transfer for a given x on x and on the
product of agent B￿ s second order belief with q for a given x, i.e. agent B￿ s expectation
of agent A￿ s expected future returns for a given x. First, we estimate an OLS regression.
Second, we run a two-stage least squares instrumental variable regression in which we
62Prominent examples are experimental studies on information cascades, e.g. by Anderson and
Holt (1997), Hung and Plott (2001), Kariv (2005), N￿th and Weber (2003), and Goeree et al. (2007).
63Agent B￿ s second order belief was elicited in a non-incentivized way after agent B has made his
decision. We are aware that these second order beliefs may be a⁄ected by agent B￿ s own decision.
Therefore, we checked whether agent B￿ s elicited second order belief signi￿cantly di⁄ers from those
elicited by agents B who have not decided upon y(x) because the lottery stopped the game after agent
A￿ s decision. We run pairwise Mann-Whitney-U tests and do not ￿nd a signi￿cant di⁄erence. Hence,
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instrument for the product of agent B￿ s second order belief with q for a given x. The
instrument we use is q itself as it is exogenous and, by de￿nition, correlated with the
instrumented variable. We run this additional regression since agent B￿ s second order
belief for x could be endogenous and, therefore, our estimated OLS coe¢ cient could be
biased and inconsistent. Table 3.6 presents the results of our regressions for x > 0.64
Table 3.6: Regressions of the return transfer for x > 0
Dependent variable: y(x) OLS-c 2SLS-IV-c
Intercept - 03.05*** - 01.67
x +00.79*** +00.33
Agent B￿ s second order belief * q +00.24 +00.77
Number of observations 124 124
R-squared 0.3384 0.2700
*, **, *** signi￿cant at 10, 5, 1 percent signi￿cance level
-c with individual clusters
In all of our regressions agent B￿ s belief about agent A￿ s expected return does not
signi￿cantly a⁄ect agent B￿ s return for a given x. In OLS-c the only signi￿cant regressor
is agent A￿ s transfer: The higher agent A￿ s transfer, the more agent B returns.65
Result 3.3: No e⁄ect of agent B￿ s belief about agent A￿ s expected returns
Agent B￿ s elicited beliefs about agent A￿ s expected returns do not a⁄ect agent B￿ s
returns.
Consequently, we conclude that incorrect higher order beliefs of agent B are not
the explanation for why the kindness of an action that seems altruistic and the action￿ s
future rewards are not spoiled by the actor￿ s expectation to receive future rewards.
E⁄ect on the perception or on emotions
The perceived kindness of an action may be spoiled by the actor￿ s expectation to receive
future rewards without a⁄ecting the reaction to that action. Similarly, the reactor￿ s
emotions may be a⁄ected in the sense that he experiences more negative emotions and
64In all regressions we consider x > 0 since the restriction on x = 20 would considerably reduce
our data set.
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less positive emotions in T-HIGH than in T-LOW. Table 3.7 reports one-sided p-values
of Mann-Whitney-U tests on whether the perceived kindness of agent A￿ s action di⁄ers
across treatments.66
Table 3.7: One-sided p-values of Mann-Whitney-U tests on perceived kindness across
treatments
Number of Number of Number of Number of
x observations max. int. observations max. int. p-value
in T-HIGH in T-HIGH in T-LOW in T-LOW
0 16 0 15 0 0.1058
5 16 0 15 0 0.0964
10 16 0 15 1 0.0284
15 16 1 15 2 0.2567
20 16 10 15 12 0.2294
max. int. observations perceiving the kindness with maximal intensity
For any x 2 f0;15;20g we do not identify any signi￿cant di⁄erences in the perceived
kindness across treatments.67 x = 5 and x = 10 are perceived as less kind in T-HIGH
at a signi￿cance level of 10 %. We take this as weak evidence that agent B￿ s perception
of agent A￿ s action is a⁄ected by the treatment variation.
Result 3.4: Hardly no e⁄ect of agent A￿ s intention on agent B￿ s percep-
tion of agent A￿ s action
Agent B￿ s perceived kindness of agent A￿ s action does not signi￿cantly vary across
treatments. This is true for x = 20 and for the most other values of x.
Table 3.8 reports one-sided p-values of Mann-Whitney-U tests on whether the in-
tensity of hypothetically sensed emotions is higher in one of the treatments.68
For x = 20, stated anger is sensed signi￿cantly more strongly in T-HIGH than in
T-LOW at a signi￿cance level of 10 %. There is no signi￿cant di⁄erence in contempt,
gladness, and appreciation for x = 20.
66In our questionnaire agents B had to indicate on a scale ranging from 1 to 7 how kind they
perceive a given transfer by agent A. 1 represented "very unkind", while 7 represented "very kind".
67For x = 20 this could be due to the fact that the majority of agents B choose the maximal
intensity.
68In our questionnaire individuals had to indicate on a scale ranging from 1 to 7 with which intensity
they hypothetically sensed an emotion for each x. If they did not sense an emotion at all, they were
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Table 3.8: One-sided p-values of Mann-Whitney-U tests on emotions across treatments
Number of Number of Number of Number of
Emotion x observations max. int. observations max. int. p-value
in T-HIGH in T-HIGH in T-LOW in T-LOW
Anger 0 16 3 15 1 0.1449
5 16 0 15 0 0.0669
10 16 0 15 0 0.0154
15 16 0 15 0 0.0023
20 16 0 15 0 0.0820
Contempt 0 16 4 15 0 0.0358
5 16 0 15 0 0.0384
10 16 0 15 0 0.0079
15 16 0 15 0 0.0097
20 16 1 15 0 0.4185
Gladness 0 16 0 15 0 0.2011
5 16 1 15 0 0.1242
10 16 1 15 0 0.0989
15 16 1 15 3 0.3273
20 16 12 15 13 0.1791
Appreciation 0 16 0 15 0 0.1439
5 16 0 15 0 0.0054
10 16 0 15 1 0.0060
15 16 0 15 3 0.0579
20 16 9 15 9 0.3954
max. int. observations sensing an emotion with maximal intensity
For interior values of x, anger is signi￿cantly more strongly pronounced in T-HIGH
than in T-LOW. The same holds for contempt. Only for x = 10 gladness is signi￿cantly
less pronounced in T-HIGH than in T-LOWat a signi￿cance level of 10 %. Appreciation
is signi￿cantly less pronounced in T-HIGH than in T-LOW for interior values of x.
For x = 0, we detect a signi￿cant treatment di⁄erence in contempt only.69
Result 3.5: E⁄ect of A￿ s intentions on anger, contempt, and appreciation
for interior values of x
Negative emotions such as anger and contempt are signi￿cantly more pronounced
in T-HIGH than in T-LOW for interior values of x. Furthermore, appreciation is
signi￿cantly less strongly pronounced in T-HIGH than in T-LOW for interior values of
69For x = 20, one may, however, argue that regarding the positive (negative) emotions a large
number of observations indicated the maximal (minimal) intensity and, therefore, no treatment dif-
ferences are identi￿ed. For x = 0, a large number of observations indicated the minimal intensity for
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x. Gladness seems to be una⁄ected by the treatment variation for the most values of
x.
Consequently, we conclude that agent B￿ s emotions may be a⁄ected by agent A￿ s
intentions. This e⁄ect, however, does not seem to carry over to agent B￿ s perception
of agent A￿ s action and to agent B￿ s reaction.
Other explanations
There are other potential reasons for why the perceived kindness of an action that
seems altruistic and the action￿ s rewards are not spoiled by the actor￿ s expectation
of future rewards in our setting. One reason may be that agent B can voluntarily
decide on his return transfer and is not forced to return a certain amount. Expecting
a return that is voluntarily given may not spoil the kindness of an action. This may
be di⁄erent for expecting a return that is involuntarily given. The introduced models
of intention-based reciprocity do not take this into account.
Another reason may be that kindness is not an absolute measure but a relative one
that captures the ranking of actions for a given action set. x = 20, for instance, may
be perceived as the kindest action of agent A and, therefore, would be evaluated as
equally kind in both treatments.
3.5 Conclusion
We have presented an experimental study on whether the perceived kindness of an
action that seems altruistic, i.e. a costly action that bene￿ts others, and the action￿ s
rewards are reduced by the actor￿ s expectation to receive future rewards.
In our experimental study second movers in a modi￿ed trust game return signif-
icantly positive rewards to ￿rst movers. On average, these rewards increase in the
￿rst mover￿ s transfer. However, they do not signi￿cantly vary in the probability that
the second mover can reciprocate. The second mover￿ s return transfer is even slightly
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0.5 for some values of x. On the basis of data from our questionnaire, we test whether
this is due to incorrect higher order beliefs of second movers. Our regression results
suggest that this, however, does not seem to be the case. Furthermore, we test whether
the second mover￿ s perception or emotions are a⁄ected by the probability that the sec-
ond mover can reciprocate. We ￿nd signi￿cant e⁄ects on some of the second mover￿ s
emotions, at least for some values of x.
Our results suggest that behavior that seems altruistic is rewarded. The more al-
truistic it seems, the higher is the reward in return. The reward for a given action,
however, does not vary in the actor￿ s expectation to receive future rewards. This is
consistent with the predictions of models of social preferences based on ￿nal outcomes
but inconsistent with the predictions of the self-interest model and the introduced mod-
els of intention-based reciprocity. Hence, individuals in this setting seem to condition
their behavior on outcomes rather than on intentions or higher order beliefs.
These results seem to be relevant for di⁄erent kinds of contexts. Political as well
as commercial campaigns often try to gain the support of a large group of individuals
by behaving in a way that seems altruistic, e.g. by distributing small gifts. Individuals
may well anticipate that these gifts are intended to gain their support. In the light of
our results, however, we would conclude that this does not diminish the e⁄ectiveness of
the small gifts. Similarly, in some organizations workers are ￿nancially incentivized to
help their colleagues.70 Workers, therefore, may anticipate that the help of a colleague
is motivated by receiving ￿nancial rewards. We would conclude that this does not
diminish the perceived kindness of help and does not harm the willingness to reward
this action.
This experimental study contributes to the discussion of higher order beliefs and of
intentions. Our results suggest that higher order beliefs and speci￿c kinds of intentions
do not signi￿cantly in￿ uence the reaction to an action that seems altruistic. It may
well be that higher order beliefs and intentions are crucial for other sorts of behavior,
though, e.g. for the reaction to socially undesired behavior. Criminal law often condi-
tions penalties on the criminal￿ s intentions. Hence, the e⁄ect of intentions may depend
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on the speci￿c context.
3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Experimental sessions and instructions
Experimental sessions
The order of events during each experimental session was the following: Individuals
were welcomed and randomly assigned a cubicle in the laboratory where they took their
decisions in complete anonymity from the other individuals. The random allocation
to a cubicle also determined an individual￿ s role. The instructions for the experiment,
which each individual found in his cubicle, were read aloud. Then, individuals could go
through the instructions on their own and ask questions. After all remaining questions
had been answered and no individual needed more time to go through the instructions,
they had to answer a set of control questions concerning the procedure of the experi-
ment. After each individual had answered all control questions correctly, participants
were informed about their role in the experiment and we proceeded to the decision
stages. First, agents A decided upon x. Second, a computer program determined ran-
domly which games of a session were stopped. Each game of a session had the same
probability that it is stopped, which corresponded to q of the implemented treatment
of the session. Third, agents B were informed about whether the game was stopped
or not. In case the game was not stopped agents B decided upon the return transfer
for each x. In case the game was stopped agents B were asked what they would have
transferred in return for each x if the game had continued. After participants had
made their decisions, they were asked questions whose answers were not related to any
payments, e.g. agents A were asked how many points they believe agent B transfers
in return for each x given the game is not stopped, and agents B were asked which
intensities of certain emotions they would experience for each x. After all participants
had answered the questions posed to them, all agents were informed about the outcome
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right after agent A￿ s decision, and - in case the game was not stopped - agent B￿ s
decision for the corresponding x. Finally, we elicited demographic variables such as
sex, age and subject of studies. At the end of the session individuals were paid in cash
according to their earned amount in the modi￿ed trust game plus a show-up fee of 5
Euro.
The instructions, the control questions, the program, and the questionnaire were
originally written in German. The translated instructions for T-HIGH can be found
in the following. The instructions for T-LOW are similar except that the probability
that the game is not stopped right after agent A￿ s decision is 50 % (instead of 80 %).
Translated instructions of T-HIGH
Instructions for the experiment
Welcome to this experiment. You and the other participants are asked to make
decisions. Your decisions as well as the decisions of the other participants determine
the result of the experiment. At the end of the experiment you will be paid in cash
according to the actual result of the experiment. So please read the instructions atten-
tively and think about your decisions carefully. In addition, you receive ￿independent
of the result of the experiment - a show up fee of 5 Euro.
During the whole experiment it is not allowed to talk with other participants, to
use mobile phones, or to start other programs on the computer. The contempt of these
rules immediately leads to the exclusion of the experiment and of all payments. If you
have any questions, please raise your hand. An instructor of the experiment will then
come to your seat in order to answer your questions.
During the experiment we talk about points rather than about Euros. Your whole
income is initially calculated in points. At the end of the experiment your actual
amount of total points is converted into Euros according to the following rate:
1 point = 30 Cents.
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experiment starts, you are informed whether you are a participant A or a participant
B. While entering the room this was randomly determined. If you are participant A,
you are randomly and anonymously matched to a participant B. If you are participant
B, you are randomly and anonymously matched to a participant A. Neither during nor
after the experiment you receive any information about the identity of your matched
participant. Likewise, your matched participant does not receive any information about
your identity.
The procedure
Participant A has an initial endowment of 20 points. Participant B has an initial
endowment of 0 points.
Participant A can decide how much of his initial endowment he transfers to partic-
ipant B. Participant A can either choose 0, 5, 10, 15 or 20 points.
In order to make this decision, participant A selects one amount on the following
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Participant A￿ s transfer is then tripled and sent to participant B.
After participant A chose his transfer and participant A￿ s tripled transfer
was sent to participant B, it is randomly determined whether the experiment is
stopped at this point in time.
￿ With the probability of 20% the experiment is stopped at this point in time.
In this case participant A receives his initial endowment minus his
transfer, and participant B receives participant A￿ s tripled transfer.
￿ With the probability of 80% the experiment is not stopped at this point in time
and participant B decides which integer between 0 and participant A￿ s tripled
transfer (including 0 and participant A￿ s tripled transfer) he transfers back to
participant A. In this case participant A receives his initial endowment
minus his transfer plus participant B￿ s back transfer, and participant
B receives participant A￿ s tripled transfer minus his back transfer.
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pant B makes the decision about the back transfer. In order to do that, participant
B indicates for each possible transfer of participant A his selected amount on the fol-
lowing computer screen and presses the OK-button. Depending on what participant A
transferred, participant B￿ s corresponding entry is transferred back to participant A.Can intentions spoil the kindness of a gift? 106
Participant B makes this decision only if the experiment was not stopped right after
participant A￿ s decision.
Example 1: Participant A chooses a transfer of 15 points. Then, it is randomly
determined that the experiment is stopped right after participant A￿ s decision. Partic-
ipant A receives 20 ￿15 points = 5 points. Participant B receives 3 * 15 points = 45
points.
Example 2: Participant A chooses a transfer of 15 points. Then, it is randomly
determined that the experiment is not stopped right after participant A￿ s decision.
Participant B chooses a back transfer of 39 points if participant A transferred 15
points. Participant A receives 20 ￿15 + 39 points = 44 points. Participant B receives
3 * 15 ￿39 points = 6 points.
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After this procedure participant A and participant B are both informed about par-
ticipant A￿ s transfer, about whether the experiment was stopped right after participant
A￿ s decision, and - in case the experiment was not stopped right after participant A￿ s
decision - about participant B￿ s back transfer. Then, the experiment ends. The proce-
dure is not repeated.
During the course of the experiment you might be asked to answer questions. The
answers to these questions do not a⁄ect the payments and the procedure of the exper-
iment. They are treated anonymously and are not sent to your matched participant or
any other participant.
Before you are informed whether you are participant A or participant B and the
experiment starts, you are asked to answer several control questions concerning the
procedure of the experiment.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand. An instructor of the experiment
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3.6.2 Behavioral predictions of the modi￿ed version of the
model by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004)
The basic model by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004)
In Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) individual i￿ s utility function in a 2-player game
with individual j is de￿ned in the following way:
Ui = ￿i + Yi ￿ ￿i ￿ ￿i,
where ￿i represents individual i￿ s expectation of his own material payo⁄ that depends
on his strategy and his belief about individual j￿ s strategy, Yi > 0 individual i￿ s para-
meter of sensitivity to reciprocity concerns, ￿i individual i￿ s perception of the kindness
of his own strategy, and ￿i individual i￿ s perception of the kindness of individual j￿ s
strategy. Yi is a parameter that is exogenously given, whereas ￿i, ￿i, and ￿i depend on
individual i￿ s strategy, individual i￿ s belief about individual j￿ s strategy, and individual
i￿ s belief about individual j￿ s belief about individual i￿ s strategy.
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) de￿ne ￿i as individual i￿ s expectation of indi-
vidual j￿ s material payo⁄ minus a reference payo⁄ which is the mean of the maximum
and the minimum expected material payo⁄ individual i beliefs he could assign to indi-
vidual j by varying his strategy.71 ￿i is de￿ned as individual i￿ s belief about individual
j￿ s expectation of individual i￿ s material payo⁄ minus a reference payo⁄ which is the
mean of the maximum and the minimum expected material payo⁄ individual i beliefs
that individual j beliefs he could assign to individual i by varying his strategy.
Note that an individual￿ s beliefs are updated in the course of the game and, there-
fore, may di⁄er after di⁄erent histories of play. Updated beliefs after a given history
equal initial beliefs, except for the choices that were already made and lead to the given
history. Updated beliefs assign a probability of 1 to already made choices. Consider,
for example, individual i that initially believes individual j to play action a with prob-
ability p and action b with probability 1 ￿ p (which may, indeed, be correct). After
71Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) de￿ne the reference payo⁄ in a more general way that is
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individual j￿ s action a has realized, individual i believes that individual j has chosen a
with probability 1 (and not p). As beliefs are updated, also an individual￿ s perception
of the kindness of his own strategy and of the other individual￿ s strategy are updated
in the course of the game and may di⁄er after di⁄erent histories of play.
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) introduce the sequential reciprocity equilib-
rium (SRE) in which each player in each of his decision nodes makes choices that
maximize his utility for the given history, given his updated ￿rst and second order be-
liefs, and given that he follows his equilibrium strategy at other histories. Furthermore,
all players￿initial ￿rst and second order beliefs are correct.
Our modi￿cation
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) restrict attention to ￿nite multi-stage games with-
out nature. For our context, we could simply use their framework and consider nature
as a third player who always chooses to stop the game with probability 1 ￿ q and to
continue the game with probability q, and to whom agent A and agent B are insensi-
tive to reciprocity concerns. This, however, leads to an unintuitive way of evaluating
agent A￿ s kindness in the course of the game: At the beginning of the game agent
B has some initial belief about agent A￿ s strategy, nature￿ s strategy, and agent A￿ s
belief about nature￿ s strategy. After agent A￿ s chosen amount is transferred and the
lottery has chosen to continue the game, agent B￿ s updated beliefs are that agent A
has chosen the given transfer (with probability 1), that nature has chosen to continue
the game (with probability 1), and that agent A believes that nature has chosen to
continue the game (with probability 1). If agent B evaluates the kindness of agent A￿ s
strategy given his updated beliefs, he takes into consideration that agent A believes
that nature has chosen to continue the game with probability 1. However, agent A￿ s
belief about nature￿ s strategy was di⁄erent at agent A￿ s decision node and, therefore,
agent A￿ s intentions were di⁄erent.
In order to avoid that, we undertake a small and natural modi￿cation of the basic
model by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004). Our modi￿cation consists in the way
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agent B￿ s decision node we let him evaluate the kindness of agent A￿ s strategy on the
basis of his belief that agent A believes that nature has chosen to continue the game
with probability q rather than with probability 1.
Agent B￿ s utility function when he is asked to decide
Consider agent A has chosen on x and the lottery has determined to continue the
game. Agent B, then, decides on y(x) 2 [0;3 ￿ x].72 At his decision node he believes
that agent A has chosen x (with probability 1), that nature has chosen to continue the
game (with probability 1), and that agent A believes that agent B returns e y(0) = 0,
e y(5) 2 [0;15], e y(10) 2 [0;30], e y(15) 2 [0;45], e y(20) 2 [0;60], where e y(x) represents
agent B￿ s second order belief for x.
Then, agent B￿ s expectation of his own material payo⁄ is equal to
￿B (y(x);x) = 3 ￿ x ￿ y(x),
and agent B￿ s perception of the kindness of his own strategy, y(x), is equal to
￿B (y(x);x) = 20 ￿ x + y(x) ￿ ref￿B (x), with ref￿B (x) =
(20￿x+0)+(20￿x+3￿x)
2 .
The ￿rst term of ￿B (y(x);x), 20 ￿ x + y(x), refers to agent B￿ s expectation of agent
A￿ s material payo⁄, while the second, ref￿B (x), to the corresponding reference payo⁄
that is the mean of the minimum he (believes he) can assign to agent A with y(x) 2
[0;3 ￿ x], 20 ￿ x + 0, and its maximum, 20 ￿ x + 3 ￿ x.
Furthermore, agent B￿ s perception of the kindness of agent A￿ s strategy, x, is equal
to
￿B (e y(￿);x) = 3 ￿ x ￿ q ￿ e y(x) ￿ ref￿B (e y(￿)).
The ￿rst term of ￿B (e y(￿);x), 3 ￿ x ￿ q ￿ e y(x), represents agent B￿ s belief about agent
A￿ s expectation of agent B￿ s material payo⁄, which depends on agent B￿ s belief about
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agent A￿ s action, x, as well as agent B￿ s belief about agent A￿ s belief about agent
B￿ s strategy, e y(x), and nature￿ s move. The second term of ￿B, ref￿B (e y(￿)), represents
the corresponding reference payo⁄ that is the mean of the minimum agent B believes
agent A believes he (agent A) can assign to agent B with x 2 f0;5;10;15;20g and its
maximum. As e y(x) 2 [0;3 ￿ x], the minimum of 3 ￿ x ￿ q ￿ e y(x) is equal to 0 which is
attained at x = 0. The maximum of 3￿x￿q￿e y(x) depends on agent B￿ s second order
beliefs e y(x) for all x. Note that it is not necessarily equal to 3￿20￿q ￿ e y(20) which is
attained at x = 20.
Hence, agent B￿ s utility function is the following
UB (y(x);x; e y(￿)) = ￿B (y(x);x) + YB ￿ ￿B (y(x);x) ￿ ￿B (e y(￿);x) =





￿ (3 ￿ x ￿ q ￿ e y(x) ￿ ref￿B (e y(￿))).
Equilibrium predictions
In this subsection we derive some statements that hold in any SRE in which agent B
chooses a pure strategy y(x) 2 [0;3 ￿ x] for all x 2 f0;5;10;15;20g.
1. y(x) (weakly) increases in x 8 q 2 (0;1).
Suppose not. Then there exist x0;x 2 f0;5;10;15;20g with x0 > x but y(x0) < y(x).
As in any SRE initial beliefs about strategies are correct, e.g. y(x) = e y(x) and y(x0) =
e y(x0), agent B believes that agent A intends to assign him more expected payo⁄ with
x0 than with x since 3 ￿ x0 ￿ y(x0) ￿ q > 3 ￿ x ￿ y(x) ￿ q. As ref￿B (e y(￿)) is the same
under x0 and x, we have ￿B (e y(￿);x0) > ￿B (e y(￿);x), i.e. agent B perceives strategy x0
as kinder than strategy x. Nevertheless, agent B returns less when he receives 3 ￿ x0
than when he receives 3 ￿ x. From revealed preferences it must be the case that:
UB (y(x0);x0;e y(￿)) ￿ UB (y(x);x0;e y(￿))
and
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because y(x) is available given x0 (since y(x) ￿ 3 ￿ x < 3 ￿ x0), and y(x0) is available
given x (since y(x0) < y(x) ￿ 3 ￿ x). The two inequalities can be written as




￿ ￿B (e y(￿);x0) ￿




￿ ￿B (e y(￿);x0)
and





￿ ￿B (e y(￿);x) ￿





￿ ￿B (e y(￿);x)
which can be rewritten as
1
YB ￿ ￿B (e y(￿);x0) and 1
YB ￿ ￿B (e y(￿);x).
This implies ￿B (e y(￿);x) ￿ ￿B (e y(￿);x0) which is a contradiction.
2. (3 ￿ x ￿ y(x) ￿ q) (weakly) increases in x 8 q 2 (0;1).
Suppose not. Then, there exist x0;x 2 f0;5;10;15;20g with x0 > x but
(3 ￿ x0 ￿ y(x0) ￿ q) < (3 ￿ x ￿ y(x) ￿ q). As in any SRE initial beliefs about strate-
gies are correct, e.g. y(x) = e y(x) and y(x0) = e y(x0), agent B believes that agent A
intends so assign him less payo⁄with x0 than with x. As ref￿B (e y(￿)) is the same under
x0 and x, we have ￿B (e y(￿);x0) < ￿B (e y(￿);x), i.e. agent B perceives strategy x as kinder
than strategy x0. From revealed preferences it must be the case that:
UB (y(x0);x0;e y(￿)) ￿ UB (y(x);x0;e y(￿))
and
UB (y(x);x; e y(￿)) ￿ UB ((y(x0) ￿ 3 ￿ (x0 ￿ x));x; e y(￿))
because y(x) is available given x0 (since y(x) ￿ 3 ￿ x < 3 ￿ x0), and y(x0) ￿ 3 ￿ (x0 ￿ x)
is available given x. The latter is true since y(x0) ￿ 3 ￿ (x0 ￿ x) ￿ 3 ￿ x, which isCan intentions spoil the kindness of a gift? 113
equivalent to y(x0) ￿ 3 ￿ x0, and y(x0) ￿ 3 ￿ (x0 ￿ x) ￿ 0 since the above assumed
(3 ￿ x0 ￿ y(x0) ￿ q) < (3 ￿ x ￿ y(x) ￿ q) implies y(x0)￿3￿(x0 ￿ x) > y (x) ￿ 0. The two
inequalities can be written as




￿ ￿B (e y(￿);x0) ￿




￿ ￿B (e y(￿);x0)
and





￿ ￿B (e y(￿);x) ￿
3 ￿ x ￿ (y(x0) ￿ 3 ￿ (x0 ￿ x)) + YB ￿
￿
(y(x0) ￿ 3 ￿ (x0 ￿ x)) ￿ 3
2 ￿ x
￿
￿ ￿B (e y(￿);x).
3 ￿ x0 ￿ y(x0) ￿ q < 3 ￿ x ￿ y(x) ￿ q is equivalent to 3 ￿ (x0 ￿ x) < q ￿ (y(x0) ￿ y(x))
and implies (i) y(x0) > y(x) and (ii) 3 ￿ (x0 ￿ x) < y(x0) ￿ y(x) which is equivalent to
y(x0) ￿ 3 ￿ (x0 ￿ x) > y(x). Therefore, we can be rewrite the two inequalities as
￿B (e y(￿);x0) ￿ 1
YB and ￿B (e y(￿);x) ￿ 1
YB.
This implies ￿B (e y(￿);x0) ￿ ￿B (e y(￿);x) which is a contradiction.
3. ￿B (e y(￿);x) (weakly) increases in x 8 q 2 (0;1).
As in any SRE initial beliefs about strategies are correct, e.g. y(x) = e y(x) for
all x 2 f0;5;10;15;20g, and our second property holds, agent B believes that agent
A intends to assign him (weakly) more expected material payo⁄ the higher x. As
ref￿B (e y(￿)) is the same for any x 2 f0;5;10;15;20g, ￿B (e y(￿);x) (weakly) increases in
x.
4. The higher q the (weakly) smaller y(x) 8 q 2 (0;1) and x = 20.
Suppose not. Then, there exist q0;q 2 (0;1) with q0 > q and an SRE for q0 with
y(20)q0 and an SRE for q with y(20)q such that y(20)q0 > y(20)q. As in any SRE
initial beliefs about strategies are correct, agent B believes that agent A intends to
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not stopped is q rather than q0 because 3 ￿ 20 ￿ y(20)q ￿ q > 3 ￿ 20 ￿ y(20)q0 ￿ q0.
ref￿B (e y(￿)) may be di⁄erent for q0 and q. Due to our second property and correct
initial beliefs about strategies, we can simply calculate ref￿B (e y(￿)) as the mean of the
minimum agent B believes agent A believes he (agent A) can assign to agent B with
x 2 f0;5;10;15;20g, which is attained at x = 0, and its maximum, which is attained
at x = 20. Hence, ref￿B (e y(￿)q)q = (3 ￿ 20 ￿ y(20)q ￿ q) ￿ 1
2 and ref￿B (e y(￿)q0)q0 =
(3 ￿ 20 ￿ y(20)q0 ￿ q0) ￿ 1
2. As a consequence, agent B perceives x = 20 as kinder in
the SRE with q than in the one with q0, i.e. ￿B (e y(￿)q;20)q > ￿B (e y(￿)q0;20)q0.73 This
is because (3 ￿ 20 ￿ y(20)q ￿ q) ￿ 1
2 > (3 ￿ 20 ￿ y(20)q0 ￿ q0) ￿ 1
2. Nevertheless, agent B
returns more in the SRE with q0 than in the one with q. From revealed preferences it
must be the case that:
UB (y(20)q0;20;e y(￿)q0)q0 ￿ UB (y(20)q;20;e y(￿)q0)q0
and
UB (y(20)q;20;e y(￿)q)q ￿ UB (y(20)q0;20;e y(￿)q)q
because y(20)q and y(20)q0 are both available given x = 20. The two inequalities can
be written as





￿ ￿B (e y(￿)q0;20)q0 ￿





￿ ￿B (e y(￿)q0;20)q0
and





￿ ￿B (e y(￿)q;20)q ￿





￿ ￿B (e y(￿)q;20)q
which can be rewritten as
￿B (e y(￿)q0;20)q0 ￿ 1
YB and ￿B (e y(￿)q;20)q ￿ 1
YB.
73This may not be the case for x < 20.Can intentions spoil the kindness of a gift? 115
This implies ￿B (e y(￿)q0;20)q0 ￿ ￿B (e y(￿)q;20)q which is a contradiction.
5. If y(20)q = y(20)q0 for q0;q 2 (0;1) with q0 > q, then either y(20)q =
y(20)q0 = 60 or y(20)q = y(20)q0 = 0.
Suppose not. Then, there exist q0;q 2 (0;1) with q0 > q and an SRE for q0 with
y(20)q0 and an SRE for q with y(20)q such that 0 < y(20)q0 = y(20)q < 60. As in any
SRE initial beliefs about strategies are correct, agent B believes that agent A intends to
assign him more expected payo⁄with x = 20 when the probability that the game is not
stopped is q rather than q0 because 3￿20￿y(20)q￿q > 3￿20￿y(20)q0￿q0 (with y(20)q0 =
y(20)q > 0). Due to our second property and correct initial beliefs about strategies,
we can simply calculate ref￿B (e y(￿)q)q = (3 ￿ 20 ￿ y(20)q ￿ q) ￿ 1
2 and ref￿B (e y(￿)q0)q0 =
(3 ￿ 20 ￿ y(20)q0 ￿ q0) ￿ 1
2. As a consequence, agent B perceives x = 20 as kinder
in the SRE with q than in the one with q0, i.e. ￿B (e y(￿)q;20)q > ￿B (e y(￿)q0;20)q0.74
Nevertheless, agent B returns the same in the SRE with q0 as in the one with q. From
revealed preferences it must be the case that:
UB (y(20)q0;20;e y(￿)q0)q0 ￿ UB (0;20;e y(￿)q0)q0
and
UB (y(20)q;20;e y(￿)q)q ￿ UB (60;20;e y(￿)q)q
because 0 and 60 are available given x = 20. The two inequalities can be written as





￿ ￿B (e y(￿)q0;20)q0 ￿





￿ ￿B (e y(￿)q0;20)q0
and





￿ ￿B (e y(￿)q;20)q ￿





￿ ￿B (e y(￿)q;20)q
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which can be rewritten as
￿B (e y(￿)q0;20)q0 ￿ 1
YB and ￿B (e y(￿)q;20)q ￿ 1
YB.
This implies ￿B (e y(￿)q0;20)q0 ￿ ￿B (e y(￿)q;20)q which is a contradiction.
6. ￿B (e y(￿);20) is (weakly) larger when q = 0:5 than when q = 0:8.
Suppose not. Then, there exist an SRE for q = 0:5 with y(20)0:5 and an SRE
for q = 0:8 with y(20)0:8 such that ￿B (e y(￿)0:5;20)0:5 < ￿B (e y(￿)0:8;20)0:8. Due to
our second property and correct initial beliefs about strategies, this implies that
(60 ￿ 0:5 ￿ y(20)0:5) ￿ 1
2 < (60 ￿ 0:8 ￿ y(20)0:8) ￿ 1
2 and, therefore, y(20)0:5 > y(20)0:8.
From revealed preferences it must be the case that:
UB (y(20)0:5;20;e y(￿)0:5)0:5 ￿ UB (y(20)0:8;20;e y(￿)0:5)0:5
and
UB (y(20)0:8;20;e y(￿)0:8)0:8 ￿ UB (y(20)0:5;20;e y(￿)0:8)0:8
because y(20)0:5 and y(20)0:8 are available given x = 20. The two inequalities can be
written as





￿ ￿B (e y(￿)0:5;20)0:5 ￿





￿ ￿B (e y(￿)0:5;20)0:5
and





￿ ￿B (e y(￿)0:8;20)0:8 ￿





￿ ￿B (e y(￿)0:8;20)0:8
which can be rewritten as
￿B (e y(￿)0:5;20)0:5 ￿ 1
YB and ￿B (e y(￿)0:8;20)0:8 ￿ 1
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This implies ￿B (e y(￿)0:5;20)0:5 ￿ ￿B (e y(￿)0:8;20)0:8 which is a contradiction.
7. Agent A￿ s expected return from x = 20, q ￿ y(20), is (weakly) smaller
when q = 0:5 than when q = 0:8.
Our sixth property states ￿B (e y(￿)0:5;20)0:5 ￿ ￿B (e y(￿)0:8;20)0:8. Due to our second
property and correct initial beliefs about strategies, this implies (60 ￿ 0:5 ￿ y(20)0:5) ￿
1
2 ￿ (60 ￿ 0:8 ￿ y(20)0:8) ￿ 1
2 which is equivalent to 0:8 ￿ y(20)0:8 ￿ 0:5 ￿ y(20)0:5.
Existence of an SRE
So far, we have developed a couple of statements that hold in any SRE in which agent
B chooses a pure strategy y(x) 2 [0;3 ￿ x] for all x 2 f0;5;10;15;20g. In the following
we show that at least one such SRE exists for each of our treatments.
Lemma 1: 8 x 2 f0;5;10;15;20g and q 2 (0;1) there exists an optimal pure
action for agent B, y(x) 2 [0;3 ￿ x], such that agent B￿ s initial beliefs about
agent A￿ s beliefs about agent B￿ s actions are all correct, i.e. y(x) = e y(x) for
all x 2 f0;5;10;15;20g.
Take an x 2 f0;5;10;15g, a e y(20) 2 [0;60], and the fact that ref￿B (e y(￿)) =
60￿q￿e y(20)+0
2 (as it is the case in all SRE in which agent B chooses a pure strategy












. As UB (y(x);x; e y(￿))
does not depend on e y(x0) with x0 2 f0;5;10;15gnx and x and e y(20) are ￿xed, we
rewrite agent B￿ s utility function as UB (y(x);e y(x)). UB (y(x);e y(x)) is continuous
in y(x) and e y(x), and UB (￿;e y(x)) is quasi-concave in e y(x). By choosing a y(x) 2
G(e y(x)) = [0;3 ￿ x] agent B can maximize his utility. The correspondence G(e y(x))
is constant and continuous in e y(x). Furthermore, for any e y(x) G(e y(x)) is non-empty,
compact, and convex-valued. Consequently, we can apply Berge￿ s Maximum Theorem
and conclude that for any e y(x) 2 [0;3 ￿ x] there exists at least one y(x) 2 [0;3 ￿ x] that
maximizes UB(y(x);e y(x)) and the correspondence Y ￿(e y(x)) : [0;3 ￿ x] ! [0;3 ￿ x] that
maps e y(x) 2 [0;3 ￿ x] into the set of y(x) 2 [0;3 ￿ x] which maximize UB(y(x);e y(x))Can intentions spoil the kindness of a gift? 118
is non-empty, compact-valued, upper-hemicontinuous, and convex-valued. It remains
to show that Y ￿(e y(x)) has a ￿xed point e y(x) 2 Y ￿(e y(x)), i.e. agent B￿ s initial beliefs
about agent A￿ s beliefs about agent B￿ s actions for x are correct. We apply Kakutani￿ s
Fixed Point Theorem and conclude that at least one ￿xed point exists.
Now, take x = 20, and the fact that ref￿B (e y(￿)) =
60￿q￿e y(20)+0
2 . Then, agent











. As UB (y(20);20;e y(￿)) does not depend on
e y(x0) with x0 2 f0;5;10;15g and x is ￿xed at 20, we rewrite agent B￿ s utility
function as UB (y(20);e y(20)). Again, UB (y(20);e y(20)) is continuous in y(20) and
e y(20), UB(￿;e y(20)) is quasi-concave, and [0;60], the attainable set of pure actions,
is continuous in e y(20), non-empty, compact, and convex-valued. As above, we can
conclude that for any e y(20) 2 [0;60] there exists at least one y(20) 2 [0;60] that
maximizes UB(y(20);e y(20)) and that there exist at least one e y(20) that is correct.
From our second property we know that if (i) agent B has some ref￿B (e y(￿)), which
is the same under all x 2 f0;5;10;15;20g, and (ii) his initial beliefs are correct, e.g.
y(x) = e y(x) for all x 2 f0;5;10;15;20g, and (iii) he behaves rational in the sense that
he chooses an action when its derived utility is (weakly) highest, then 3 ￿ x ￿ e y(x) ￿ q
increases in x and ref￿B (e y(￿)) =
60￿q￿e y(20)+0
2 .
Proposition 1: For any q 2 (0;1) there exists an SRE, in which agent B
chooses a pure strategy.
Due to Lemma 1, it remains to show that given agent B￿ s pure optimal strategy
agent A has an optimal (possibly randomized) strategy a that is correctly expected by
initial beliefs, i.e. a = e a with e a as agent A￿ s initial second order belief on a.
Take any optimal pure strategy of agent B y(x) for all x 2 f0;5;10;15;20g which
is correctly expected by agent A. Then, agent A￿ s utility function is UA (a;y(￿);e a) =
￿A (a;y(￿))+YA￿￿A (a;y(￿))￿￿A (y(￿);e a). Let us de￿ne E (x) and e E (x) as the mean of
x resulting with strategy a and e a, respectively, and E (y (x)) and e E (y (x)) as the
mean of y (x) resulting with strategy a and e a, respectively. Then, ￿A (a;y(￿)) =
20 ￿ E (x) ￿ q ￿ E (y (x)), ￿A (a;y(￿)) = 3 ￿ E (x) ￿ q ￿ E (y (x)) ￿
0+3￿20￿q￿y(20)
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and ￿A (y(￿);e a) = 20 ￿ e E (x) + q ￿ e E (y (x)) ￿
20￿ e E(x)+q￿0+20￿ e E(x)+q￿3￿ e E(x)
2 . Hence,
UA (a;y(￿);e a) = 20￿E (x)￿q￿E (y (x))+YA￿
￿










. As y(￿) is ￿xed, we can rewrite agent A￿ s utility function as
UA (a;e a). UA (a;e a) is continuous in a and e a, UA (￿;e a) is quasi-concave, and agent A￿ s
set of possibly randomized strategies X is continuous in e a, non-empty, compact and
convex-valued. Hence, we can apply Berge￿ s Maximum Theorem and conclude that for
any e a there exists a set of strategies X￿ (e a) out of which each strategy is part of the
set X and maximizes agent A￿ s utility given e a. Furthermore, X￿ (e a) : X ! X is a
non-empty, compact, convex-valued, and upper-hemicontinuous correspondence. Con-
sequently, we can apply Kakutani￿ s Fixed Point Theorem and conclude that X￿ (e a) has
at least one ￿xed point.
3.6.3 Behavioral predictions of the modi￿ed version of the
model by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) with cen-
tral elements of the model by Falk and Fischbacher
(2006)
The model
We consider the same utility function of individual i as in the modi￿ed version of
the model by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) but de￿ne ￿i and ￿i di⁄erently.
The interpretation of these terms, though, remains the same. The reference payo⁄
used for ￿i is equal to individual i￿ s expectation of his own material payo⁄, ￿i, while
the reference payo⁄ used for ￿i is equal to individual i￿ s belief about individual j￿ s
expectation of individual j￿ s material payo⁄. Everything else remains the same.
Agent B￿ s utility function when he is asked to decide
In comparison to agent B￿ s corresponding utility function in the modi￿ed version of
the model by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), ￿B (y(x);x) and ￿B (e y(x);x) change.
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￿B (y(x);x) = 20 ￿ x + y (x) ￿ (3 ￿ x ￿ y (x))
and
￿B (e y(x);x) = 3 ￿ x ￿ q ￿ e y(x) ￿ (20 ￿ x + q ￿ e y(x)).
Hence, agent B￿ s utility function is the following
UB (y(x);x; e y(x)) = 3￿x￿y(x)+YB￿(20 ￿ 4 ￿ x + 2 ￿ y (x))￿(4 ￿ x ￿ 2 ￿ q ￿ e y(x) ￿ 20).
Equilibrium predictions
In this subsection we derive some statements that hold in any SRE in which agent B
chooses a pure strategy y(x) 2 [0;3 ￿ x] for all x 2 f0;5;10;15;20g.
1. y(x) (weakly) increases in x 8 q 2 (0;1).
Suppose not. Then there exist x0;x 2 f0;5;10;15;20g with x0 > x but y(x0) < y(x).
As in any SRE initial beliefs about strategies are correct, e.g. y(x) = e y(x) and y(x0) =
e y(x0), ￿B (e y(x0);x0) > ￿B (e y(x);x) since 4￿x0￿2￿q￿y(x0)￿20 > 4￿x￿2￿q￿y(x)￿20.
Nevertheless, agent B returns less when he receives 3 ￿ x0 than when he receives 3 ￿ x.
From revealed preferences it must be the case that:
UB (y(x0);x0;e y(x0)) ￿ UB (y(x);x0;e y(x0))
and
UB (y(x);x; e y(x)) ￿ UB (y(x0);x; e y(x))
because y(x) is available given x0 (since y(x) ￿ 3 ￿ x < 3 ￿ x0), and y(x0) is available
given x (since y(x0) < y(x) ￿ 3 ￿ x). The two inequalities can be written as
3 ￿ x0 ￿ y(x0) + YB ￿ (20 ￿ 4 ￿ x0 + 2 ￿ y (x0)) ￿ ￿B (e y(x0);x0) ￿
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and
3 ￿ x ￿ y(x) + YB ￿ (20 ￿ 4 ￿ x + 2 ￿ y (x)) ￿ ￿B (e y(x);x) ￿
3 ￿ x ￿ y(x0) + YB ￿ (20 ￿ 4 ￿ x + 2 ￿ y (x0)) ￿ ￿B (e y(x);x)
which can be rewritten as
1
2￿YB ￿ ￿B (e y(x0);x0) and 1
2￿YB ￿ ￿B (e y(x);x).
This implies ￿B (e y(x);x) ￿ ￿B (e y(x0);x0) which is a contradiction.
2. ￿B (e y(x);x) (weakly) increases in x 8 q 2 f0:5;0:8g.
Suppose not. Then, there exist x0;x 2 f0;5;10;15;20g with x0 > x but
￿B (e y(x0);x0) < ￿B (e y(x);x). As in any SRE initial beliefs about strategies are cor-
rect, e.g. y(x) = e y(x) and y(x0) = e y(x0), this implies 4 ￿ x0 ￿ 2 ￿ q ￿ y(x0) ￿ 20 <
4 ￿ x ￿ 2 ￿ q ￿ y(x) ￿ 20 which is equivalent to 4 ￿ (x0 ￿ x) < 2 ￿ q ￿ (y(x0) ￿ y(x)) and
implies y(x0) > y(x). Furthermore, for q 2 f0:5;0:8g y(x) < 3 ￿ x in SRE. If not and
y(x) = e y(x) = 3 ￿ x, ￿B (e y(x);x) = 4 ￿ x ￿ 2 ￿ 3 ￿ x ￿ q ￿ 20, which is equal or smaller
than 0 for q 2 f0:5;0:8g. Given ￿B (e y(x);x) ￿ 0, agent B preferred to return nothing
instead of y(x) = 3 ￿ x.
From revealed preferences it must be the case that:
UB (y(x0);x0;e y(x0)) ￿ UB (y(x);x0;e y(x0))
and
UB (y(x);x; e y(x)) ￿ UB (3 ￿ x;x;e y(x))
because y(x) is available given x0 (since y(x) < 3 ￿ x < 3 ￿ x0), and 3 ￿ x is available
given x. The two inequalities can be written as
3 ￿ x0 ￿ y(x0) + YB ￿ (20 ￿ 4 ￿ x0 + 2 ￿ y (x0)) ￿ ￿B (e y(x0);x0) ￿
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and
3 ￿ x ￿ y(x) + YB ￿ (20 ￿ 4 ￿ x + 2 ￿ y (x)) ￿ ￿B (e y(x);x) ￿
3 ￿ x ￿ 3 ￿ x + YB ￿ (20 ￿ 4 ￿ x + 2 ￿ 3 ￿ x) ￿ ￿B (e y(x);x).
As y(x0) > y(x) and y(x) < 3 ￿ x, the two inequalities can be rewritten as
￿B (e y(x0);x0) ￿ 1
2￿YB and ￿B (e y(x);x) ￿ 1
2￿YB.
This implies ￿B (e y(x0);x0) ￿ ￿B (e y(x);x) which is a contradiction.
3. The higher q the (weakly) smaller y(x) 8 q 2 (0;1) and x 2 f0;5;10;15;20g.
Suppose not. Then, there exist q0;q 2 (0;1) with q0 > q and an SRE for q0 with y(x)q0
and an SRE for q with y(x)q such that y(x)q0 > y(x)q. As in any SRE initial beliefs
about strategies are correct, e.g. y(x)q0 = e y(x)q0 and y(x)q = e y(x)q, ￿B (e y(x)q;x)q >
￿B (e y(x)q0;x)q0 since 4￿x￿2￿q ￿y(x)q ￿20 > 4￿x￿2￿q0 ￿y(x)q0 ￿20. Nevertheless,
agent B returns more in the SRE with q0 than in the one with q for x. From revealed
preferences it must be the case that:
UB (y(x)q0;x; e y(x)q0)q0 ￿ UB (y(x)q;x; e y(x)q0)q0
and
UB (y(x)q;x; e y(x)q)q ￿ UB (y(x)q0;x; e y(x)q)q
because y(x)q and y(x)q0 are both available given x. The two inequalities can be written
as
3 ￿ x ￿ y(x)q0 + YB ￿ (20 ￿ 4 ￿ x + 2 ￿ y(x)q0) ￿ ￿B (e y(x)q0;x)q0 ￿
3 ￿ x ￿ y(x)q + YB ￿ (20 ￿ 4 ￿ x + 2 ￿ y(x)q) ￿ ￿B (e y(x)q0;x)q0
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3 ￿ x ￿ y(x)q + YB ￿ (20 ￿ 4 ￿ x + 2 ￿ y(x)q) ￿ ￿B (e y(x)q;x)q ￿
3 ￿ x ￿ y(x)q0 + YB ￿ (20 ￿ 4 ￿ x + 2 ￿ y(x)q0) ￿ ￿B (e y(x)q;x)q
which can be rewritten as
￿B (e y(x)q0;x)q0 ￿ 1
2￿YB and ￿B (e y(x)q;x)q ￿ 1
2￿YB.
This implies ￿B (e y(x)q0;x)q0 ￿ ￿B (e y(x)q;x)q which is a contradiction.
4. For x 2 f5;10;15;20g it holds that if y(x)q = y(x)q0 for q0;q 2 (0;1) with
q0 > q, then either y(x)q = y(x)q0 = 3 ￿ x or y(x)q = y(x)q0 = 0.
Suppose not. Then, there exist q0;q 2 (0;1) with q0 > q and an SRE for q0 with
y(x)q0 and an SRE for q with y(x)q such that 0 < y(x)q0 = y(x)q < 3 ￿ x. As in any
SRE initial beliefs about strategies are correct, ￿B (e y(x)q;x)q > ￿B (e y(x)q0;x)q0 since
4 ￿ x ￿ 2 ￿ q ￿ y(x)q ￿ 20 > 4 ￿ x ￿ 2 ￿ q0 ￿ y(x)q0 ￿ 20. Nevertheless, agent B returns
the same in the SRE with q0 as in the one with q. From revealed preferences it must
be the case that:
UB (y(x)q0;x; e y(x)q0)q0 ￿ UB (0;x; e y(x)q0)q0
and
UB (y(x)q;x; e y(x)q)q ￿ UB (3 ￿ x;x;e y(x)q)q,
because 0 and 3 ￿ x are available given x. The two inequalities can be written as
3 ￿ x ￿ y(x)q0 + YB ￿ (20 ￿ 4 ￿ x + 2 ￿ y(x)q0) ￿ ￿B (e y(x)q0;x)q0 ￿
3 ￿ x ￿ 0 + YB ￿ (20 ￿ 4 ￿ x + 2 ￿ 0) ￿ ￿B (e y(x)q0;x)q0
and
3 ￿ x ￿ y(x)q + YB ￿ (20 ￿ 4 ￿ x + 2 ￿ y(x)q) ￿ ￿B (e y(x)q;x)q ￿
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which can be rewritten as
￿B (e y(x)q0;x)q0 ￿ 1
2￿YB and ￿B (e y(x)q;x)q ￿ 1
2￿YB.
This implies ￿B (e y(x)q0;x)q0 ￿ ￿B (e y(x)q;x)q which is a contradiction.
5. ￿B (e y(x);x) is (weakly) larger when q = 0:5 than when q = 0:8.
Suppose not. Then, there exist an SRE for q = 0:5 with y(x)0:5 and an SRE for
q = 0:8 with y(x)0:8 such that ￿B (e y(x)0:5;x)0:5 < ￿B (e y(x)0:8;x)0:8. Due to correct
initial beliefs about strategies, this implies that 4￿x￿2￿0:5￿y(x)0:5￿20 < 4￿x￿2￿
0:8 ￿ y(x)0:8 ￿ 20 and, therefore, y(x)0:5 > y(x)0:8. From revealed preferences it must
be the case that:
UB (y(x)0:5;x; e y(x)0:5)0:5 ￿ UB (y(x)0:8;x; e y(x)0:5)0:5
and
UB (y(x)0:8;x; e y(x)0:8)0:8 ￿ UB (y(x)0:5;x; e y(x)0:8)0:8,
because y(x)0:5 and y(x)0:8 are available given x. The two inequalities can be written
as
3 ￿ x ￿ y(x)0:5 + YB ￿ (20 ￿ 4 ￿ x + 2 ￿ y(x)0:5) ￿ ￿B (e y(x)0:5;x)0:5 ￿
3 ￿ x ￿ y(x)0:8 + YB ￿ (20 ￿ 4 ￿ x + 2 ￿ y(x)0:8) ￿ ￿B (e y(x)0:5;x)0:5
and
3 ￿ x ￿ y(x)0:8 + YB ￿ (20 ￿ 4 ￿ x + 2 ￿ y(x)0:8) ￿ ￿B (e y(x)0:8;x)0:8 ￿
3 ￿ x ￿ y(x)0:5 + YB ￿ (20 ￿ 4 ￿ x + 2 ￿ y(x)0:5) ￿ ￿B (e y(x)0:8;x)0:8
which can be rewritten as
￿B (e y(x)0:5;x)0:5 ￿ 1
2￿YB and ￿B (e y(x)0:8;x)0:8 ￿ 1
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This implies ￿B (e y(x)0:5;x)0:5 ￿ ￿B (e y(x)0:8;x)0:8 which is a contradiction.
6. Agent A￿ s expected return from x, q ￿ y(x), is (weakly) smaller when
q = 0:5 than when q = 0:8.
Our ￿fth property states ￿B (e y(x)0:5;x)0:5 ￿ ￿B (e y(x)0:8;x)0:8. Due to correct initial
beliefs about strategies, this implies 4￿x￿2￿0:5￿y(x)0:5￿20 ￿ 4￿x￿2￿0:8￿y(x)0:8￿20
which is equivalent to 0:8 ￿ y(x)0:8 ￿ 0:5 ￿ y(x)0:5.
Existence of an SRE
So far, we have developed a couple of statements that hold in any SRE in which agent
B chooses a pure strategy y(x) 2 [0;3 ￿ x] for all x 2 f0;5;10;15;20g. In the following
we show that at least one such SRE exists for each of our treatments.
Lemma 1￿ : 8 x 2 f0;5;10;15;20g and q 2 (0;1) there exists an optimal pure
action for agent B, y(x) 2 [0;3 ￿ x], such that agent B￿ s initial beliefs about
agent A￿ s beliefs about agent B￿ s actions are all correct, i.e. y(x) = e y(x) for
all x 2 f0;5;10;15;20g.
Take an x 2 f0;5;10;15;20g. Then, agent B￿ s utility function is
UB (y(x);x; e y(x)) = 3￿x￿y(x)+YB ￿(20 ￿ 4 ￿ x + 2 ￿ y(x))￿(4￿x￿2￿q￿e y(x)￿20).
As x is ￿xed, we rewrite agent B￿ s utility function as UB (y(x);e y(x)). UB (y(x);e y(x))
is continuous in y(x) and e y(x), and UB (￿;e y(x)) is quasi-concave in e y(x). By choosing
a y(x) 2 G(e y(x)) = [0;3 ￿ x] agent B can maximize his utility. The correspon-
dence G(e y(x)) is constant and continuous in e y(x). Furthermore, for any e y(x)
G(e y(x)) is non-empty, compact and convex-valued. Consequently, we can apply
Berge￿ s Maximum Theorem and conclude that for any e y(x) 2 [0;3 ￿ x] there exists
at least one y(x) 2 [0;3 ￿ x] that maximizes UB(y(x);e y(x)) and the correspon-
dence Y ￿(e y(x)) : [0;3 ￿ x] ! [0;3 ￿ x] that maps e y(x) 2 [0;3 ￿ x] into the set of
y(x) 2 [0;3 ￿ x] which maximize UB(y(x);e y(x)) is non-empty, compact-valued, upper-
hemicontinuous, and convex-valued. It remains to show that Y ￿(e y(x)) has a ￿xed
point e y(x) 2 Y ￿(e y(x)), i.e. agent B￿ s initial beliefs about agent A￿ s beliefs about agentCan intentions spoil the kindness of a gift? 126
B￿ s actions for x are correct. We apply Kakutani￿ s Fixed Point Theorem and conclude
that at least one ￿xed point exists.
Proposition 1￿ : For any q 2 (0;1) there exists an SRE, in which agent B
chooses a pure strategy.
Due to Lemma 1￿ , it remains to show that given agent B￿ s pure optimal strategy
agent A has an optimal (possibly randomized) strategy a that is correctly expected by
initial beliefs, i.e. a = e a with e a as agent A￿ s initial second order belief on a.
Take any optimal pure strategy of agent B y(x) for all x 2 f0;5;10;15;20g which
is correctly expected by agent A. Then, agent A￿ s utility function is UA (a;y(￿);e a) =
￿A (a;y(￿)) + YA ￿ ￿A (a;y(￿)) ￿ ￿A (y(￿);e a). Let us de￿ne E (x) and e E (x) as the mean
of x resulting with strategy a and e a, respectively, and E (y (x)) and e E (y (x)) as the
mean of y (x) resulting with strategy a and e a, respectively. Then, ￿A (a;y(￿)) = 20 ￿
E (x)￿q￿E (y (x)), ￿A (a;y(￿)) = 3￿E (x)￿q￿E (y (x))￿(20 ￿ E (x) + q ￿ E (y (x))),
and ￿A (y(￿);e a) = 20 ￿ e E (x) + q ￿ e E (y (x)) ￿
￿
3 ￿ e E (x) ￿ q ￿ e E (y (x))
￿
. Hence,
UA (a;y(￿);e a) = 20 ￿ E (x) ￿ q ￿ E (y (x)) + YA ￿ (4 ￿ E (x) ￿ 2 ￿ q ￿ E (y (x)) ￿ 20) ￿
￿
20 ￿ 4 ￿ e E (x) + 2 ￿ q ￿ e E (y (x))
￿
. As y(￿) is ￿xed, we can rewrite agent A￿ s utility
function as UA (a;e a). UA (a;e a) is continuous in a and e a, UA (￿;e a) is quasi-concave,
and agent A￿ s set of possibly randomized strategies X is continuous in e a, non-empty,
compact, and convex-valued. Hence, we can apply Berge￿ s Maximum Theorem and
conclude that for any e a there exists a set of strategies X￿ (e a) out of which each
strategy is part of the set X and maximizes agent A￿ s utility given e a. Furthermore,
X￿ (e a) : X ! X is a non-empty, compact, convex-valued, and upper-hemicontinuous
correspondence. Consequently, we can apply Kakutani￿ s Fixed Point Theorem and
conclude that X￿ (e a) has at least one ￿xed point.Chapter 4
The curse of wealth and power in
an experimental jungle-game￿
4.1 Introduction
The jungle ￿as introduced by Piccione and Rubinstein (2007) ￿is an economy where
power relationships govern the involuntary exchange of assets. Contrary to the vol-
untary and mutually bene￿cial trade of goods in the textbook exchange economy,
individuals in the jungle can use their power to seize control of assets that are held by
weaker individuals. Examples for the jungle in real life are vertical hierarchies. In many
organizations hierarchical power often enables stronger individuals to exploit weaker
ones. For example, it is often the case that upper-level managers are authorized to
decide on the allocation of time of subordinated lower-level managers and employees to
certain tasks. This means that upper-level managers have the power to consume the
manpower of subordinates for their own interests and careers (see, for instance, Bowles
and Gintis, 1992).
An intuitive conjecture when thinking about the jungle would be that being more
powerful is always an advantage in the sense that more powerful individuals will never
end up less wealthy than less powerful ones. In fact, many organizations rely on (tour-
nament) promotions to upper hierarchies with more power as instruments to incentivize
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less powerful individuals. Piccione and Rubinstein (2004) have shown that this con-
jecture may be misleading, though. Their so-called "curse of wealth and power" states
that if the order of power is perfectly correlated with the order of initial wealth and
there are at least 3 agents, then there is always an agent (who is not the most powerful
one) that ￿nally ends up less wealthy than a less powerful agent. Hence, less power
may be a blessing in the jungle. The intuition is that initial wealth and power, which
enables an agent to seize the wealth of others, attracts attacks.
In this study we use the model of Piccione and Rubinstein (2004) for an experimen-
tal test of behavior in the jungle, i.e. in an economy where the involuntary exchange
of wealth is determined by a hierarchical structure of power relations. We focus our
attention on the following questions: (i) Do individuals exploit their hierarchical power
in order to seize the wealth of less powerful individuals, as predicted by Piccione and
Rubinstein (2004)? (ii) How frequently does the curse of wealth and power occur when
it is expected under standard assumptions of sel￿shness? (iii) Does the involuntary
exchange of assets create more inequality in ￿nal wealth compared to the distribution
of initial wealth in the jungle?
Our results show that experimental participants try to seize the wealth of less
powerful individuals more (instead of less) often than sel￿sh individuals are expected
to do under standard assumptions of rationality and payo⁄maximization. This pattern
of behavior is robust to the correlation of the order of power and of initial wealth, and
the costs of seizing another individual￿ s wealth. The curse of wealth and power occurs
almost always when it is predicted to occur (in the treatments with perfect correlation
of the order of power and of initial wealth), but it also occurs quite frequently when it
should not occur according to standard analysis (when the order of power and of initial
wealth are not perfectly correlated). We also ￿nd that the behavior of individuals in the
laboratory increases (rather than decreases) the inequality in ￿nal wealth in comparison
to the initial wealth distribution.
These results are unexpected since more powerful individuals do not hesitate to
exploit less powerful ones, even if that generates extremely unequal distributions of
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of social preferences, like fairness and inequality aversion. Recent surveys of Camerer
(2003) or Fehr and Schmidt (2006), for instance, report that a considerable fraction
of individuals care for a fair distribution of wealth in simple distributional games. In
the penultimate section of this chapter we show that our ￿ndings could be reconciled
with the presence of social preferences and that social preferences need not preclude
the curse of wealth and power in our setting, though.
A few earlier experimental papers have investigated behavior in the jungle, albeit
in a context that is di⁄erent from Piccione and Rubinstein (2004, 2007). Durham et al.
(1998) have examined the so-called paradox of power (Hirshleifer, 1991) which states
that in the course of a bilateral battle an initially poorer side will gain in relative
position in comparison with an initially richer side. In their experiment two parties
have to allocate their exogenously given resources between a productive and an ap-
propriative e⁄ort. The latter determines endogenously a party￿ s strength. A higher
investment in appropriation yields ceteris paribus a larger share of the common output
from the productive e⁄ort. Durham et al. (1998) have found that individuals do not
abstain from investing in appropriation. Furthermore, their results on the occurrence
of the paradox of power are broadly in line with the theoretical predictions. Similar
to Durham et al. (1998), Du⁄y and Kim (2005) or Powell and Wilson (2008) have
experimentally analyzed situations where parties can invest into productive, appro-
priative, or defensive activities. Du⁄y and Kim (2005) have observed parties engaging
in appropriative activities as predicted in the Nash equilibrium of an anarchy model.
Installing a dictator (i.e., the state) has led to Pareto superior outcomes. Powell and
Wilson (2008) have reported a high degree of ine¢ ciency in their Hobbesian jungle,
with parties being unwilling to sign (and keep) a constitutional contract that requests
all parties to abstain from appropriative activities. In line with our results, Durham
et al. (1998), Du⁄y and Kim (2005), and Powell and Wilson (2008) have found that
individuals do not shy away from seizing the wealth of others and behaving relatively
aggressively. However, in these three studies there is no clear order of power relations
and each agent can attack each other agent. In our experiment, in contrast, there is
a clear hierarchical structure and agents can only attack less powerful agents, i.e. an
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the jungle-
game and our treatments. The experimental results are presented in Section 4.3. In
Section 4.4 we discuss how the existence of social preferences might ￿t with our results.
Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 The jungle-game
4.2.1 General structure of the jungle-game
The jungle-game includes a set of N agents fA1;:::;ANg that are strictly ordered by
their power such that agent Ai is more powerful than agent Aj if i < j. Each agent
Ai is initially endowed with wealth wi according to a vector of initial endowments
W =(w1;:::;wN). All agents decide simultaneously whether they want to seize the
wealth of a less powerful agent. Each agent may ￿but need not ￿attack at most one
less powerful agent at positive costs c. If an agent Ak is attacked simultaneously by
two (or more) more powerful agents Ai and Aj, then only the most powerful agent Ai
(with i < j < k) acquires the wealth of agent Ak. Nevertheless, all attackers have
to bear the costs c. Note that acquiring the wealth of a less powerful agent may also
work indirectly through a chain of attacks. If agent Ai attacks agent Aj, and agent
Aj attacks agent Ak, then agent Ai receives the wealth of agents Aj and Ak, whereas
agent Aj loses his initial endowment and has to bear costs c.
4.2.2 Experimental treatments
We consider the simplest possible version of Piccione and Rubinstein￿ s (2004) jungle
that consists of a set of 3 agents fA1;A2;A3g with initial endowments W =(w1;w2;w3)
and costs of c. Our treatments di⁄er with respect how the order of power and of initial
wealth are correlated since this is crucial for the existence of the curse of wealth and
power. In treatments with WMon power and initial endowments are monotonically
related, while in treatments with WNonMon the relation between initial endowments
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treatments. Table 4.1 presents our four treatments.
Table 4.1: Treatments of the jungle-game
WMon = (320, 200, 80) WNonMon = (320, 80, 200)
c = 20 Mon20 NonMon20
c = 60 Mon60 NonMon60
4.2.3 Experimental procedure
In each session one treatment of the jungle-game was played for ￿ve rounds in a perfect
stranger matching, meaning that no participant interacted with any other participant
more than once. Participants were randomly assigned the role of agent A1, A2, or A3 at
the beginning of each round. After each round all individuals received feedback about
the actions in their group of three agents and their individual payo⁄s.
The experiment was conducted at the Max Planck Institute of Economics in Jena,
Germany, where individuals decided at visually separated computer terminals. A total
of 120 undergraduate students from the University of Jena participated in the comput-
erized experiment (using zTree by Fischbacher, 2007, for programming and ORSEE by
Greiner, 2004, for recruiting). No individual was allowed to participate in more than
one session. In each treatment we had 30 participants. Individuals had to answer con-
trol questions before the decision stages. At the end of the experiment all ￿ve rounds
were paid. The sessions were framed neutrally75 and lasted less than 45 minutes. In-
dividuals received 2.5 e for showing up on time, plus the amount of money earned in
the experiment (where 100 points of ￿nal wealth corresponded to 1 e).
4.2.4 Behavioral predictions
Treatments Mon20 and Mon60 have a unique Nash equilibrium where agent A1 attacks
agent A2, while agent A2 does not attack agent A3. This yields a ￿nal distribution of
75The experimental instructions for Mon20 are included in the appendix. The instructions for the
other treatments are as similar as possible.The curse of wealth and power in an experimental jungle-game 132
wealth W1 > W3 > W2, where Wi denotes the ￿nal wealth of agent Ai. Hence, the
curse of wealth and power is predicted to occur.
Treatments NonMon20 and NonMon60 have also a unique Nash equilibrium where
agent A1 attacks agent A3, while agent A2 does not attack agent A3. As a consequence,
the distribution of ￿nal wealth satis￿es W1 > W2 > W3, meaning that the order of
power and of ￿nal wealth are perfectly correlated and the curse of wealth and power
does not occur in equilibrium.
4.3 Experimental results
In Figure 4.1 we summarize the relative frequencies with which agents A1 and A2 attack
less powerful agents in each treatment.
In treatment Mon20 agents A1 attack the second wealthiest agent A2 in more than
95 % of cases, which is almost completely in line with our prediction. Only in 4 %
of cases agents A1 do not attack a less powerful agent. A noteworthy ￿nding is also
that nearly one fourth of agents A2 attack agent A3. When the costs of attacking are
higher, like in Mon60, the results are similar. In sum, the evidence from treatments
Mon20 and Mon60 suggests that agents behave in the jungle even more aggressively
than predicted under standard assumptions.
The curse of wealth and power occurs in 48 out of 50 groups (96 %) in Mon20,
respectively in 43 out of 50 groups (86 %) in Mon60. In 36 (33) groups the curse is
caused by equilibrium play in Mon20 (Mon60). Applying a Wilcoxon signed rank test,
we can con￿rm that in a group of 3 members agent A2￿ s ￿nal wealth is signi￿cantly
smaller than agent A3￿ s ￿nal wealth (in nearly each separate round: one-sided p <
0.05) in Mon20 as well as in Mon60.
Recall that in treatment NonMon20 and NonMon60 the relation between power
and initial endowments is non-monotonic, which changes the equilibrium prediction
in comparison to treatment Mon20 and Mon60. We observe an attack of agent A1
on agent A3 in 90 % of cases, both in NonMon20 and NonMon60. Contrary to the
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of agent A2 on agent A3. The latter happens in 10 % (18 %) of cases in NonMon20
(NonMon60), showing again, like in Mon20 and Mon60, that individuals behave more
aggressively in the jungle than predicted under standard assumptions.
The curse of wealth and power occurs in 10 % of cases both in NonMon20 and
NonMon60, although it shouldn￿ t occur in equilibrium. Overall, a Wilcoxon signed
rank test con￿rms that in a group of 3 members W2 > W3 (in nearly each separate
round: one-sided p < 0.05) in both treatments.
Across all treatments we observe a considerably larger degree of inequality in ￿nal
wealth in comparison to the distribution of initial endowments. Overall, agents A1
receive on average 86 % of the total ￿nal wealth, while their initial endowments amount
to only 53 % of the sum of initial endowments.
We summarize the ￿ndings of this section in the following: (i) On average, agents
attack other agents more often than predicted, (ii) the curse of wealth and power occurs
in 91 % of cases when the order of power is perfectly correlated with the order of initial
endowment (where the curse is predicted to occur), and still in 10 % of cases when the
order of power is not perfectly correlated with the order of initial endowment (where
the curse should not occur), (iii) the distribution of ￿nal wealth is more unequal than
the distribution of initial endowments.
4.4 Reconciling the results with the existence of
social preferences?
Our results have shown that individuals seize the assets of less powerful individuals
in the jungle, even if that increases the inequality in ￿nal wealth substantially. At
￿rst sight, these ￿ndings seem to be at odds with the abundant literature on the
importance of social preferences. In this section we would like to show that some
of our results can be reconciled with the existence of social preferences. Note that
this section is not intended to provide a test of social preference models, but rather
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seizing other individuals￿assets in the jungle.
We consider a model in which 60 % of individuals are sel￿sh and maximize their
own expected material payo⁄ and 40 % of individuals are inequity averse according
to the model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). We have chosen this model since it has
been found to explain the general patterns of human behavior in series of di⁄erent
games quite well and because it is comparatively simple. For the sake of simplicity we
assume that inequity averse individuals have a parameter of aversion to disadvantageous
inequity of 2 and a parameter of aversion to advantageous inequity of 0.6.76 Given these
assumptions, the behavior in the unique Bayesian Nash equilibria is the following.77
In Mon20 all types of agents A1 ￿the sel￿sh one and the inequity averse one ￿have
a strictly dominant action, namely the attack of agent A2. This is because the material
bene￿t from attacking agent A2 is larger than the utility loss from increasing inequity
by attacking agent A2. Anticipating agent A1￿ s attack, agent A2 does not attack agent
A3, irrespective of his type. In Mon60 only sel￿sh agents A1 have a strictly dominant
action, namely the attack of agent A2. As the costs of attacking are larger in Mon60,
inequity averse agents A1 are not willing to attack agent A2 if he does not attack agent
A3 (and accumulate more wealth). Anticipating that at least sel￿sh agents A1 attack
agent A2, neither type of agent A2 attacks agent A3. Consequently, inequity averse
agents A1 do not attack.
Hence, a simple model of social preferences can explain why so many agents A1
attack agent A2 in Mon20. However, this model cannot predict that so many agents
A1 attack agent A2 in Mon60, and that agent A2 attacks agent A3.
In NonMon20 the attack of nobody is strictly dominated by the attack of agent
A3 for both sel￿sh and inequity averse agents A1 because the material bene￿t from
an attack is larger than the utility loss from an increase in inequity of ￿nal wealth.
Anticipating agent A1 attacking either agent A2 or A3, neither type of agent A2 attacks
agent A3. Consequently, sel￿sh and inequity averse agents A1 attack agent A3. In
76In the notation of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) the sensitivity to disadvantageous inequity is captured
by the coe¢ cient ￿, and the sensitivity to advantageous inequity by ￿. The distribution of types with
respect to ￿ and ￿ is a simpli￿cation of the distribution presented in Fehr and Schmidt (1999). It has
also been used in the experimental studies of Fehr et al. (2007, 2008).
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NonMon60, in which the costs of attacking are higher, the attack of nobody is strictly
dominated by the attack of agent A3 for sel￿sh agents A1 only. Inequity averse agents
A1 are only willing to attack agent A2 if he attacks agent A3 (and accumulates more
wealth) with at least some strictly positive probability. In equilibrium of NonMon60
the sel￿sh agents A1 attack agent A2, while the inequity averse agents A1 attack agent
A2 only with a probability of 32
257 ￿ 0:12, but do not attack with probability 225
257 ￿ 0:88.
As a consequence, the sel￿sh types of agent A2 attack agent A3, and the inequity averse
agents A2 attack agent A3 with probability 1
2.
This model of social preferences can explain why agents A1 attack agent A3 in
NonMon20 and why agents A2 attack agent A3 in NonMon60. However, it does not
explain why agents A2 attack agent A3 in NonMon20 and why agents A1 attack agent
A3 in NonMon60.
In sum, a simple model of social preferences is compatible with several features of
observed behavior that seems to be unsocial. From this it should be clear that social
preferences may not necessarily make life in the jungle peaceful. Why? In this simple
model of social preferences there is still a fraction of individuals that are sel￿sh. These
individuals are not disciplined by the presence of inequity averse individuals to behave
less aggressively or sel￿shly, as it might be the case e.g. in multistage games in which
punishment of sel￿sh behavior is possible. In NonMon60 sel￿sh agents A2 are predicted
to behave even more aggressively than in the self-interest model. Furthermore, inequity
averse individuals themselves often do not abstain from attacking others. This is
because in the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) the payo⁄ inequity in comparison
to each matched agent is weighted with 1
N￿1, with N as the number of agents in the
jungle. A successful attack increases the payo⁄inequity in comparison to the attacked
agent to a large extent, but it only slightly increases (or even decreases) the payo⁄
inequity in comparison to the other (not attacked) agent. Hence, the material bene￿t
from an attack (weakly) exceeds its generated utility loss from increased inequity for
inequity averse agents A1 in Mon20, NonMon20, and NonMon60, and for inequity
averse agents A2 in NonMon60.
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observed behavior unexplained. This might be driven by agents having incorrect beliefs
about other agents￿actions. It might also be the case that social preferences play at best
a minor role in the jungle when power relationships ￿rather than mutually bene￿cial
and voluntary trade ￿determine the exchange of assets.
4.5 Conclusion
Motivated by the thought-provoking work of Piccione and Rubinstein (2004, 2007)
we have introduced an experimental jungle-game to test human behavior in situations
where power relationships govern the involuntary exchange of wealth. In the jungle-
game more powerful agents have been able to attack less powerful ones in order to
seize their wealth. With our four simple versions of this game we have shown that
individuals in the jungle behave largely as predicted from the standard analysis of
Piccione and Rubinstein (2004). If anything di⁄ered, they are even more aggressively
attacking others than expected. As a consequence of this kind of behavior, the resulting
distribution of ￿nal wealth is very unequal. As predicted for the case of a perfect
correlation of the order of power and of initial endowments, the curse of wealth and
power occurs almost always, and it even occurs when the order of power and of initial
endowment are not perfectly correlated, in which case the curse should not appear,
though. The results observed are remarkably close to the predictions derived from the
model introduced by Piccione and Rubinstein (2004). Of course, our results do not
necessarily imply that agents in the jungle do not have social preferences. Our ￿ndings
and a simple model with social preferences indicate that social preferences ￿if existent
￿may not prevent an overwhelming majority of agents from seizing the assets of less
powerful agents.
We would like to conclude with some possible implications of our experimental
study. Hierarchically structured organizations in which the exchange of resources is
determined by power relations are part of our daily life. Our results suggest that (i)
individuals often use their power to seize the assets of less powerful agents and increase
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of such behavior. Both aspects of our results may have undesirable consequences
for organizations. The exploitation of weaker individuals by more powerful individuals
could decrease the incentives of weaker individuals to invest ex ante, e.g. in ￿rm-speci￿c
knowledge. It may even support notions of shirking when less powerful individuals
expect their work to be exploited to the bene￿t of superiors. In addition to this
disincentive e⁄ect, which works irrespective of how the order of power and of initial
wealth are correlated, the curse of wealth and power may add another disincentive e⁄ect
because many organizations rely on (tournament) promotions to upper hierarchies
with more power as an instrument to incentivize less powerful individuals. Lower-level
managers, for example, are not incentivized by promotion prospects when middle-
level managers end up worse. Hence, alarm bells should be ringing in organizations if
employees compare working conditions to life in the jungle.
4.6 Appendix
4.6.1 Experimental instructions of treatment Mon20
Welcome to the experiment!
In the following you ￿nd the rules for this experiment. At the end of this experiment
you will receive 2.50 e for showing up on time plus the amount that you can earn in
this experiment.
Number of rounds and group size
This experiment consists of 5 rounds that proceed according to the same scheme. In
each round groups of 3 members are formed. The composition of a group changes
each round such that you are matched with each person of this room at most once.
This means that you are not matched with a person of this room more than once.
Within a group each member in each round is randomly assigned a number. I.e.
you are either member 1, member 2, or member 3. This number can change in each
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A member with a higher number will be called inferior in the following, whereas a
member with a lower number will be referred to as a superior member.
Endowment of each member
Each member receives an endowment.
Member 1 receives an endowment of 320 points.
Member 2 receives an endowment of 200 points.
Member 3 receives an endowment of 80 points.
Your decision ￿Whether or not to form a direct link
Your only decision in this experiment is whether or not you want to form a direct link
to another member of your group, and ￿if so ￿to which member. All group members
have to decide simultaneously whether to form a direct link or not, and ￿if so ￿to
which member.
Rules for forming a direct link
Each member can only form one direct link, and it is only possible to form a direct
link to an inferior member (i.e. one with a higher member number).
More precisely, member 1 can form a direct link either to member 2 or to member
3. Member 2 can only form a link to member 3. And member 3 cannot form any link.
Please note the following with respect to the formation of direct links. If two
members form a direct link to the same other member, then only the link of the superior
member will be successfully established, whereas the link of the inferior member will
be cancelled.
An example: If both member 1 and member 2 directly link to member 3, then only
member 1 has a direct link to member 3, but member 2 does not.
Costs of forming a direct link
The costs of forming a direct link are 20 points. Note that these costs have to be borne
whenever you decide to form a direct link, be it successful or cancelled later on. (ThatThe curse of wealth and power in an experimental jungle-game 140
means that in the above example both member 1 and member 2 would have to bear
costs of 20 points each.)
Indirect links
Through the formation of a direct link you may also form an indirect link. That
means that if you form successfully a link to an inferior member, then you form an
indirect link to that member to whom the inferior member has formed a direct link.
Another example: If member 1 directly links to member 2, and member 2 directly
links to member 3, then member 1 has a direct link to member 2 plus an indirect link
to member 3.
Note that an indirect link of a superior member dominates a direct link of an
inferior member. "Domination" means that the link of the inferior member is not valid
any longer for the inferior member himself. That means that in the example just given
it is member 1 who has established links to both member 2 and member 3, but that
member 2 himself does not have a direct link to member 3 any longer (even though
member 2 has to bear the costs of forming a direct link).
Further note that the formation of an indirect link does not have any costs.
Chains of links (= sum of direct and indirect links)
Establishing direct and indirect links creates chains of links. A chain starts with
the member to whom no superior member has established a link. Then, the direct link
of this member and its indirect links follow.
It is possible that a member has an empty chain of links. This is the case if a
superior member has established a link to this member.
It is possible that a member has a chain of links that consists of his own member
number only. This is the case if (1) no superior member has established a link to this
member, and if (2) either this member has not established a direct link or the direct
link of this member is not valid due to the indirect link of a superior member.
Examples for chains of links: The following table presents some examples (NotThe curse of wealth and power in an experimental jungle-game 141
all possible chains of links are listed.).
Your earnings of a round and the chain of links
Your earnings of a round is the sum of the endowments of all those members
who are in your chain of links.
If a member formed a direct link (was it successful or cancelled later on), then
the costs of forming a direct link (= 20 points) are deducted of the chain￿ s sum of
endowments.
Note that only the ￿rst member of a chain of links receives the endowments of all
members of the chain. The other members of this link do no receive anything, but
eventually have to bear costs of forming a direct link.
At the end of the experiment 100 points earned will be worth 1 Euro (= 100
Euro-cents).
4.6.2 Derivation of the Nash equilibria in our treatments
Independent of whether c = 20 or c = 60 and whether W =(w1;w2;w3) is monotoni-
cally decreasing or not, the best response correspondences of agents A1 and A2 (on the
other player￿ s pure strategies) are single-valued.78 In the following we illustrate for our
four treatments the two-dimensional decision matrices and their Nash equilibria char-
acterized by the (unique) intersection of both player￿ s best response correspondences.79
78Agent A3 ￿the least powerful agent - is not considered as an active player since his strategy set
is a singleton.
79In the treatments with the monotonically decreasing endowment vector the Nash equilibrium
strategy of agent A1 is a strictly dominant strategy. In the treatments with the not monotonically
decreasing endowment vector the Nash equilibrium equals the unique strategy combination that follows
from the iterated elimination of strictly dominated actions. Hence, in all of our four treatments the
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4.6.3 Derivation of the Bayesian Nash equilibria in our treat-
ments when agents are heterogeneous with respect to
their utility function
We assume that 60 % of individuals are sel￿sh and 40 % are inequity averse according
to the model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Furthermore, we assume for inequity averse
individuals that ￿ = 2, the parameter of aversion to disadvantageous inequality, and
￿ = 0:6, the parameter of aversion of advantageous inequality. In our model each
individual knows his own preferences but not the preferences of his matched individuals.
However, each individual believes that each of the other individuals in his group is
sel￿sh with probability 0.6 and inequity averse with probability 0.4.
Mon20
An agent￿ s strategy in this context speci￿es an action for each type of an agent. The
sel￿sh agent A1 has a strictly dominant action, namely an attack of agent A2. For the
inequity averse agent A1 it is also a strictly dominant action to attack agent A2. This
is due to the following two inequalities that hold for ￿ = 0:6 and any p 2 [0;1], the
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Hence, in any Bayesian Nash equilibrium all types of agent A1 attack agent A2.
Given agent A1 attacks agent A2 with probability 1, the sel￿sh agent A2 attacks
nobody and the inequity averse agent A2 also attacks nobody. The latter is true since
0 ￿ ￿
2 ￿ (500) ￿ ￿
2 ￿ (80) > ￿20 ￿ ￿
2 ￿ (580 + 20) ￿ ￿
2 ￿ (20)
is satis￿ed for ￿ = 2. Therefore, in the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium all types of
agent A1 attack agent A2 and all types of agent A2 attack nobody.
Mon60
For a sel￿sh agent A1 it is a strictly dominant action to attack agent A2. The inequity
averse agent A1 does not have a strictly dominant action.80 However, the inequity
averse agent A1￿ s action to attack agent A3 is strictly dominated by the action to
attack nobody. This is because the following inequality holds for ￿ = 0:6 and any
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Hence, in any Bayesian Nash equilibrium all types of agent A1 do not attack agent A3.
80If agent A2 attacks nobody with probability 1, the inequity averse agent A1 prefers to attack
nobody. If agent A2 attacks agent A3 with probability 1, the inequity averse agent A1 prefers attacking
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Given agent A1 attacks agent A2 with a probability that is at least equal to 0.6,
the sel￿sh agent A2 prefers to attack nobody since
s ￿ 0 + (1 ￿ s) ￿ 200 > s ￿ (￿60) + (1 ￿ s) ￿ 220
for s 2 [0:6;1], where s represents the probability that agent A1 attacks agent A2 and
1￿s the probability that agent A1 attacks nobody. Similarly, the inequity averse agent
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for s 2 [0:6;1]. Hence, in any Bayesian Nash equilibrium all types of agent A2 attack
nobody.
Given agent A2 attacks nobody with probability 1, the inequity averse agent A1
attacks nobody since for ￿ = 0:6
320 ￿
￿
2 ￿ (320 ￿ 200) ￿
￿
2 ￿ (320 ￿ 80) > 460 ￿
￿
2 ￿ (460 ￿ 0) ￿
￿
2 ￿ (460 ￿ 80):
Therefore, in the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium the sel￿sh agent A1 attacks agent
A2, the inequity averse agent A1 attacks nobody, and all types of agent A2 attack
nobody.
NonMon20
The sel￿sh agent A1￿ s action to attack nobody is strictly dominated by the action to
attack agent A3. Similarly, the inequity averse agent A1￿ s action to attack nobody
is strictly dominated by the action to attack agent A3. This is because the following
inequality holds for ￿ = 0:6 and any p 2 [0;1], the probability that agent A2 attacks
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Hence, in any Bayesian Nash equilibrium all types of agent A1 do not abstain from an
attack.
Given that agent A1 attacks either agent A2 or agent A3, the sel￿sh agent A2 attacks
nobody. Similarly, the inequity averse agent A2 attacks nobody since for ￿ = 2 and
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￿
2 ￿ (60 ￿ 0)
￿
for s 2 [0;1], where x represents the probability that agent A1 attacks agent A2 and
1 ￿ s the probability that agent A1 attacks agent A3. Hence, in any Bayesian Nash
equilibrium all types of agent A2 do not attack anybody.
Given agent A2 attacks nobody with probability 1, a sel￿sh agent A1 attacks agent




2 ￿ (500 ￿ 80) ￿
￿
2 ￿ (500 ￿ 0) > 380 ￿
￿
2 ￿ (380 ￿ 0) ￿
￿
2 ￿ (380 ￿ 200):
Therefore, in the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium all types of agent A1 attack agent
A3 and all types of agent A2 attack nobody.
NonMon60
A sel￿sh agent A1￿ s action to attack nobody is strictly dominated by the action to
attack agent A3. An inequity averse agent A1￿ s action to attack agent A3 is strictly
dominated by the action to attack nobody since for ￿ = 0:6 and any p 2 [0;1], the
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The following weak inequality holds if and only if p ￿ 0:4:
p ￿ 340 + (1 ￿ p) ￿ 540 ￿ 460.
Hence, if p < 0:4, a sel￿sh agent A1 strictly prefers to attack agent A2, if p > 0:4, a
sel￿sh agent A1 strictly prefers to attack agent A3, and if p = 0:4, a sel￿sh agent A1 is
indi⁄erent between attacking agent A2 and agent A3.
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￿
Hence, if p > 0:2, an inequity averse agent A1 strictly prefers to attack nobody, if
p < 0:2, an inequity averse agent A1 strictly prefers to attack agent A2, and if p = 0:2,
an inequity averse agent A1 is indi⁄erent between attacking nobody and agent A2.
The following weak inequality holds if and only if k ￿ 0:3, the probability that
agent A1 attacks nobody:
k ￿ 80 + s ￿ 0 + (1 ￿ k ￿ s) ￿ 80 ￿ k ￿ 220 + s ￿ (￿60) + (1 ￿ k ￿ s) ￿ 20,
where s represents the probability that agent A1 attacks A2. Hence, if k < 0:3, the
sel￿sh agent A2 strictly prefers to attack nobody, if k > 0:3, the sel￿sh agent A2 strictly
prefers to attack agent A3, and if k = 0:3, the sel￿sh agent A2 is indi⁄erent between
attacking nobody and agent A3.
For ￿ = 2 and ￿ = 0:6 the following weak inequality holds if and only if k ￿ 102+78￿s
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Hence, if k < 102+78￿s
436 , the inequity averse agent A2 strictly prefers to attack nobody,
if k > 102+78￿s
436 , the inequity averse agent A2 strictly prefers to attack agent A3, and if
k = 102+78￿s
436 , the inequity averse agent A2 is indi⁄erent between attacking nobody and
agent A3.
Assume p 2 [0;0:2). Then, a sel￿sh agent A1 prefers to attack agent A2, and an
inequity averse agent A1 also prefers to attack agent A2. Hence, k = 0 and s = 1.
Consequently, all types of agent A2 prefer to attack nobody, which means that p = 1.
This is a contradiction. Therefore, in any Bayesian Nash equilibrium p = 2 [0;0:2).
Assume p = 0:2. Then, a sel￿sh agent A1 prefers to attack agent A2, and an inequity
averse agent A1 is indi⁄erent between attacking agent A2 and nobody. Consider the
inequity averse agent A1 to attack nobody with probability n and to attack agent A2






all types of agent A2 prefer to attack nobody and p = 1. This is a contradiction.
If n = 3
4, the sel￿sh agent A2 is indi⁄erent between attacking nobody and agent A3,
and the inequity averse agent A2 prefers to attack nobody. Hence, p 2 [0:4;1]. This






, the sel￿sh agent A2 prefers to attack agent A3,
and the inequity averse agent A2 prefers to attack nobody. Hence, p = 0:4. This
is a contradiction. If n = 225
257, the sel￿sh agent A2 prefers to attack agent A3, and
the inequity averse agent A2 is indi⁄erent between attacking nobody and agent A3.
Consider the inequity averse agent A2 attacking nobody with probability l and agent
A3 with probability 1 ￿ l. Hence, p = 0:4 ￿ l. If and only if l = 0:5, this is not a





, all types of agent A2 prefer to attack agent A3. Hence,
p = 0. This is a contradiction.
Assume p 2 (0:2;0:4). Then, a sel￿sh agent A1 prefers to attack agent A2, and
an inequity averse agent A1 prefers to attack nobody. Hence, k = 0:4 and s = 0:6.
Consequently, all types of agent A2 prefer to attack agent A3 and p = 0. This is a
contradiction. Therefore, in any Bayesian Nash equilibrium p = 2 (0:2;0:4).The curse of wealth and power in an experimental jungle-game 148
Assume p = 0:4. Then, a sel￿sh agent A1 is indi⁄erent between attacking agent A2
and agent A3, and an inequity averse agent A1 prefers to attack nobody. Consider the
sel￿sh agent A1 to attack agent A2 with probability n and agent A3 with probability
1 ￿ n. Hence, k = 0:4 and s = 0:6 ￿ n. Consequently, all types of agent A2 prefer to
attack agent A3 and it follows that p = 0. This is a contradiction. Therefore, in any
Bayesian Nash equilibrium p 6= 0:4.
Assume p 2 (0:4;1]. Then, a sel￿sh agent A1 prefers to attack agent A3, and
an inequity averse agent A1 prefers to attack nobody. Hence, k = 0:4 and s = 0.
Consequently, all types of agent A2 prefer to attack agent A3 and it follows that p = 0.
This is a contradiction. Therefore, in any Bayesian Nash equilibrium p = 2 (0:4;1].
Therefore, in the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium a sel￿sh agent A1 attacks agent
A2, an inequity averse agent A1 attacks nobody with probability 225
257 and agent A2 with
probability 1 ￿ 225
257, a sel￿sh agent A2 attacks agent A3, and an inequity averse agent
A2 attacks nobody with probability 0.5 and agent A3 with probability 0.5.Bibliography
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